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ABSTRACT
GROUP KEY MANAGEMENT IN WIRELESS AD-HOC AND SENSOR
NETWORKS
Mohammed A. Moharrum 
Old Dominion University, 2006 
Director: Dr. Ravi Mukkamala
A growing number o f secure group applications in both civilian and military 
domains is being deployed in WAHNs. A Wireless Ad-hoc Network (WAHN) is a 
collection o f autonomous nodes or terminals that communicate with each other by 
forming a multi-hop radio network and maintaining connectivity in a decentralized 
manner. A  Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) is a special type o f  WAHN with mobile 
users. MANET nodes have limited communication, computational capabilities, and 
power. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are sensor networks with massive numbers o f  
small, inexpensive devices pervasive throughout electrical and mechanical systems and 
ubiquitous throughout the environment that monitor and control most aspects o f our 
physical world.
In a WAHNs and WSNs with un-trusted nodes, nodes may falsify information, 
collude to disclose system keys, or even passively refuse to collaborate. Moreover, 
mobile adversaries might invade more than one node and try to reveal all system secret 
keys. Due to these special characteristics, key management is essential in securing such 
networks. Current protocols for secure group communications used in fixed networks 
tend to be inappropriate. The main objective o f  this research is to propose, design and 
evaluate a suitable key management approach for secure group communications to 
support WAHNs and WSNs applications.
Key management is usually divided into key analysis, key assignment, key generation 
and key distribution. In this thesis, we tried to introduce key management schemes to 
provide secure group communications in both WAHNs and WSNs.
Starting with WAHNs, we developed a key management scheme. A novel architecture 
for secure group communications was proposed. Our proposed scheme handles key dis
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
tribution through Combinatorial Key Distribution Scheme (CKDS). We followed with 
key generation using Threshold-based Key Generation in WAHNs (TKGS). For key 
assignment, we proposed Combinatorial Key Assignment Scheme (CKAS), which 
assigns closer key strings to co-located nodes. We claim that our architecture can readily 
be populated with components to support objectives such as fault tolerance, full- 
distribution and scalability to mitigate WAHNs constraints. In our architecture, group 
management is integrated with multicast at the application layer.
For key management in WSNs, we started with DCK, a modified scheme suitable 
for WSNs. In summary, the DCK achieves the following: 1) cluster leader nodes carry 
the major part o f  the key management overhead; (2) DCK consumes less than 50% o f the 
energy consumed by SHELL in key management; (3) localizing key refreshment and 
handling node capture enhances the security by minimizing the amount o f information 
known by each node about other portions o f the network; and (4) since DCK does not 
involve the use o f  other clusters to maintain local cluster data, it scales better from a 
storage point o f  view with the network size represented by the number o f  clusters.
We went further and proposed the use o f key polynomials with DCK to enhance 
the resilience o f  multiple node capturing. Comparing our schemes to static and dynamic 
key management, our scheme was found to enhance network resilience at a smaller 
polynomial degree t and accordingly with less storage per node.
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
A wireless ad-hoc network (WAHN) is a collection o f  autonomous nodes or 
terminals that communicate with each other by forming a multi-hop radio network and 
maintaining connectivity in a decentralized manner. Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (WAHNs) 
are special type o f WAHNs with mobile users. The unique characteristics o f WAHNs1, 
including limited power, communication and computation capabilities, have introduced 
many research challenges. One major characteristic is the absence o f any type o f fixed 
communication infrastructure support as well as the very limited resources o f nodes. 
Researchers trying to implement well-defined services from other networking domains 
cannot just automatically transfer such schemes. Due to these characteristics, WAHNs or 
WAHNs call for distributed collaborative schemes to perform different network 
functionalities. On the other hand, i f  those nodes are smaller in size and computation 
capabilities, they are known as Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs).
In an ad-hoc network, secure communication is essential to different types o f  
applications. The simplest case is secure communications between two nodes (1-to-l). 
Several researchers have proposed solutions for this type o f applications [132], Other 
applications, such as mobile advertisement or secure broadcast o f commands in military 
tactical operations, might require a single sender to deliver messages to multiple receivers 
(.1-to-M'). Furthermore, applications such as mobile auctioning or collaboration o f  
military units in tactical operations, and distributed virtual environments (DVEs), require 
secure group communications (M-to-M ). In addition to two types o f group applications, 
other non-group applications, such as fusing sensor readings to report a phenomenon, 
secure routing and exchange o f  network status information, might also require secure 
team collaboration. Such WAHNs applications might take good advantage o f an 
underlying secure group communication service.
The formatting in this thesis follows the IEEE Transaction in Software Engineering guidelines.
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2Providing efficient and secure group communication services in WAHNs environments, 
however, encounters many challenges. Typically, nodes in WAHNs have limited storage 
and communications resources. In addition to these bottlenecks, the lack o f any 
networking infrastructure, the transient nature o f connections, and the overhead 
introduced by implementing security, further exacerbate the problem [5]. This thesis 
addresses some o f  the challenges o f providing secure and efficient group communication 
services in wireless ad-hoc network environments with medium (hundreds) to large 
(thousands) number o f  un-trusted nodes.
In military tactical operations, fast and secure communications need to be established 
between different units deployed in an unknown hostile territory. Those units may 
include different type o f vehicles or individual military personnel as well as small 
aircraft. Such units may move along unplanned paths and routes due to unexpected 
circumstances. Moreover, no networking infrastructure or fixed support o f  any can be 
assumed. Thus, those units need to communicate securely and in an autonomous fashion. 
Since ad-hoc networks technology was initially developed with military applications in 
mind [84], the above situation is a typical military application o f MANETs, with secure 
group communication requirements In addition to the above, it is natural to assume that 
some units might be compromised, captured or failed. Such nodes should not affect the 
communications and collaboration o f other nodes. Fig. 1 depicts such an application. 
The operation involves multiple vehicles and three aircrafts. Not all units can reach each 
other directly. However, a path can be provided through hop-by-hop routing. Some 
enemy aircrafts might be listening to the communications. They should not be able to 
interpret. At the same time, one vehicle, shown in the picture, was captured and 
compromised. This vehicle is trying to mislead other units. Another vehicle lost power 
source and was abandoned. A robust secure group communications protocol for 
MANETs is required to survive such hostile circumstances.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3Current M-Commerce applications depend on cellular communications infrastructure 
support. Although cellular networks cover global areas, most M-commerce applications 














Fig. 1. A Small Military tactical Operation in Unknown Territoiy.
cellular networks might be replaced with set o f  autonomous self-organizing MANET- 
based devices. From an economical point o f view, efficient MANET devices provide a
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4cost effective alternative for localized mobile applications. One reason is that a third 
party is not involved and does not charge transaction fees. Another reason is that no 
expensive mobile support stations are needed. This alternative support should be 
integrated with the original fixed support in a seamless way that is transparent to users. 
Consider applying this alternative to an existing M-Commerce application such as a 
mobile auctioning system. In mobile auctioning, both parties, sellers and bidders, can be 
mobile. They use their cellular phones for performing transactions such bidding or 
advertising. A cellular network provider facilitates such transaction through its cellular 
coverage. Replacing this with MANET-based system, we get the situation in Fig. 2, 
where sellers and bidders are in mobile vehicles on a highway. Some other fixed stations 
might exist on the highway. However, those stations are not part o f  the system. For 
instance, some individuals living close to the highway may casually subscribe to the 
service i f  they are interested. In such a case, a seller auctions his item using a MANET- 
device (such as a laptop) on his vehicle. Mobile subscribers may receive such information 
and can even place bids. Other mobile vehicles may not receive, or be able to interpret, 
such messages. However, they may voluntarily provide routing points through their 
vehicles as part o f  the ad-hoc networking infrastructure. As some vehicles move away, 
they might not be interested in the service anymore. At the same time, other vehicles may 
approach the area and join the service. This should not interfere with the service to other 
subscribers. Since moving vehicles represent a consciously dynamic routing topology, 
this is a typical MANET application. Since security is essential to M-Commerce 
transactions, the above application calls for secure group communication service in a 
mobile ad-hoc network.
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Fig. 2. Structure o f  a Typical Sensor Networks.
Fig. 2 shows the structure o f a sensor network.
The main difference between WAHNs and WSNs are
* Number o f nodes: in WSNs they are orders o f magnitude larger than WAHNs,
■ Reliability: Sensors are more prone to failure,
■ Topology: more dynamic in WSNs due to sleep-awake cycle,
■ Communication: broadband in WSNs while a point-to-point in WAHNs,
■ Resources: the power, computation and communications are lower in WSNs 
than WAHNs,
■ Sink: different from WAHNs, a long-range radio connecting WSNs to the 
outside world.
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6However, in both networks, secure communication is essential to different type of 
applications. The simplest case is secure communications between two nodes (1-to-l). 
Several researchers have proposed solutions for this type o f applications [132]. Other 
applications, such as mobile advertisement or secure broadcast o f commands in military 
tactical operations, might require a single sender to deliver messages to multiple receivers 
(1-to-M). .
1.1. OVERVIEW
Providing efficient and secure group communication services in WAHNs and 
WSNs environments, however, encounters many challenges. Typically, nodes in 
WAHNs have limited storage. The computational and communications resources are 
under limited in WSNs than in WAHNs. In addition to these bottlenecks, the lack o f any 
networking infrastructure, the transient nature o f connections, and the overhead 
introduced by implementing security, further exacerbate the problem. [5]. This thesis 
addresses some o f the challenges o f  providing secure and efficient group communication 
services in wireless ad-hoc network environments with medium (hundreds) to large 
(thousands) number o f un-trusted nodes. It also addresses WSNs with even a larger size.
A growing number o f secure group applications are expected to be delivered in WAHNs 
and WSNs environments for their applicability in civilian and militaiy domains. The two 
major requirements for supporting such applications are group communications and 
secure group management. Currently, group communications is supported through 
network level multicast routing protocols (e.g. MAODV, OMRP,.., etc). Such protocols 
provide basic session management in addition to multicast data delivery. However, a 
considerable amount o f group state information is stored at individual nodes. Moreover, 
such protocols do not provide any type o f group security.
In wire-line networks, secure group management have been investigated thoroughly and 
many good protocols have been proposed. Since such protocols do not take in 
consideration the special characteristics o f WAHNs and WSNs. They are not 
automatically applicable to WAHN group applications. At the same time, current group 
applications based on network-level multicast support tend to redundantly perform some 
group management tasks at both application and network layer.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71.2. CONTRIBUTIONS
In this thesis, we propose a new framework for secure group applications in 
WAHNs and WSNs. In our model for WAHNs, we assume an internal threat from 
autonomous un-trusted nodes that might falsify information, collude to reveal secret keys, 
or simply choose not to collaborate. Our external threat includes mobile adversaries that 
can compromise a number o f nodes as well. We use Application-Level Multicast (ALM) 
as the means o f group communications rather than network-level multicast routing 
protocol. We propose a new overlay architecture that provides an abstraction for the 
underlying network dynamic topology.
Among the several modules o f the proposed architecture, group management is especially 
sensitive to the characteristics o f the underlying infrastructure. While several key 
management protocols such as Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP) [49]), Logical 
Key Hierarchy (LKH) [22], and One-way Function Chain Tree (OFCT) [12] have been 
proposed in literature, we find that they are not directly applicable to WAHN 
environments. Other researchers adopted some key agreement protocols from distributed 
peer systems to WAHNs, e.g. [119]. However, most of these protocols depend on 
variations of Diffie-Hellman protocol, which might require both reliable communications 
as well as significant computations. Here, we propose and integrate schemes for different 
group management components (e.g., key generation, key assignment, and key 
distribution). Our proposed scheme handles key distribution through Combinatorial Key 
Distribution Scheme (CKDS). We followed with key generation using Threshold-based 
Key Generation in WAHNs (TKGS). For key assignment, we proposed Combinatorial 
Key Assignment Scheme (CKAS), witch assigns closer key strings to co-located nodes. 
We show that our architecture can readily be populated with components to support 
objectives such as fault tolerance, full-distribution and scalability to mitigate WAHNs 
constraints. In our architecture, group management is integrated with multicast at the 
application layer. We also show how each component supports security, fault-tolerance, 
and efficiency.
Considering WSNs, we propose a similar solution through an efficient EBS-base key 
management scheme. Our proposed scheme was shown to overcome several problems in 
other schemes such as ( 1 ) cluster leader nodes carry the major part of the key
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8management overhead; (2) Consuming less than 50% o f the energy consumed by other 
schemes in key management; (3) localizing key refreshment and handling node capture 
enhances the security by minimizing the amount o f  information known by each node 
about other portions o f the network; (4) Using key polynomials enhance network 
resilience at a smaller polynomial degree 1 and accordingly with less storage per node.
1.3. OUTLINE
The remaining part o f this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we describe 
the necessary background material, including group communications in WAHNs and 
WSNs, Key management schemes for both, and the need for improvement. In Chapter 3, 
we describe the proposed solutions for key management in WAHNs. In Chapter 4, we 
show the simulation results comparing our solution to existing ones. In Chapter 5, we 
describe our proposed key management scheme for WSNs. In Chapter 6 , we show the 
simulation results comparing our scheme to existing ones in WSNs. In Chapter 7, we 
conclude by summarizing our contribution as well as presenting ideas for future research.
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CHAPTER II 
BACK GROUND AND RELATED WORK
A Wireless Ad-Hoc Network (WAHN) is a collection o f  autonomous nodes or 
terminals that communicate with each other by forming a multi-hop radio network and 
maintaining connectivity in a decentralized manner. Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (WAHNs) 
are special type o f  WAHN with mobile users [89]. The unique characteristics o f  
WAHNs, such as limited power, communication and computation capabilities, have 
introduced many research challenges. One major challenge is preserving the efficient and 
secure communications in the absence of any type o f fixed communication infrastructure 
support as well as the very limited resources o f nodes. Researchers trying to implement 
well-defined services from other networking domains cannot just automatically transfer 
such schemes.
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) usually use micro-sensor technology with no 
fabrication-time identity as well as low-power signal processing and computations to 
reduce the size as well as extending the life with bob-renewable energy source.
Due to the critical applications o f both types o f networks in both military and civilian 
arenas, security is a major concern [15]. Confidentiality, authenticity, availability and 
integrity are the major security objectives. WAHNs are subject to different types o f  
attacks from a variety o f attackers that target one or more o f these security goals. Attacks 
may be external varying from traffic jamming to compromising nodes, or internal such as 
collusion.
Secure communication among WAHNs and WSNs nodes is an essential requirement 
mandated by many applications and lack o f which might highly restrict the applicability 
o f such networks. There are several solutions to the secure communication problem 
depending on the communication model. Some solutions assume a peer-to-peer 
communication model and thus construct (or pre-distribute) pair-wise keys. Other 
solutions assume a group communication model in which a single source multicasts 
message to numerous destinations. In such a case, group keys are established.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The main objectives o f this chapter are to discuss some security aspects in WAHNs and 
WSNs and some existing solutions and protocols for secure group communication. This 
will lead to the need of new key management solutions for both types o f networks which 
is the main contribution o f this thesis.
The structure o f this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 discusses architectures, 
components and characteristics o f both WAHNs and WSNs. Section 2.2 discusses 
security objectives, threats and attacks in WAHNs and WSN’s. Section 2.3 discusses 
secure communication schemes and key management protocols in WAHNs and WSNs. 
In section 2.4, we briefly describe existing group key management protocols in WAHNs. 
In section 2.5, we briefly describe existing group key management protocols in WSNs. 
In section 2.6, we briefly describe Exclusion-Basis Systems (EBS) as the theoretical 
foundation o f our proposed solutions. Finally, in section 2.7 we summarize the existing 
solutions and establish the need for new solutions.
2.1. WIRELESS AD-HOC NETWORKS AND WIRELESS SENSOR 
NETWORKS ARCHITECTURES
WAHNs and MANETs are the new generation o f wireless devices. They are 
receiving much attention from academia, industry, and government. Although they have 
many applications in civilian and military arenas, certain specific characteristics appear to 
be very challenging in designing solutions to such networks [5]. In the first sub-section, 
we briefly introduce the reader to Wireless Ad-hoc Networks architecture. In the second 
sub-section, we discuss the Wireless Sensor Networks architecture.
2.1.1. THE WAHN ARCHITECTURE
2.1.1.1. WAHN COMPONENTS (NODES)
A wireless ad-hoc network is a collection o f autonomous nodes or terminals. Each 
node in a wireless ad-hoc network functions as both a host and a router, and the control o f  
the network is distributed among the nodes [5]. The number of nodes in such a network 
varies between few tens in MANETs and up to millions in sensor networks.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In an ad-hoc network, nodes may move as a result, the signal strength between any two 
nodes may change. In addition, the environment has a greater effect on the signal 
strength. Electromagnetic interference can reduce signal strength. When signal strength 
is reduced, protocols often reduce their bandwidth requirements. Increased traffic on the 
radio frequency can also reduce bandwidth.
Users may come and go at any time resulting in routing problems. This may be due to 
energy levels, as in sensor networks, or just the nature o f the users, as in the ad-hoc 
Internet network connection. Another problem is that nodes may lose enough signal 
strength to another node that they effectively become unavailable.
There is no mechanism to physically secure network connections. For example, a secure 
wired network might have computers secured inside a locked building, connected by 
fiber optic cable, encased in pressurized conduit. If the pressure drops in the conduit an 
alarm is sounded. On the other hand, in an ad-hoc wireless network, even a novice hacker 
with the right brand o f  WI-FI card can gain access to the network communication data. 
Nodes may be under power limitations as they may be powered by battery or other low 
power sources. In addition, nodes may only be available at certain times. This could be 
due to power conservation [106], or because the node must operate in “stealth mode” as 
in a military situation.
2.1.1.2. WAHN CONNECTORS (COMMUNICATION)
Nodes communicate with each other by forming a multi-hop radio network and 
maintaining connectivity in a decentralized manner. Since WAHN nodes communicate 
over wireless links, they have to contend with the effects o f radio communication such as 
noise, fading, and interference. In addition, the links typically have less bandwidth than 
in a wired network. The network topology, in general, is dynamic, because the 
connectivity among the nodes may vary with time due to node departures, new node 
arrivals, and the possibility o f having mobile nodes. Hence, there is a need for efficient 
routing protocols to allow the nodes to communicate over multi-hop paths consisting o f  
possibly several links in a way that does not use any more o f the network "resources" 
than necessary.
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Nodes in an ad-hoc network are required to provide routing services. Routing is usually 
provided at the network level. A  number o f routing protocols have been proposed such as 
AODV [90] and DSR [57] and many others. Routing without security can cause major 
problems. Multicast routing may be provided at the network level as well. Example 
protocols include MADOV [99] and ODMRP [64]. Application-level multicast achieves 
more scalability and implements more sophisticated group logic at the application layer. 
Examples include AMRoute protocol [117], and PAST-DM [44].
An ad-hoc network may be a self-contained network, act as a stub [22], or be used as a 
connection between two networks. A self-contained network is the simplest because it 
can run custom routing protocols.
In some ad-hoc networks (e.g. MANETs), nodes are free to move arbitrarily at different 
speeds. In other networks, the random ad-hoc interaction among nodes (e.g., smart sensor 
networks) produces a dynamic networks topology [5].
2.1.1.3. WAHN CONFIGURATIONS
Based on the node mobility, wireless ad-hoc networks may be classified to be 
either fixed or mobile. Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) is an example o f  mobile 
WAHN. A MANET is an autonomous collection o f  mobile users that communicate over 
bandwidth-constrained wireless links. Since the nodes are mobile, the network topology 
may change rapidly and unpredictably over time. An example o f  fixed ad-hoc networks is 
Smart Sensor Networks (SSN). A  smart sensor network is a large number o f sensor nodes 
deployed randomly and communicate via short-range radio transmission [5]. Nodes 
spend most o f their time in a sleep mode to save energy and wake up randomly to interact 
with each other in an ad-hoc fashion.
Based on membership restrictions, WAHNs may also be classified into open or closed 
classes. In an open network, anyone can join. A  new user would contact nearby users 
and set up communication. The node then may be asked to route traffic from one node to 
another, and can access other nodes through its neighbors. An example would be an 
Armature Packet Radio Network (APRN). Anyone with a ham radio license can join the 
network. Obviously, the ability for anyone to join a network is itself a serious security 
concern.
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In a closed network, only valid nodes can join. A node is either pre-configured with keys 
or has some special information that only that ad-hoc group knows. The join is then done 
in a very similar manner to open networks with the exception that the initialization may 
take extra steps. The security concerns for closed networks are much like that o f standard 
WI-FI networks. The general idea is simply to keep intruders out.
The main distinction between WAHNs and other infrastructured wireless communication 
systems is the lack o f  any centralized control or fixed support stations found in cellular 
wireless networks (e.g., MSS, MSC, HLR, VLR, etc) [48], Although most research work 
assumes pure WAHNs (e.g. AODV [90] and DSR [57] and many others), hybrid 
configuration is also viable. Even within pure WAHNs, nodes might not be o f the same 
capabilities. For example, in smart sensor networks, a sensor node normally is assumed to 
have up to 4MHz processor and 8 KB memory [92], At the same time, the network 
deploys one or more special nodes that, with larger capabilities, can communicate with 
the base station.
Another example o f hybrid networks is integrating cellular networks with MANETs to 
improve QoS such as in Cellular-aided mobile Ad-hoc Network (CAMA) [48]. In this 
architecture, ad-hoc nodes register at the cellular service provider for authentication. 
Network management tasks are performed through cellular servers while data exchange 
is done through the ad-hoc network.
No assumption can be made about node collaboration. Nodes might refuse to get 
involved in any collaborative group management function either deliberately or 
unwillingly due to limited resources. WAHNs nodes are generally more prone to physical 
security threats than fixed cable nets. These threats include, but not limited to, 
eavesdropping, spoofing, and denial-of-service-like attacks [51].
Due to the above characteristics, regular network protocols employed in fixed wire line 
networks are not transparently transferable to WAHNs. WAHNs’ characteristics 
mandate careful design o f routing protocols as well as mobility management algorithms 
to increase reliability and availability. All algorithms and protocols should focus on the 
limited capabilities o f WAHN nodes to meet the above challenges. Secure group 
communications, which is the focus o f this work, is no exception.
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2.1.2. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
A sensor network is usually assumed to have a base station and a large number o f  
identical sensor nodes [31] [32] [33], No pre-determined configuration is assumed. Upon 
deployment, the base station and the sensor nodes work together to dynamically establish 
a virtual configuration. Flat (or single level) sensor networks lack scalability and are 
usually limited by the transmission range o f  the base station [14]. A hierarchical 
(multilevel) sensor network consists o f a base station, several data aggregation nodes, 
and a large number o f  sensor nodes. Such architecture was shown to provide scalability, 
notable energy efficiency, and security benefits [122] and [14]. Our system model adopts 
the latter model and distributes key management tasks among the network levels.
For the purpose o f key management, we consider a two-level (three-tier) sensor network 
consisting o f a topmost base-station (BS), under which, sensor nodes (SN) are organized 
in clusters. Each cluster is lead by a node known as cluster leader (CL). CLs comprise the 
second highest tier while sensor nodes are at the bottom tier. Clusters can be formed 
based on various aspects such as capabilities, location, communication range, etc. [46]. 
Cluster leaders are able to communicate with the base station (also known as command 
node). In addition, we assume that in each cluster, the cluster leader is capable o f  
reaching all other nodes within the cluster through broadcast, and hence it plays the role 
of a Key Distribution Node (KDN). In this thesis, we assume that both sensor nodes and 
cluster leaders are stationary and that each node is aware o f its physical location and 
communication range. In contrary to SHELL [122], DCK cluster leaders are different 
from data gateways. A cluster leader is considered a keying gateway that performs certain 
key management function, yet, cluster leaders are not necessarily data gateways that 
perform data aggregation and processing functions.
Each tier o f the network possesses different architectural capabilities. The base station is 
assumed to have no computational and storage limitations. However, the communication 
channel between the base station and the cluster leaders is assumed to be restricted. Since 
the base station might not be collocated with the other nodes in the deployment field, 
communications between nodes and the base station might take place either though slow 
satellite links and/or multi-hop packet transmissions, which might increase the 
probability o f  packet loss. This motivates the minimization o f the base station
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involvement in the regular network operations. A sample sensor network is depicted in 
Fig. 3.
Similar to SHELL [122] and SECK [14], DCK assumes cluster leaders to enjoy better 
capabilities than regular sensor nodes. The sensor nodes are assumed to be constrained in 
energy and processing resources, and cannot perform complex computations or store 
large amounts o f data. The MICA Mote, which includes 4K RAM and an 8 -bit 4MHz 
processor, and runs with 2 AA batteries, is an example for the capabilities o f a typical 
sensor node.
2.2. SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN WAHNS AND WSNS
The basic method for securing communications is cryptography. Confidentiality, 
integrity and availability are the main goals o f  securing communications in WAHNs [51]. 
Although encryption/decryption is meant to provide data confidentiality, cryptographic 
techniques provide integrity and may even contribute to availability. We start by 
discussing briefly the security objectives that applies to both WAHNs and WSNs. Then, 
we discuss different threat models and attacks on WAHNs. Then, we discuss different 
threat models and attacks on Security Objectives in WSNs.
2.2.1. SECURITY OBJECTIVES
The major objectives o f securing communications in WAHNs and WSNs are 
confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and availability. In this sub-section, we introduce 
the need for these objectives in applications
2.2.1.1. CONFIDENTIALITY
Confidentiality ensures that certain information is never disclosed to unauthorized 
entities. Data encryption (and decryption) with either symmetric or asymmetric keys 
clearly provides data confidentiality (e.g., against eavesdropping). In the context o f  pair­
wise communications, confidentiality can be defined as the property o f  hiding the 
communicated data from anyone other than the two communicating parties. In the 
context o f  group communications, where more than two parties are involved, 
confidentiality (group commutations people prefer the term secrecy [116]) is more
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complicated and time dependent. Current secrecy refers to the property that any party 
other than the current communication group members is unable to obtain the 
communicated data. Forward secrecy refers to the property that previous members o f  the 
communicating group should be unable to obtain data communicated after they have left 
the group. Backward Confidentiality refers to the property that new members o f  the 
communicating group should be unable to obtain data communicated before they have 
joined the group. In WAHNs, hop-by-hop radio is used as the communication channel 
[5]. In some applications, such as military tactical operations or other civilian 
applications described above, other parties might interfere with this communications. 
Thus confidentiality is an essential security goal in WAHNs applications.
2.2.1.2. INTEGRITY
Integrity is the property that guarantees that a message being transferred is never 
corrupted. A message could be corrupted because o f benign failures, such as radio 
propagation impairments, or because o f malicious attacks on the network [130], Message 
Authentication Codes (MAC) is a cryptographic technique used for assuring data 
integrity. Deng et al [23] used such technique to achieve security and integrity o f  routing 
information in MANETs.
2.2.1.3. AVAILABILITY
Availability can be defined as the property o f maintaining the network (or 
network services) up and running under hostile conditions (such as denial o f  service 
attacks) [130]. A denial o f service attack could be launched at any layer o f  an ad-hoc 
network. On the physical and media access control layers, an adversary could employ 
jamming to interfere with communication on physical channels. On the network layer, an 
adversary could disrupt the routing protocol and disconnect the network. On the higher 
layers, an adversary could bring down high-level services. One such target is the key 
management service, an essential service for any security framework [48].
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2.2.1.4. AUTHENTICATION
Source authentication is the property that enables a receiver to verity that the 
received data has originated from the claimed source and has not been compromised on 
the route [48]. Authentication in WAHNs may be achieved using either asymmetric key 
operations through public-key infrastructure (PKI), or symmetric key operations. 
Asymmetric key cryptography is the main authentication technique in modem computers. 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is used everywhere on the Internet to authenticate users 
and service providers different transactions [115]. The major problems with PKI in 
WAHNs are the need for a centralized Certificate Authority (CA) its availability, and 
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) [1], Some decentralized Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI) solutions have been proposed in WAHNs. Threshold protocols have been used 
quite successfully in developing PKI-based security scheme with a threshold-based 
(Certification Authority) CA such as COCA [130]. In MANETs, a similar technique was 
proposed in MOCA [126]. A performance enhancement by using cashing was proposed 
in CACMAN [1], Although PKI can be deployed in WAHNs with certain capabilities, it 
might not be suitable for other ad-hoc networks with more restricted capabilities (e.g., 
sensor networks). The main reason, in addition to the need for an efficient CA, is the 
computational complexity and storage overhead o f asymmetric key operations. Brown et 
al [10] have reported that a 512-bit RSA signature generation takes 2.6 seconds on a RIM 
Pager and a Palm Pilot. Perrig et al [92] report that a current generation sensor node has 
just 4500 bytes for security and application needs.
Symmetric key operations are much more affordable for WAHNs due to their lower 
overhead and storage requirements. Existing symmetric key authentication schemes in 
wired networks, such as Kerberos [61] and Otway-Rees [8 8 ], cannot fit in WAHNs due 
to their computational overhead. Reserchers proposed several lighter weight 
authentication schemes for WAHNs. Examples include TESLA [93], LEAP [134] and 
pTESLA [92],
2.2.2. A THREAT MODEL FOR WHANS
Threats can be characterized based on as to the area of attack. Common domains 
of security compromise include physical, personnel, hardware, software, and procedural
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[37]. All o f  these areas do not apply directly to ad-hoc networks, but nevertheless they 
are valuable security areas for the entire life cycle o f  networks architectures. Attackers 
can be either internal or external. In the following, we briefly discuss relevant types o f  
attacks and attackers to our WAHN.
2.2.2.1. THREATS
Like all other networks, WAHNs are subject to attacks o f different types. According to 
Farhmand [37], attacks may be physical, personnel, hardware, software, or procedural.
a. Physical: Physical penetration refers to the physical means o f  gaining access 
to a restricted area. Areas can include buildings, computer labs, or other sensitive 
domains. Physical attacks are not common themes in the deployment o f ad-hoc 
network security.
b. Personnel (collusion): An individual who subverts personnel authorization, 
and gains unauthorized access or privilege are said to have penetrated area o f  
personnel. Ad-hoc nodes, who are authorized nodes, and then abuse that status by 
colluding to re-configure the network, compromise secret keys, or route packets 
to an unauthorized node has violated are area o f personnel.
c. Hardware: A hardware attack can be mounted in order to subvert or a deny 
service to a system. Ad-hoc networks can be vulnerable to this in the case o f  
human sabotage. A device that is not tamper-resistant might be vulnerable to this 
type o f attack. In addition, building custom hardware to circumvent a network’s 
security measures could be considered a hardware attack.
d. Software: Techniques, which compromise the integrity o f  system software, 
application programs, or utility routines, are attacks against the software.
e. Procedural: A  procedural penetration is where an authorized or unauthorized 
intruder node can gain access to the system. This threat arises when nodes leave 
or join networks, and the confidentiality o f the private keys must be protected.
In addition to the above network security attacks, some reports on ad-hoc security have 
the additional measure o f  privacy. Furthermore, attacks are qualified based on whether 
they are passive or aggressive and in terms o f the network layer to which it is aimed.
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Finally, attacks can be qualified according to the network layer to which they are aimed.
Application Layer: An attack that, for instance, injects false information to undermine 
the integrity o f an application is referred to as an Application Layer attack.
Network Layer: A node with access to the routing mechanisms can degrade the network. 
This also includes a node that acts selfishly, not working cooperatively with the network. 
Link Layer: A user can modify the MAC address o f his WI-FI card to hide his 
identity.
Physical Layer: A physical layer attack, may be aimed at jamming transmission 
o f a node or destroying a certain node’s hardware
2.2.2.2. TYPES OF ATTACKS
There are several common methods used to attack ad-hoc networks. Some are 
similar to infrastructure networks while others are unique to ad-hoc networks. Note that 
these attack types include Physical Layer (jamming DoS), Link Layer (Spoofing), 
Network Layer (MIM), and Application Layer (Eavesdropping) [6 ],
a. Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping generally occurs when an unauthorized attacker listens to traffic 
on the network. In a wireless network, it is virtually impossible to prevent people 
from opening a radio receiver (hardware) and listening to what is being broadcast. 
[90] In addition, in an open network, a node could join and simply listen to traffic 
routed through that node. Eavesdropping can be used for listening to data traffic 
(what data one node is sending another) or to routing traffic (in an attempt to gain 
illegal access to the network). It is possible to prevent the attacker from gleaning 
useful information by employing encryption. Eavesdropping violates the 
confidentiality security measure listed in the threat model [6 ].
b. Man-in-the-middle Attack
Man-in-the-middle (MIM) attack involves an attacker forging his identity to two 
nodes that want to communicate. Each node thinks it is talking directly to the
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other, while the MIM node reads, modifies or filters the data. MIM breaks 
confidentiality implicitly and authenticity and non-repudiation measures directly. 
The attacker could also use this position to affect integrity, availability and access 
measures. This type o f attack can easily be carried out in an open network since 
any node can become a router. It could also be done at a lower level without 
joining the network.
c. Denial-of-Service Attack
Denial o f service is an attack that simply prevents nodes from getting useful work 
done. This can occur at many different levels and can be passive or active. DOS 
attacks are theoretically unpreventable [90], A  simple example would be jamming 
the radio frequency used by the network, or nodes refusing to forward packets 
when asked to. Using secure routing protocols can mitigate the problems with the 
routing aspects o f  the attack, while hardware attacks can be reduced using spread 
spectrum [52] and similar technologies. DOS attacks break availability in the 
threat model.
d. Theft o f resources
A node joins a network using a false identity and proceeds to consume resources 
that the node is not authorized to use. This would break the authenticity and 
access control and could implicitly break availability.
e. Corruption o f data
A user corrupts data (in some subtle way) either at the hardware level using short 
bursts o f  false data or at the software level during routing. This is a subset o f  
either DOS or MIM depending on the situation. This attack breaks integrity.
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Fig. 3. A Sensor network with four clusters.
We direct the interested reader to a comprehensive study o f different security attacks in 
networks to [37] and specifically for WAHNs to [51].
2.2.3. THREAT MODEL FOR SENSOR NETWORKS
Being wireless and working unattended mostly in a hostile environment renders 
sensor networks vulnerable to a myriad o f attacks. Classical network attacks include 
eavesdropping, message interception, and message reproduction and jamming. In this 
thesis, we focus on attacks that aim to control the network permanently rather than 
causing a temporary disruption o f the network functionality. We assume all bottom and 
second tier nodes to be subject to such attacks. Although we assume the base station to be 
unreachable to attackers, our solution should not depend heavily on that fact (i.e., we 
should avoid using the base station as a key distribution center (KDC) that shares a 
symmetric key with every individual node).
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When nodes are captured, their memory can be read and erased or tampered with. 
Therefore, an adversary would know all the contents o f a compromised node’s memory. 
A widely accepted assumption [122], [14] is that an adversary will not launch an attack 
during the few minutes following the network initial deployment. Therefore, the network 
initialization will take place safely. Similar to LEAP [133], in DCK assumes that the 
adversary will not launch a coordinated attack i.e., if more than one sensor node were to 
be captured, a compromised node would not be aware o f  the location o f  other 
compromised ones unless they are its immediate neighbors. In order to handle collusion, 
any EBS-based collusion-resistant key assignment scheme like [46], might be used within 
DCK. Several dynamic keying schemes in cluster sensor network [122][14] assume that 
cluster leader nodes are less likely to be captured than regular sensor nodes. On contrary, 
DCK assumes other than base station every node is as likely to be captured as any other 
node. However, we assume at the same time that an adversary will not be able to 
distinguish between these a cluster leader and a sensor node either visually or through 
monitoring radio activity.
2.3. SECURE COMMUNICATIONS
Having a secure communication service is essential to most WAHN and WSN 
applications. In this section, we discuss different cryptographic solutions to provide 
secure communications in WAHNs and WSNs. We start with a classification o f different 
solutions; we then discuss existing solutions in WHANs. Finally, we discuss existing 
solutions in WSNs.
2.3.1. CLASSIFICATION OF SECURITY SOLUTIONS
Security solutions for WAHNs and WSNs may be classified based on the 
communication model (e.g., Peer-to-Peer vs. Group-based), the implementation layer (i.e. 
physical, network, and application), and the technique used (cryptographic vs. non­
cryptographic). Fig. 3 4 shows the solution space. Non-cryptographic solutions may 
depend on techniques such as frequency hopping [58], while cryptographic solutions 
depend on data encryption. Physical layer solutions are hard to implement (e.g., 
frequency hopping). Network layer solutions may include secure routing, while
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application layer solutions incorporate more sophisticated application logic (such as 







Fig. 4. Security solutions for WAHNs
There are two major solution approaches to securing communications in WAHNs, a peer- 
to-peer approach and a group communications approach. In a peer-to-peer solution, nodes 
establish pair-wise connections using some shared key between each two communicating 
nodes. In the group communication approach, nodes participate in a securely 
communicating group whose members use a common group key to encrypt/decrypt group 
traffic.
Facilitating secure peer-to-peer communication on symmetric key cryptography in 
WAHNs has requirements similar to that o f an on-line key distribution server (KDC) 
[134], Thus, classical infrastructured networks schemes, such as such as Kerberos [61] 
and Otway-Rees [8 8 ], cannot fit in WAHNs. In order to overcome such problem, 
researchers have proposed several schemes such as [134] and [92].
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Secure group communications requires the establishment o f a communication group and 
distributing group key(s) to each group member. The simplest way is to have a group key 
used by the sender to encrypt data, and by the receivers to decrypt. Such a key is known 
as Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) [49]. The group key can be used as well in different 
security services such as authentication and maintenance o f message integrity among 
users [113]. The major problem with group TEK is the group dynamics. However, in 
dynamic groups, membership changes cause the group key to be refreshed. Several group 
key management schemes have been used successfully in wired [61]networks such as 
Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP) [49] and several variations o f Logical Key 
Hierarchy (LKH), [113] and [116]. The main problem with adapting such schemes in 
WAHNs is the lack o f  reliable multicast channel as well as the need for centralized group 
controller. In Section 6 , several WAHN group key management protocols are discussed.
2.3.2. THE KEY MANAGEMENT PROCESS
One major issue with secure communications schemes in WAHNs is the use o f  
several cryptographic keys for both traffic and control. Accordingly, managing these keys 
in a constrained environment, such as WAHN, is a major problem. In the next section, 
we discuss several components o f  key management and how they are performed in 
different secure communications schemes.
In general, rekeying can be considered to have a lifecycle (Fig. 5). The first step in such 
lifecycle is to establish the need for new or updated keys and determine which keys to be 
created or updated. Second, those keys need to be generated. The third step is to assign 
keys to users/parties/nodes, which are going to use them. The final step is to deliver the 
keys to these parties.
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Initialize rekeyingJoin/leave event
Rekeying policy Rekeying Structure
Key Distribution Key Generation
Key assignment
C onstruct rekeying 
m essa g e s
Group Rekeying Analysis Determ ine keys for update
Fig. 5. Rekeying lifecycle in secure group communications.
In Fig. 6 , we start with a system with secure communications established among all 
parties (e.g., WAFIN nodes). A  certain event (e.g., a new party joins or an existing party 
leaves) relevant to secure communication occurs. The system determines how to handle 
such an event by updating or generating a certain sub-set o f the system keys (e.g., 
rekeying). The first step in handling such an event is key generation. New keys are 
generated to replace expired keys and then assigned to both rekeying messages and 
parties. The next step is to deliver these keys to appointed parties securely. Finally, by 
using the new keys, the system retains its original secure communication stage.
Although the term key management is used in the literature loosely as a synonym to 
rekeying (especially in the context o f  secure group communications and multicasting
[116]), we use the term to describe all operations related to the maintenance o f system
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keys. In our abstract model, we define the following four key management processes in 







Fig. 6 . The key management process.
Key analysis: keying requirements are analyzed to determine the required number o f  
keys for the network as well as the number o f keys needed by each node. Also, analysis 
may take place (using input from a detection system) to determine keys that needs 
update. Next, key assignment is performed. Actual keys are then generated (and 
encrypted) then distributed to their designated nodes.
Key assignment: refers to the mapping o f  keys to the different parties. 
Administrative key assignment is considered here since communication keys are simply 
assigned by agreement o f  parties wanting to establish a secure communication channel. 
Key assignment may be static (for example, each node is assigned the same set o f  keys 
throughout the network’s lifetime) or dynamic depending on the key management 
solution employed.
Mapping decisions significantly impact the level o f  security offered by the key 
management scheme since a captured node may reveal all its keys to an attacker. If that 
node or a small number o f  nodes collectively possess all network administrative keys, 
capturing these nodes will jeopardize the security o f  the entire network. Therefore, when 
a node is captured, the fewer the number o f keys known (or the more number o f keys 
unknown) to that node, the greater is the reduction in security risk. However, since some
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schemes depend on the existence o f overlapping keys among nodes to establish 
communication among these nodes, decreasing the number o f keys known to a node in 
these schemes may hamper network connectivity (see section 4 for security and 
performance analyses).
Random key assignment is the simplest and least expensive solution [32], However, it 
limits control over the network security risk in case o f multiple node captures. 
Deployment information (such as location or attack probability) have been used to reduce 
the attacker’s probability to uncover more keys by capturing related nodes (for example, 
collocated nodes) [28][71].
Key generation: generation o f administrative keys may take place once or multiple 
times over the lifespan o f  the network. The generation o f communication keys is the 
responsibility o f the communicating parties (i.e. sensor nodes, gateways, or base 
stations). In all cases, the key generating node(s) must be trusted by all key-receiving 
nodes. Keys might be as simple as bit string or as complex as a symmetric bi-variate 
polynomial [71].
In static key pre-distribution schemes, administrative keys are generated by a key server 
and loaded into nodes prior to deployment [16], [35], In other schemes, new keys are 
generated regularly throughout the life time o f the network [56], possibly with a different 
key generator at different times (as proposed in this article).
Key distribution (and re-distribution): refers to the delivery o f  keys to their 
designated nodes after they have been generated and assigned to the nodes. In case 
administrative keys are delivered to their destinations post network deployment, for 
example due to re-keying, other (previously distributed) administrative keys may be used 
to encrypt the new keys. The distribution o f communication keys usually takes place after 
the network has been deployed. Communication keys are used for a short period o f time 
and should be regularly updated (this may include analysis, assignment, generation and 
(re-)distribution).
2.3.3. KEY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOLS
Key management is an essential issue for secure communications in WAHNs. 
Key management protocols can be classified according to the communication model used
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
for secure group communications to be either pair-wise or group-based. In this sub­
section, we discuss briefly both types o f  protocols. In Section 2.6, we discuss group key 
management protocols in greater detail.
2.3.3.I. PAIR-WISE KEY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOLS
In pair-wise node interactions, keys are redistributed to nodes during pre­
deployment. Each pair o f nodes share one secret key (either directly or indirectly) is used 
to establish an ephemeral session key whenever the two nodes decide to interact. As 
illustrated in Fig. 7, the two interacting nodes might seek help from other nodes to 
establish a secure path.
Node pair-wise key 
inialization
Pair-wise keys pre 
distribution
Deployment Establish secure pathInitialization




Use session key to 
communicate
Send/recive messages
Fig. 7. Peer-to-peer communications using pair-wise keys.
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For secure peer-to-peer communication between two mobile nodes in a wireless ad-hoc 
network it is necessary for the two nodes to share a secret key. This can be done using a 
public key infrastructure (PKI) [132]. Although there are several proposals for employing 
PKI in WAHNs, many ad-hoc networks cannot afford the deployment o f  such systems 
due to computational, communication, and storage constraints [11]. In a pair-wise key 
management system, shared keys are pre-distributed to nodes and are used to establish 
session keys using symmetric cryptography. In such schemes, key distributing and key 
assignment is performed in a pre-deployment fashion. The major advantage o f  pair-wise 
key management is full distribution with no need for a centralized Key Distribution 
Center (KDC) or online Certification Authority (CA). Examples o f pair-wise key 
management protocols are Sensor Network Encryption Protocol SNEP [92] and the pair­
wise key establishment protocol [132].
SNEP: Sensor Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP) [92] targets an environment o f  
sensor nodes with few base-stations. However, the same protocol may be used for other 
types o f WAFINs. SNEP focuses on how to use a shared secret key to exchange 
messages between two parties and provide confidentiality, data authentication, and 
integrity. Secret keys are assumed to be pre-distributed at a bootstrapping stage. In SNEP, 
each two communicating parties A and B are assumed to share a master secret key, XAB. 
The two parties derive two independent pairs o f  keys from Xab using a pseudo random 
function F. A pair o f communication keys, K Ah a n d  K Ba, is used for encrypting data back 
and forth. Another pair o f  MAC keys, K ’ab a n d  K ’ba, is used for message hashing. Each 
party uses a local counter (e.g., C a ) to keep track o f  messages.
The pair-wise key establishment protocol: In [132], a probabilistic key sharing 
technique along with a threshold cryptography protocol to insure that each two parties 
exclusively share a certain key with an overwhelming probability. The protocols 
encounter three phases: key pre-distribution phase, logical path establishment, and pair­
wise key establishments.
The key pre-distribution phase includes both key distribution and key assignment. In the 
key pre-distribution, the off-line key server loads each node u with m distinct keys from
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the key pool P  o f  I keys {k l; k2; : : : ; kl} prior to the formation o f the ad-hoc network. 
As a result, each key in the key pool has a probability o f  m/l to be chosen by each node. 
This procedure assigns to each node a set o f m keys (out o f /) whose IDs can be 
deterministically obtained using the node ID.
The path establishment procedure is executed when a node wants to securely exchange 
messages with other nodes in the network even i f  they do not directly share a key. Two 
nodes can establish a logical path through other nodes with which they share other keys. 
A node u can independently compute Iv, the set o f  key ids corresponding to a node v’s 
key set. Therefore, without proactively exchanging the set o f its key ids with others, a 
node knowing the ids o f  its I neighbors can determine which two neighbors share which 
keys. Two arbitrary nodes u and v, node u can use a proxy node x as follows:
U x : {M }i„  
x u : {M }kxv
u ~ ^ v :  {M }ka
2.3.3.2. CLASSIFICATION OF GROUP KEY MANAGEMENT 
PROTOCOLS
Key management plays an important role in enforcing access control on the group 
key (and consequently on the group communications). It supports the establishment and 
maintenance o f key relationships between valid parties according to a security policy 
being enforced on the group [74]. It encompasses techniques and procedures that can 
carry out member identification and authentication, access control, and generation, 
distribution and installation o f  key material. According to [98], key management schemes 
can be broadly classified into three major categories.
• Centralized group key management protocols
A single entity, e.g. KDC, is employed for controlling the whole group; hence a 
group key management protocol seeks to minimize storage requirements, 
computational power on both client and server sides, and bandwidth utilization.
•  Decentralized key management protocols.
The management o f  a large group is divided among subgroup managers, trying to 
minimize the problem o f  concentrating the work in a single place.
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•  Distributed key management protocols
There is no explicit KDC, and the members themselves do the key management. 
All members can perform access control. The generation can be either 
contributory, meaning that all members contribute some information to generate 
the group key, or done by one o f the members.
Key management protocols may be also classified based on the structures used for 
rekeying. Simple (or linear) rekeying structures involve the use o f a single key per user, 
and distributing the TEK using such key. Example o f  such systems is GKMP [49], 
Graph-based systems uses a key graph, Iolus [78], or key tree Logical Key Hierarchy 
(LKH) [116] and [113]. Other systems use a combinatorial structure such as Exclusion 
Basis System (EBS) [30], In Section 2.6, we discuss group key management protocols in 
more detail.
2.4. GROUP KEY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOLS
Recently a number o f key management schemes have been developed for sensor 
networks. Examples include [25][122][14][121][17], Key management schemes for 
sensor networks may be broadly classified into static and dynamic keying based on 
whether the administrative keys (those used to establish communication keys) are 
updated or not after the initial network deployment and set up. A well known static 
keying scheme is due to Eschenauer and Gligor [35]. In this scheme, each sensor node is 
assigned k  keys out o f a large pool P  o f keys in the pre-deployment phase. Neighboring 
node may establish a secure link only if  they share al least one key, which is provided 
with a certain probability based on the selection o f  k and P. A major advantage o f this 
scheme is the exclusion o f the base station in key management. However, successive 
node captures enable the attacker to reveal network keys and use them to attack other 
nodes. An enhancement to such scheme was proposed in [17] in which two nodes can 
establish a link only if  they share q keys. Liu and Ning [70] provided further 
enhancement by using t-degree bi-variate key polynomial. Since an attacker needs to 
capture at least t+1 nodes to obtain any t-degree polynomial, this solution was shown to 
significantly enhance network resilience to node capture.
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On the other hand, dynamic keying schemes change all keys revealed to an attacker upon 
node capture. The major advantage o f dynamic keying is enhanced network survivability 
since any captured keys are replaced in a timely manner.
Also, when adding new nodes, unlike static keying, the probability o f  network capture 
does not necessarily increase. Jolly et al. [56] have proposed a key management scheme 
that is based on the Identity Based Symmetric Keying. Although their approach requires 
very few keys to be stored at each node, the re-keying procedure is inefficient due to the 
large number o f  messages exchanged for key renewals. In addition, they require a 
centralized key server to play a major role in key management. Another group o f  
dynamic keying schemes are based upon Exclusion Basis Systems (EBS) - a 
combinatorial formulation o f group key management problem. In EBS-based schemes, 
each node is assigned k keys out o f pool o f size k+m  keys. Once one or more nodes are 
captured (or suspected to be captured), rekeying takes place by generating replacement 
keys, encrypting them with all the m keys unknown to the captured nodes and distributing 
them to the other nodes. However, since the value o f  m is selected to be relatively small, 
to make rekeying feasible in terms o f  number o f messages, a small number o f  nodes may 
collude and collectively reveal all the network keys. EBS-based schemes with collusion- 
resistance have been proposed recently in [14] and [121]. While more energy efficient 
than Jolly et a l ’s scheme, both schemes still considerably rely on a centralized key server 
to perform rekeying.
In this section, we discuss factors that affect the selection o f a specific group key 
management solution as well as different existing types o f  key management schemes with 
some examples.
2.4.1. FACTORS AFFECTING GROUP KEY MANAGEMENT 
SOLUTIONS
Group key management protocols attracted many researchers through the last 
decade (e.g. [115], [24], and [30]). Most o f  existing protocols were proposed with the 
Internet in mind as a deployment environment. Researchers focused on performance 
issues such as storage and communication cost, based on the assumption o f having IP- 
Multicast. The situation is different in WAHNs. Wireless communications is much less
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reliable, multicast might not be supported, and group size may grow up to several tens o f  
thousands or even millions. Adopting one o f  these protocols or even developing a new 
protocol suitable for WAHNs should take several factors into consideration. Some factors 
are related to the group issues, others may be related to network characteristics, 
application environment, or performance constraints. In the following sub-sections, we 
discuss some o f  these factors.
2.4.1.1. GROUP-RELATED FACTORS
The major factor concerning a group is the group size. In some applications, such 
as M-Commerce or rescue missions, group size is kept within tens o f  nodes. In other 
applications, such as data aggregation in smart sensor networks, group size may reach 
several ten or hundreds o f  thousands o f nodes [111]. A group key management protocol 
should be scalable enough to support such large group sizes while keeping the 
communication and storage overhead as low as possible.
Group dynamics is another major concern. According to [49] group Traffic Encryption 
Key (TEK) (and other administrative keys), where to changed every time a node joins or 
leaves the group. The rate o f  nodes joining and leaving the group significantly affects the 
performance o f any group key management protocol. To reduce such overhead, 
researchers have proposed batch rekeying rather than individual rekeying [65]. However, 
batch rekeying may cause the system to be vulnerable for short periods o f times in which 
certain nodes have left the group while rekeying did not take place yet.
Group structure and the capability o f  sub-grouping is another important issue. In groups 
with large number o f nodes, having a flat group with rekeying taking place by 
distributing new keys to thousand o f nodes through unreliable communications, is very 
undesirable. It is an important advantage for a key management protocol to have the 
ability o f  sub-grouping to avoid such a huge overhead. However, classical sub-grouping 
protocols with multiple encryptions, such as Iolus [78] or Dual Encryption Protocol [24] 
introduce unacceptable overhead. There might be a need for new protocols that allows 
sub-grouping without the cost o f multiple encryptions. Combinatorial-based protocols are 
promising in that area [30].
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2.4.I.2. NETWORK-RELATED FACTORS
The WAHN environment is quite different from conventional wired networks. 
Those differences significantly affect the applicability o f key management protocols o f  
conventional networks to WAHNs. WAHNs have less reliable communications, less 
support for multicast, different configuration and networks structure, as well as the factor 
o f mobility.
Most existing key management protocols were developed to target the Internet with IP- 
Multicast. In WAHNs, the network environment is quite different. Multicasting protocols 
in the Internet generally focus on optimizing either the distance (or cost) from the sender 
to each receiver individually, or the total cost o f  the multicast tree. Multicasting in ad-hoc 
networks is more challenging because o f the need to optimize the use o f  several resources 
simultaneously [48]. Among those hurdles are the limited battery power at each node, the 
lack o f  a centralized status, and the varying link quality between mobile nodes that act as 
routers [48], Accordingly, in some situations, key management and group 
communications in general may depended on a network level unicast service and 
implement the multicast at the application layer. Examples include AMRoute protocol
[117] and PAST-DM [44]. Some recent protocols, such as EKDMS, do not assume a 
network-level multicast support and instead use Application Level Multicast (ALM) as 
an alternate.
WAHNs may have either flat or clustered structure. In WAHN applications with flat 
structure, nodes are autonomous and enjoy similar capabilities [15]. Nodes may be 
geographically collocated and any two arbitrary nodes may communicate via the same 
multi-hop channel. In some other applications with clustered or hybrid network structure, 
some nodes (super-nodes) may have special communications or storage capabilities. An 
example o f  such nodes is the base stations in sensor networks [110]. Nodes may be 
grouped in clusters (either geographically or logically) with super-nodes performing 
inter-cluster communications. Other applications may also integrate other non-WAHN 
networks (such as cellular networks) with a different communication model, see CAMA
[9]-
Mobility is a major difference between WAHNs (and specifically MANETs) and other 
networks. From a group communications point o f view, intense mobility o f  WAHN
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
nodes may cause frequent disconnections and/or leaves. This may cause nodes to miss 
rekeying messages and/or data streams. Solutions to this problem may include a 
threshold-based scheme for rekeying messages such that a node needs to collect a 
threshold number, t, out o f  the total number o f  messages, n, in order to reconstruct all the 
rekeying material. Examples include the use o f Forward Error Correction (FEC) [128], 
simple t-out-of N simple exclusive OR [69], and Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) [42],
2.4.2. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
Different WAHN applications have different security and performance 
requirements. Characterizing such requirements is essential for selecting or developing a 
key management protocol for WAHNs. Security requirements include the providing 
forward and/or backward secrecy; the need for authentication, the level o f  trust among 
nodes, the possibility o f collusion, and the maximum vulnerability period the system can 
go through [98], Performance constraints include storage requirements for keys, 
communications efficiency, as well as scalability [65],
Rekeying is the primary solution to providing both backward and forward secrecy. 
However, some applications do not mandate backward secrecy, such as time varying data 
sensing where data is offered as public after a short time. In such case, a key management 
protocol should take advantage o f releasing such a constraint by reducing the rekeying 
overhead. Some systems sacrifice forward secrecy for performance tradeoff such as 
GKMP [49],
The existence o f an authentication service is a non-essential requirement that may not be 
needed in certain applications (e.g., open networks). In such a case, group management 
protocol should accommodate more dynamics by waiving such a requirement. Nodes in 
WAHN are generally autonomous. In open WAHNs applications, any node can join the 
group, especially in the absence o f  an authentication service. In such a case, the trust 
level among nodes should be minimal and extra verification techniques (e.g., Verifiable 
Secret Sharing) should be imposed. In other applications, the authentication service sets a 
high level o f  trust among nodes so that no verification overhead should be incurred. 
Collusion may be defined as the case in which several nodes can come together and 
collectively reveal all administrative keys and breaks both forward and backward secrecy.
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The possibility o f such an event depends on the ease o f communications among nodes as 
well as the amount o f administrative information acquired by each node. Some 
decentralized systems are subject to collusion such as VERSA [112]. Although 
combinatorial key management protocols use a fewer number o f keys to manage a large 
number o f users, they are subject to collusion [30]. Some distributed combinatorial 
protocols use collusion-resistant key assignment.
Due to the scarce resources in WAHNs, efficient storage and communications is essential 
to key management protocols. In wired networks, researchers focused on optimizing the 
number o f rekeying messages as well as the number o f keys stored. However, with the 
assumption o f IP-Multicast support, communication cost was quantified in terms o f  
number o f multicast messages. In WAHNs, multicast may be either expensive or even 
not supported at all. In such case, communication cost should be optimized further taking 
in consideration both the ability o f  limited broadcast as well as unicast-based rekeying,. 
Such solutions should also maintain a lower storage cost per node to achieve scalability 
in large group sized WAHNs applications. Combinatorial key management protocols [30] 
were shown to require number o f  keys comparatively smaller than tree-based solution for 
the same number o f nodes. Communication cost includes number o f control messages 
(unicast and multicast) exchanged upon join or leave as the group continues. In batch 
rekeying, the communication cost an be measured in number o f messages exchanged 
upon rekeying, taking in consideration the rekeying rate ore threshold [118].
2.5. GROUP KEY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOLS IN WSNS
In this section, we briefly introduce the network and attack models, as well as some 
static and dynamic key management schemes that we consider for comparison.
2.5.1. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
We consider a typical sensor network comprised o f  a large number o f resource- 
limited sensor nodes deployed in a field. A  resource-rich base station is deployed 
alongside the sensor nodes for communication with the outside world [1], Each sensor 
node stores keying material that is injected into nodes either through pre-distribution or 
during a post-deployment bootstrapping phase, (which is assumed to be secure). Secure
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communications among network nodes is maintained using encryption keys generated 
using this keying material.
Being wireless and working unattended mostly in a hostile environment renders sensor 
networks vulnerable to a myriad o f attacks. Classical network attacks include 
eavesdropping, message interception, and message reproduction and jamming. In this 
thesis, we focus on attacks that aim to control the network permanently rather than 
causing a temporary disruption o f  the network functionality. When nodes are captured, 
their memory can be read and erased or tampered with. Therefore, an adversary would 
know all the contents o f a compromised node’s memory, including keying material. A 
widely accepted assumption is that an adversary will not launch an attack during the few 
minutes following the network initial deployment. Therefore, the network initialization 
will take place safely. Node capture attacks can be either simple or coordinated. In a 
simple attack, i f  more than one sensor node were to be captured, a compromised node 
would not be aware o f the location o f other compromised ones unless they are its 
immediate neighbors. On the other hand, in a coordinated attack, an attacker can foster 
collusion among nodes that are not co-located, and thus the network topology is not a 
factor in the success or failure o f the attack. Most dynamic key management schemes 
assume the simple attack models, while most static key management schemes assume the 
coordinated attack model. In our proposed model, we assume a coordinated attack with 
an upper limit on the rate at which the attacker can capture network nodes.
2.5.2. STATIC KEYING SCHEMES
Recall that static keying schemes assume administrative keys once pre-deployed 
in the nodes, will not be changed. The basis o f  most existing key management schemes 
have originated in the key pre-distribution scheme proposed by Eschenauer and Gligore 
in [35], This scheme selects k  keys for each node out o f a large pool P. A major 
advantage o f  such scheme is incurring no post-deployment communication overhead on 
sensor nodes (for administrative keys). However, successive node capture enables the 
attacker to reveal keys stored in the nodes and use them to attack other nodes. The 
authors show that on average half o f  the keys are used to secure links between nodes, and 
thus, successive node capturing hampers the network survivability. A major advantage of
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this scheme is the exclusion o f the base station in key management. An enhancement of 
this scheme has been proposed in [8 ] in which two nodes can establish a link only if  they 
share q keys.
Liu and Ning [70] provided further enhancements by using t-degree bi-variate key 
polynomials. Instead o f selecting k keys for each node as in the basic probabilistic 
scheme, each node carries k bi-variate polynomials. Each is stored as t+1 shares. Two 
nodes can directly communicate only if  they have at least one shared polynomial. Since 
an attacker needs to capture at least t+1 nodes to obtain any t-degree polynomial, this 
solution was shown to significantly enhance network resilience to node capture as long as 
the number o f captured nodes is below a certain threshold (around 3% as shown in [56]). 
However, if  the number o f  captured nodes exceeds this threshold, the number o f  keys 
revealed to the attackers jumps sharply to reach almost 1 0 0 %.
Another issue with the abovementioned static schemes is the reduction in network 
connectivity resulting from the use o f a large key pool, P. As P increases for the same k, 
network connectivity decreases since only nodes that overlap in one or more keys (or key 
polynomials) can directly interact.
2.5.3. DYNAMIC KEYING SCHEMES
Dynamic keying schemes change administrative keys revealed to an attacker upon 
detection o f node capture. Administrative keys can also be changed periodically or on 
demand to increase network resilience to capture. The major advantage o f dynamic 
keying is enhanced network survivability since any captured keys are replaced in a timely 
manner. Also, upon adding new nodes, unlike static keying, the probability o f network 
capture does not necessarily increase.
An example o f dynamic keying schemes is due to Jolly et al. [56] who proposed a key 
management scheme that is based on the Identity Based Symmetric Keying. Although 
their approach requires very few keys to be stored at each node, the re-keying procedure 
is inefficient due to the large number o f  messages exchanged for key renewals. In 
addition, they require a centralized key server to play a major role in key management. 
Another group o f  dynamic keying schemes are based upon Exclusion Basis Systems 
(EBS) - a combinatorial formulation o f group key management problem developed by
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Eltoweissy et al in [32], In EBS-based schemes, each node is assigned k  keys out o f  pool 
o f size k+m  keys. Once one or more nodes are captured (or suspected to be captured), 
rekeying takes place by generating replacement keys, encrypting them with all the m keys 
unknown to the captured nodes and then distributing them to the other nodes. However, 
since the value o f  m is selected to be relatively small, to make rekeying feasible in terms 
o f number o f messages, a small number o f nodes may collude and collectively reveal all 
the network keys. A brief description o f the EBS methodology is included in Section 3 
for clarity. For details on EBS, please refer to [30],
Eltoweissy et al also proposed the use o f  EBS key management in a sensor network with 
a virtual infrastructure [32]. In their scheme, the sensor network efficiently establishes a 
coordinate system around the base station. All nodes located in the same coordinate cell 
are assigned the same EBS key combination and are considered collectively as an EBS 
group member. Rekeying takes place on the cell level by sending m messages o f  k  keys 
each to evict nodes in a specific cell. Although very efficient, this scheme does not 
address collusion and assume coarse keying granularity due to the assumption o f ID-less 
nodes..
EBS-based schemes with collusion-resistance have been proposed recently by Younis et 
al in [121] and Chorzempa et al in [14], While more energy efficient than Jolly et al’s 
scheme, both schemes still considerably rely on a centralized key server to perform 
rekeying.
As stated earlier, in dynamic keying, mitigating key compromises (by capturing nodes) is 
handled by rekeying. In EBS-based schemes, all k keys known by the captured node are 
replaced with updated k keys, encrypted with m keys unknown to the attacked node and 
broadcasted to the network. If the attacker can capture and foster the collusion o f enough 
nodes that collectively know the entire set o f  k+m  keys (we call the set o f  captured nodes 
in this case the collusion chain), the network is considered compromised. In [124], the 
authors proposed a location-based key assignment to increase the length o f  the collusion 
chain compared to random key assignment.
In our study, we consider the Liu and Ning scheme [70] as an example o f static schemes 
and Younis et al. scheme [123] as an example o f dynamic keying.
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2.6. COMBINATORIAL GROUP KEY MANAGEMENT 
PROTOCOLS
Combinatorial group key management protocols depend on a different key structure, 
a combinatorial matrix. A set o f  (k+m) administrative keys is used to support a set o f N  
multicast users. The administrative keys are distributed among users such that each user 
knows a different set o f  keys. Exclusion Basis System (EBS) [30] is an example o f a 
centralized combinatorial protocol. Efficient Decentralized Key Management Scheme is 
still needed.
2.6.1. EXCLUSION BASIS SYSTEM (EBS)
Eltoweissy et al introduced an Exclusion-Basis System (EBS) framework for the 
efficient management o f keys in secure group communications [30], The EBS framework 
uses a combinatorial formulation to maintain administrative keys (keys used to securely 
distribute session encryption keys). An EBS is defined as a collection T o f subsets o f the 
set o f members. Each subset corresponds to a key and the elements o f  a subset A e  Y are 
the nodes that have that key. An EBS T o f  dimension (n, k, m) represents a situation in a
TABLE 1.
The canonical matrix A for EBS(10, 3, 2)
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 U7 U 8 U9 U10
K1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
K2 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
K3 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
K4 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
K5 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
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secure group where there are n members numbered 1 through n , and where a key server 
holds a distinct key for each subset in T . In this section, we will use the terms “key” and 
“subset” interchangeably. If the subset At is in T , then the key AI is known by each o f the
members whose number appears in the subset A/ . Furthermore, for each t e [1, n\ there 
are m elements in T whose union is [1 ,« ]-{ /} . From this it follows that the key server 
can evict any member t ,  re-key, and let all remaining members know the replacement 
keys for the &keys they are entitled to know, by multicasting m messages encrypted by 
the keys corresponding to the m elements in F whose union is [1,«] -  { t} . Each new key 
is encrypted by its predecessor to limit decipherability only to the appropriate members. 
To construct EBS(n,k,m ) for feasible^, k m d m , a canonical enumeration o f all possible 
ways o f forming subsets o f  k  objects from a set o f k + m objects may be employed. As in 
[30], we choose an enumeration where each element o f the sequence is a bit string o f  
lengths + m , where a 1 in the Imposition o f a string means that object i is included in 
that subset, for all i (1 < i < k  + m ). Note that, every bit string in this enumeration will 
have exactly k  ones. We use a canonical type o f enumeration for the binomial coefficient 
f  k + m ^
subsets using induction on k + m.  For any k and m , let Canonical{k,m) be the
canonical enumeration o f all
(  k + m \
ways to form a subset o f k elements from a set o f
V k
k + m objects. For the sequence o f  bit strings in Canonical(k,m), a matrix A is formed,
/  k+m''
where k and m are understood, and whose columns are the successive bit strings
V k
of k + m length, each with k  ones. A is called the canonical matrix for EBS{n,k,m ). 
For example, the canonical matrix A for EBS(10, 3, 2) contains the enumeration o f  all 
C(5,3) ways to form a subset o f  3 keys from 5 keys, A is shown in Table 1.
In [30], Eltoweissy et al note that all systems for key management are examples o f an 
EBS. That is, given a logical system for key management, one can describe each key as a
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subset o f users, i.e. those users that possess that key. Eltoweissy et al show how a binary 
key management tree is an EBS. The overhead o f  an optimum compact EBS (one where 
k+m  is equal to the number o f  keys in the system) is half that o f  a binary key tree [30]. In 
a collusion-free environment, using EBS for key management guarantees forward and 
backward secrecy.
A compact EBS may suffer from collusion attacks that involve a small number o f evicted 
users. In [30], some solutions to collusion resistance in EBS are proposed. The selection 
of certain values o f  the parameters k and m might increase the overlap between keys 
known by different users. We plan to propose a better solution that depends on 
appropriately selecting k  and m.
2.7. SUMMARY
EBS has been used as a component for many key management solutions in both WAHNs 
and WSNs. These solutions have several problems.
In Ad-hoc networks, the problems include:
Duplication of group management functions [73]. In current architectures, the 
multicast session and group membership is maintained at the network layer (for 
all group-based applications). However, the group security and key management 
are performed at the application layer. Clearly, in this approach, there is 
significant computational overhead and a need for consistency (between 
application and network layers) management. In addition, network layers in 
WAHNs cannot implement the multicast functionality as efficiently as the 
Internet. For these two reasons, we propose to combine the multicast group 
functionality and the key management functionality at the application layer itself. 
Overhead of distributing control traffic. Current key management protocols use 
the network level multicast channel to distribute both data and rekeying/control 
traffic [12], [116],[118]. Accordingly, all group members unnecessarily receive 
all rekeying messages. In the proposed architecture, we avoid this overhead by 
ensuring that the keys are distributed only to the required nodes. This is possible 
due to the integration o f  multicast and key management functions in the 
application layer.
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Scalability. IP-multicast has a scalability problem with respect to the number o f  
applications or groups that can be supported [27], The scalability issue is the main 
motivation behind shifting to ALM. In our architecture, we assume no network- 
level multicast support in WAHNs and use application-level multicast. ALM 
provides more scalability with less overhead for larger number o f applications 
with limited group membership.
Distribution o f key management functions. In most existing key management 
protocols, a centralized group controller maintains all the key management 
functionality [12], [116], [118], In a limited resource environment, such as 
WAHNs, this constitutes an unacceptable overhead and drain o f resources for a 
single node. Moreover, WAHN nodes tend to be unreliable and are prone to 
failure. The novel architecture handles this problem by having separate modules 
for key generation, assignment and distribution, each performed in a fully- 
distributed and fault-tolerant fashion.
Handling miss-behaving and untrusted nodes. WAHN nodes are autonomous 
and each node may choose whether or not to participate in group management 
[73]. In addition, nodes may falsify information or collude by exchanging 
rekeying material [30], In the novel architecture, the key management modules 
take these threats into consideration by applying techniques such as verifiable 
secret sharing, threshold-bases key generation, and collusion-resistant key 
assignment.
In Wireless Sensor networks, the list further includes: A large number o f keys need to be 
managed in order to encrypt and authenticate all sensitive data exchanged. However, due to the 
characteristics o f sensor networks, including lack o f physical protection and the resource 
constrained nature o f sensors and sensor networks, most existing key management 
solutions developed for other networks may not be feasible for sensor networks (for 
example. PKI-based solutions). The tradeoff between managing acceptable levels of  
security and conserving network energy for sensor network operation is a challenging 
task.
In this thesis, we propose an efficient dynamic key management scheme using key 
polynomials that:
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(1) Achieves and maintain high network connectivity required to establish 
efficient communication paths;
(2) Performs efficient rekeying as needed to enhance network resilience to 
attacks. We compare our scheme to other leading static and dynamic schemes 
with respect to collusion resistance, overhead, and connectivity.
The objective o f  this thesis is to propose an efficient key management solution for both 
WAHNs and WSNs that overcomes these problems. In the next chapter we describe our 
proposed solution for WAHNs.
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CHAPTER III 
KEY MANAGEMENT IN WIRELESS AD-HOC NETWORKS
Secure communication is essential for the acceptance and broader adoption o f  
Wireless Ad-hoc Networks (WAHNs) in information-sensitive applications such as 
mobile commerce, emergency medical assistance, ad-hoc conferences, and tactical 
defense operations [15]. Typically, WAHNs comprise o f autonomous end-nodes that 
must collaborate for end-to-end connectivity. Therefore, communication in WAHNs is 
inherently collaborative requiring group communication. In addition, secure group 
communication is also needed to support WAHN applications such as collaborative team 
investigations, mobile auctioning, and first-responder support [54],
WAHNs exhibit distinguishing characteristics that limit the applicability o f contemporary 
architectural solutions designed for infrastructure networks. Here, nodes work together to 
setup an ad-hoc network that does not rely on a physical networking infrastructure. 
Communications are performed via multi-hop wireless broadcast transmission among 
nodes with limited transmission range. The lack o f physical protection o f  
communications together with the constrained capabilities o f  small wireless devices 
increases the likelihood o f  failure [31]. Node autonomy in open WAHNs further 
complicates the problem; un-trusted nodes may falsify information; selfish nodes may 
refuse to cooperate. Moreover, a powerful mobile external adversary may compromise 
one or more nodes and use them to launch different attacks that might hamper the 
network functionality.
To accommodate these special needs o f WAHN environments, we propose a multilayered 
architecture for secure group communication. Our architecture does not assume the 
availability o f  any network-level support for multicast. Instead, it integrates secure group 
management and multicast functions, and places them in the application layer.
Among the several modules o f the proposed architecture, group management is especially 
sensitive to the characteristics o f the underlying infrastructure. While several key 
management protocols such as Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP) [49]), Logical 
Key Hierarchy (LKH) [113], and One-way Function Chain Tree (OFCT) [12] have been
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proposed in literature, we find that they are not directly transferable to WAHN 
environments. Here, we propose and integrate schemes for different group management 
components (e.g., key generation, key assignment, and key distribution). We also show 
how each component supports security, fault-tolerance, and efficiency.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 presents our architecture. Sections 2 to 4 
describe the design issues o f  different components to implement the proposed 
architecture. Section 2 discusses the key distribution. Section 3 describes the proposed 
group generation. Section 4 introduces our proposed key assignment scheme that 
minimizes possible collusion among nodes.
3.1. OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
In this section we discuss the need for a new architecture, our novel architecture, 
and its feasibility and practicality.
3.1.1. NEED FOR A NEW ARCHITECTURE FOR WAHNS
As explained in the introduction, WAHNs have some special characteristics that 
demand new architectural paradigms. Here, we briefly summarize some o f  the key issues 
and discuss how the novel architecture handles it. We here show how to address the 
problems identified in section 2.7.
Avoiding duplication o f  group management functions [69]: In current 
architectures, the multicast session and group membership is maintained at the 
network layer (for all group-based applications). However, the group security and 
key management are performed at the application layer. Clearly, in this approach, 
there is significant computational overhead and a need for consistency (between 
application and network layers) management. In addition, network layers in 
WAHNs cannot implement the multicast functionality as efficiently as the 
Internet. For these two reasons, we propose to combine the multicast group 
functionality and the key management functionality at the application layer itself.
Avoiding overhead o f distributing control traffic: Current key management 
protocols use the network level multicast channel to distribute both data and
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rekeying/control traffic [12],[116],[118]. Accordingly, all group members 
unnecessarily receive all rekeying messages. In the proposed architecture, we 
avoid this overhead by ensuring that the keys are distributed only to the required 
nodes. This is possible due to the integration o f multicast and key management 
functions in the application layer.
Scalability, flexibility, and application semantics: As described in Section 2, 
the major attractions to shift the multicast functionality to the application layer are 
(a) Scalability with respect to group size, number o f groups as well as frequency 
o f membership change [27]. (b) Flexibility o f  the overlay structure to adapt 
dynamically to membership and topology change [6 6 ] (e.g. mobility), (c) The 
ability to integrate other functionalities with the multicast (e.g. key and group 
management in our case) [6 6 ].
Distribution o f group and key management functions: In most existing key 
management protocols, a centralized group controller maintains all the key 
management functionality [12] [116] [118]. In a limited resource environment, 
such as WAHNs, this constitutes an unacceptable overhead and drain o f  resources 
for a single node. Moreover, WAHN nodes tend to be unreliable and are prone to 
failure. The novel architecture handles this problem by having separate modules 
for key generation, assignment and distribution, each performed in a fully- 
distributed and fault-tolerant fashion.
Security and trust: WAHN nodes are autonomous and each node may choose 
whether or not to participate in group management [69], In addition, nodes may 
falsify information or collude by exchanging rekeying material [30]. Moreover, an 
attacker might hijack one or more nodes and use them to reveal all the network 
keys. In the novel architecture, the key management modules take these threats 
into consideration by applying techniques such as verifiable secret sharing, 
threshold-based key generation, and collusion-resistant key assignment.
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3.1.2. THE NOVEL ARCHITECTURE
The proposed novel architecture is shown in Fig. 8 . It consists o f four layers 
(similar to the ISO OSI reference model). The top layer is the application layer where 
group applications (e.g., secure conferencing, secure mobile auctions, etc.) reside and 
execute. Below this layer is the sub-application layer that supports group applications 
with secure group communication primitives as well as flexibility and security 
mechanisms to conform to both trust among network nodes as well as application 
semantics. Below this layer is the network layer which is assumed to offer only unicast 
packet delivery (due to scalability considerations in WAHNs). The bottom most layer is 
the physical layer which is a standard wireless MAC layer (e.g., 802.11).
Except for the sub-application layer, which is introduced in the novel architecture, the 
remainder o f the layers correspond to the similar ones in standard wireless ISO OSI 
stack. In the rest o f  the chapter, we focus on the newly introduced sub-application layer. 
The sub-application layer integrates multicast communication with secure group 
management. One or more group applications run at the application layer utilizing the 
secure group communication services provided by the underlying layer. The sub­
application layer consists o f three key modules: authenticator, group manager, and 
Application-Level Multicast (ALM) module. The interaction among these modules is 
well explained through the following scenario.
Upon receiving a join request from a user node, the authenticator evaluates the 
credentials o f the node and decides whether or not to honor the request. After 
authenticating the source o f the request, the authenticator forwards the request to the 
group manager, which adds the new node to the multicast group and performs rekeying to 
guarantee backward secrecy [98]. Rekeying performed both on demand as well as on 
regular basis to guarantee backward secrecy [118]. The ALM module provides a 
multicast primitive at the application layer to deliver messages through underlying 
network layer (via unicast) to group members. The group manager utilizes this service to 
deliver both data and rekeying material to relevant users.







Fig. 8 . A Novel architecture for secure group communications in WAFTNs.
Among the three modules, the group manager architecture is unique and is designed to 
work in the WAHN environments without network level multicast support. It consists o f  
the following four components, which perform their functions in a distributed, fault- 
tolerant, and efficient fashion. Each WAHN node may run these modules. 
Membership/Rekeying Manager is responsible for reporting leaves and joins by current 
members and initializes rekeying according to these membership changes. It is also 
responsible for reporting such membership changes to the ALM module in order to 
modify the multicast overlay structure.
Key Generator is responsible for generating new keys for joining members as well as 
modified versions o f current keys for rekeying to preserve forward secrecy.
Key Assigner is responsible for assigning current and newly generated keys to group 
members in order to maintain current secrecy and minimize the possibility o f collusion.
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Key Distribution Manager is responsible for distributing new keys at each rekeying time 
to appropriate members either through individual unicast or ALM messages.
The overall structure o f the group manager is shown in Fig. 8 . In the following, we 
overview each o f the components in the structure and show how they support the overall 
design objectives o f  the novel architecture.
We now look at the implementability issues o f  the novel architecture. As 
mentioned above, the physical layer, the network layer, and the application layer are 
standard layers and do not need further explanation. So we concentrate on the implement 
ability o f  the sub-application layer and its three components.
Since the authenticator is responsible for evaluating the credentials presented by joining 
members, existing authentication protocols based on PKI should be adequate. However, 
contemporary PKI protocols designed specifically for WAHNs (e.g., MOCA [126]),
3.1.3. IMPLEMENTATION FEASIBILITY
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Fig. 9. Interaction among key management modules.
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might be better solutions. The ability o f capability-restricted nodes in a WAHN to 
perform public key operations has been questionable due to the scarce computing and 
power resources. Different symmetric key-based authentication algorithms have been 
proposed in the literature. Examples include TESLA [30], LEAP [41]. Advances in 
hardware implementation and power management are expected to overcome this issue 
Some recent research work investigated the possibility of implementing public key 
operations in hardware with very low power consumption [19,35].
The ALM module is responsible for maintaining application-level multicast structurle 
and using this structure to emulate multicast via the unicast at the network layer. Any 
existing ALM scheme (e.g., [18]) can be used to implement this module. In our 
prototype, we use Multicast Content Addressable Networks (MCAN] [32], a highly 
scalable lightweight ALM protocol designed for large population multicast networks. It 
was shown that the proposed architecture is implementable under current technology. In 
the coming sections, we discuss the design issues o f  different components o f  the 
distributed group key management scheme, namely, key generation, key distribution, and 
key assignment.
3.2. COMBINATORIAL KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEME (CKDS)
In order to provide efficient group communications in wireless ad-hoc networks, 
we propose Combinatorial Key Distribution Scheme (CKDS). Our scheme depends on 
EBS and CAN. CKDS targets wireless ad-hoc networks o f hundreds to thousands o f  
nodes. We consider a set o f N  autonomous nodes that participate, or intend to participate, 
in a secure multicast group with a single source. Nodes communicate via a multi-hop 
wireless facility. We assume a centralized group controller, GC, to be responsible for key 
generation and construction o f rekeying messages. GC may reside at one o f  the 
autonomous nodes possibility with additional computing and communication capabilities. 
The terms nodes and users are used synonymously to refer to multicast group members. 
In the following sub-section, we provide an overview o f CKDS. Then, we present the 
details o f  our node partition scheme. Next, we describe two schemes for key distribution, 
w-dimensional multicast and 2D multicast.
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3.2.1. CKDS OVERVIEW
In secure group multicast, the main challenge is to change and redistribute keys 
(rekey) whenever a member joins (or leaves) a group in order to maintain backward (or 
forward) secrecy. CKDS deals with efficient distribution o f the new keys, also known as 
altered keys in this chapter. In particular, it delivers the ^-altered keys (based on EBS) to 
their appropriate group members through hop-by-hop unicast. We keep in mind that 
efficiency and scalability are major concerns o f such a scheme. CKDS follows the 
following procedure:
1. Assign a key string to each node.
2. Construct a multi-dimensional key space, and partition the nodes in 
that space according to their key strings.
3. Project the key space into m-dimensions corresponding to the keys 
unknown to the evicted/added.
4. Use one o f two key distribution schemes, m-dimensional multicast, or 
2D multicast to convey messages to individual nodes.
Revisiting the EBS example in Table 1 (section 2.6.1), we consider for example, that user 
Ui leaves the group. Three keys, K i, K2, and K3, need to be altered to maintain forward 
secrecy. The group controller generates three new keys K f , K2’, and K3’ to replace the 
old keys. The three new keys are encrypted using both K4  and K5, generating two 
rekeying messages R4  and R5.
Consider the 10-user case as in Table 1 (section 2.6.1). Applying step 1, we assign each 
node a bit string similar to the corresponding column in the EBS canonical matrix. For 
example, node Ui is assigned “11100.” The nodes are then partitioned into a 5- 
dimensional space based on step 2. Since it is complex to indicate the 5-dimensional 
figure, we show its projection on the K3 -K 4 plane in Figure 10. For example, since Ui 
contains K3 but does not contain K4, it is shown in the 2nd half o f  the K3 -axis and 1st half 
o f K4 -axis.
Now, we look at step 3. Assuming that node Ui is leaving the multicast group, according 
to step 3, the key space is projected based on K4  and K5 (the keys unknown to Ui). 
Applying the key space projection in step 4 to Ui is shown in Figure 10. It may be
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observed that Ui is in the 1st half o f  K4 -axis and 1st half o f  K5-axis indicating that Ui has 
neither o f these keys.
Finally, applying step 4 results in distributing the messages according to Figures lO.a and 
lO.b, for m-dimensional multicast and 2D multicast, respectively. As shown later, to 
perform rekeying after user Ui left the space, we use only 1 2  unicast messages each o f  
size 3 keys for m-dimensional multicast. In 2D multicast, we use only 15 smaller 
messages each with size 1 key and 3 messages o f size 3 keys each. In the following sub­
sections, we describe the above procedure in more details.
3.2.2. KEY STRING ASSIGNMENT (STEP 1) AND NODE
PARTITIONING (STEP 2)
To partition nodes, we start by assigning to each node a bit string o f  length k+m  
that we refer to as the key string. The key string has bit positions corresponding to the 
ordered set o f k+m  keys. A bit value o f 1 in a certain position i (l<i<k+m) denotes that 





Fig. lO.b. Projection o f space onFig. lO.a. Projection o f  space on K3-K4
plane (ES3). K4-K5 plane (ESi).
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terminology, key strings are the columns o f  the EBS canonical matrix A (see Table 1).
In CKDS, we arrange nodes in a virtual Cartesian space similar to the CAN virtual space, 
but with a few differences. Our space has k+m  dimensions with one dimension assigned 
to each o f the EBS k+m  keys. Each dimension extends between the values o f -7  and 1. 
Each node occupies a portion o f this space by having a set o f  k+m  intervals, one for each 
dimension. An axis splits its dimension into two halves. The negative half has all zones 
o f nodes that do not know that specific key corresponding to this dimension (i.e., those 
with a key string with a zero at that specific position). The positive half contains the 
nodes that know the corresponding key. For example, in Figure lO.a , users U2, U3, U6, 
and U9 are in the negative half o f K3 . This is also evident from the K3  row in Table 1. The 
remaining six users are in the positive half.
We refer to the portion o f the space that is specified via a bit string o f length d  as a length 
d-quadrant. A quadrant that satisfies the condition o f having k ones in the bit string is 
considered valid. Every length Ar+w-quadrant can carry a maximum of a single node. 
Sub-spaces are projection o f  the key space in a number o f dimensions less than k+m. 
Subspaces are divided into smaller-length quadrants. A length q-quadrants, where q < 
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Fig. 11. Constructing the key space.
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space construction goes as follows:
•  Assume an initial (£+mj-dimension empty space divided into positive and 
negative halves along each dimension to form 2k+m quadrants. We consider only 
valid quadrants.
•  A joining node will be assigned to the quadrant o f the space that corresponds to 
its key string.
•  A new node joins the space by contacting an already existing node and reaching 
the closest node to its key string. (Usually by using Cartesian distance)
•  Whenever a node joins a quadrant occupied by one or more existing nodes, one o f  
the existing nodes splits its interval with the new node along the dimension 
corresponding to the key with lower number.
•  Neighbors are updated according to the same rule as in CAN.
The main difference between CKDS key space and the regular CAN space is that each 
node holds two values along each dimension to represent the interval it is occupying. The 
sign o f such values has significance with respect to known and unknown keys. Clearly, 
no node can have an interval along a dimension that contains zero. In the following, we 
illustrate how the CDKS key space is managed as users join and leave.
Consider the EBS( 10,3,2) example. We only consider the ^K s-plane for simplicity. The 
first user Ui joins the space with 0 in the fourth and fifth bit o f  its key string. The user is 
assigned the entire 00-quadrant and occupies one quarter o f the available K ^s-plane. We 
notice that user Uj has no neighbors it is the only one in the space. The next user U 2  joins 
with lot-ks string 70 (meaning that he or she has K4 but not K5). According to the same 
rule, U2  is assigned the 70-quadrant and occupies another quarter o f  the plane. The same 
scheme will place user U3 in the 07-quadrant. The next user, has the key string 70, 
same as user U2. This will force U2  to share its space with U4, by dividing the space in 
half along the K4  dimension. This situation is illustrated in Figure 11. The next user Us 
will share the 07-quadrant with U3. U 6  will be located in the 77-quadrant. U7 will have to 
share the 70-quadrant with both U 2  and U4. This will force one o f  these two users to split 
its space (this time along K5) and share it with U7. The same idea will be applied to 
accommodate Ug in the 07-quadrant. Users U9 and U10 will have to share the 77-quadrant 
with U (5 in the same manner. The final K4-K5 plane will look as in Figure 12.




Fig. 12. Projection o f space on K4-K5 plane after U4 left.
Each user in the above illustration occupies some area o f the K4-K5 plane and recognizes 
its neighbors along both dimensions. For example, Us recognizes U3 and U 6  as his 
preceding and succeeding neighbors along K4. At the same time U10 recognizes U9 and 
U4 as his preceding and succeeding neighbors along K5. In general, in a perfectly 
partitioned (/-dimensional space, each user will keep track o f  2d  neighbors 2  o f  them 
along each o f  the d  dimensions.
An important difference between this organization and the one in CAN [32] is that users 
do not recognize neighbors with whom they do not share key(s) along the specified 
dimension(s). In other words, neighborhood does not the axis. In the above example, Us 
does not recognize Ui as its neighbor along K5 although they overlap along the K5 
dimension. This property makes the a//-zeras-quadrant unreachable from other quadrants. 
However, users located in the a//-zeras-quadrant in a certain 2D plane will be occupying 
other quadrants in different 2D projections. For example, in Figure 12, Ui and Ug are not 
recognized as neighbors along K5, while in the K3-K4 plane in Figure lO.a, they are 
recognized as neighbors along K3.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
57
A user might leave the key space either voluntarily or involuntarily. In both cases the 
same scenario applies. All neighboring nodes will be able to sense the absence o f the 
leaving node. However, the neighbors within the same quadrant take responsibility to 
regain the space that had been occupied by the absent node similar to CAN.
In the above example, assume that U4  leave the key space (may be evicted or went 
down). Users U 2 , U 1 0 , and U7  will recognize the absence o f U 4 . As U 7  is the node with 
which U 4  shared the space, U 7  will regain the space and update the surrounding neighbors 
with the new state. The new space is illustrated Fig. 12. Key Distribution in CKDS 
Rekeying usually involves three steps key generation, construction o f  rekeying messages, 
and key distribution, as described in Section 1. Key distribution involves delivering the 
rekeying messages to appropriate group members. In a centralized key management 
system, the group controller is normally responsible for these three steps. In EKDS, the 
group controller is only responsible for the first two tasks. The step 3 o f key distribution 
is delegated to the nodes themselves using our key distribution scheme.
In fixed networks with network-level multicast support, key distribution is not an issue as 
the group controller just multicasts the rekeying messages on the channel to everyone. 
With ad-hoc networks using application-level multicast, key distribution is not as simple. 
Since the multicast is implemented with an underlying unicast, or at best as a very limited 
multicast in some areas, the number o f unicast messages needs to be optimized.
We start by revisiting the EBS(10,3,2) example with our two rekeying messages R4  and 
R5. A  first-cut scheme is to use Directed Flooding [32] multicast algorithm as described 
in Section 2 to distribute the keys. This scheme might not achieve acceptable 
performance due to the unnecessarily large number o f unicast duplicate messages used to 
deliver updated keys to users.
Here, we propose two different unicast distribution schemes-m-Dimensional scheme, and 
Localized 2D multicast scheme. Before going into the details o f  our two schemes, we 
need to define the terms Exclusion sub-space, and Complementary nodes.














Fig. 13. m-Dimensional key distribution.
An Exclusion sub-space (ESj) is defined for a group member Uj as the m-dimensional 
subspace representing the projection o f  the group {k+m) dimensional key space along the 
m dimensions whose keys are unknown to user i. Figure lO.a and lO.b represent E S i and 
ES3 respectively. Exclusion sub-spaces represent the projection o f the key space in a way 
that a certain user looks isolated in an all-zeros-q uadrant. The main purpose o f this 
projection is to facilitate rekeying in case a user leaves or joins. In the exclusion sub­
spaces, we define quadrant boundaries as virtual lines (or hyper-planes) that separate 
quadrants. In the following context, unless stated otherwise, rekeying messages are 
blocked by such boundaries.
A complementary node for a user U; is a node that knows all keys that are unknown to Uj. 
In the above example, nodes U6, U9, and U10 are complementary to U j. For a certain user 
Uj, all the complementary nodes are located in the all-ones quadrant in ESj.
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3.2.2.I. THE M-DIMENSIONAL MULTICAST SCHEME
In this scheme, the group controller delegates the responsibility o f key distribution 
to some other nodes in the key space. For adding or evicting a certain user Uj, the group 
controller projects the key space into ESj,. the exclusion sub-space o f this specific user.. 
The key generator tries first to locate any node o f the complementary set o f  Uj. A 
complementary node knows the entire set o f  the m-unaltercd keys. If such a node exists, 
the key generator forwards the rekeying messages to that node. The most suitable node is 
the one occupying the lower left comer o f  the all-ones-quadrant. Such a node will be able 
to forward rekeying messages to nodes in other quadrants (clearly, except the 00 
quadrant), it forwards rekeying messages to other nodes with which it shares the all-ones- 
quadrant at the same time. We refer to such a node as the Initial Global Distributor 
(IGD). I f  such a node does not exist, the group controller plays this role o f IGD. The 
group controller acts as a hyper-node with an all-ones key string, thus it can play the role 
of IGD.
The initial distributor has shared boundaries with all nodes eligible to receive the 
rekeying messages. It first locates a central node in each quadrant and forwards the 
appropriate rekeying message to that node. We refer to such a central node as Local 
Quadrant Distributor (LQD). A  central node is selected as LQD to minimize the delay. 
LQD is responsible for multicasting the received rekeying message among all other nodes 
at the same quadrant using a multicast algorithm such as Directed Flooding. The GID 
plays the role o f LQD within its own quadrant (i.e. the a//-o«e.s-quadrant).
Nodes at any specific quadrant may know more than one key out o f the m keys used by 
the group controller for encryption. This situation may result in a large number o f  
duplicates since all nodes in such a quadrant will receive different encryptions o f  the 
same messages. To avoid such an overhead, the group controller forwards only one 
message to each quadrant. One idea is to send the message encrypted with the key o f  
minimum (or maximum) index that nodes in a certain quadrant know.
In Fig. 13, we apply this scheme to our EBS( 10,3,2) example. The group controller 
selects U 6  as the IGD. U 6  will select U 2  and Us as LQD for the 10-quadrant and 07- 
quadrant and forwards to them R4  and R5 respectively. As a LQD, U 6  distributes the 
rekeying message R5 to the 77-quadrant.
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3.2.2.2. LOCALIZED 2D MULTICAST
In the above approach, rekeying is done through encrypting all updated k keys using their 
corresponding older revoked keys, and then encrypting the whole message once with 
very one o f the m unaltered keys. In such an approach, two cascaded encryptions are 
done for each rekeying message. Some users get longer messages where they need only 
small part o f it. However, they can’t trim this part until they decrypt the message to 
unleash the outer encryption. This overhead might be significant in a wireless ad-hoc 
network with limited networking resources and processing power at each node. In order 
to reduce this traffic and processing overhead incurred by individual nodes, we propose 
2D-multicast, an alternative key distribution scheme with lower traffic and decryption 
overhead.
As an example, consider the EBS(10,3,2) above. The rekeying message R4  contains Ki, 
K.2, and K3. This message will reach three users, U3, U5, and Ug. U3 needs to update only 
K| and K2, U5 needs to update only Ki and K3, and Us needs to update only K2 and K3. 
Each o f these users receives an extra key in the rekeying message. The situation is even 
worse in the 11-quadrant where each user receives 2  extra keys in the rekeying message. 
This constitutes an overhead o f  one or two thirds o f the total traffic. In an environment 
with low resources, such as wireless ad-hoc networks, such an overhead is considered 
significant.
One idea is to break the rekeying message down into smaller messages, say m disjoint 
messages each o f which carries only one key. Thus,
R4=K4(K ,(K ,’), K2 (K2’), k 3 (k 3’)) , 
will be broken into 3 messages as follows.
Rh= K4 (K ,(K ,’)), R42= K4(K 2(K 2’)), R43=  K4(K 2(K 3’))
Each o f  these messages will be directed to the specific set o f users who need such a key. 
We refer to the key used for outer enciyption (such as K4 in R4)  as the encryptor key. The 
key whose new version is encrypted using its old version within the message is referred 
to as the altered key. In order to avoid double decryptions by each user, we can use a 
new key for encryption. This new combined key is constructed by using a one-way hash 
function to hash the altered key with the encryptor key. According to the security 
requirement o f  the network and the computational capabilities o f the individual nodes,
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
61
the hash function can be as simple as a bit-wise Exclusive Or, or as complex and secure 
as SHA-1. We denote such combined key as Kj|Kj, where Kj is the encryptor key and Kj 
is the altered key. In that case, the original R4  will be broken down into 3 simpler 
messages as follows.
R4I”  K 4 |K ](K l’), R.42= K.4 |K2(K 2 ’), R-43=  K4|K.3(K3’)
In general, a rekeying message to update a certain altered key, Kj encrypted with a certain 
encryptor key Kj, will be in the form, Rjj=Kj|Kj(Kj’).
For these new messages to be distributed, we consider a projection o f  the key space in the 
two dimensional plane corresponding to keys Ki and Kj. In such projection, we consider 
only the 77 quadrant, the quadrant in which all nodes have the two keys Kj and Kj. 
Distribution in such quadrant starts with virtual node that occupy the 11 lower left comer 
and plays the role o f  LQD. One o f these nodes may even represent the group controller. 
Messages are multicasted to all nodes in the 77-quadrant using the same Directed 
Flooding algorithm.
Using individual messages for each set o f  users who know two keys will constitute a 
huge traffic overhead. A better way is to use this message splitting technique within each 
of the length m-quadrants. LQDs in every quadrant are responsible for multicasting the 
rekeying messages. The group controller forms a single rekeying message for each 
encryptor key concatenating the individual rekeying messages for all altered keys that has 
the same encryptor in order. It then sends to each quadrant the rekeying messages 
encrypted with the encryptor that has maximum (or minimum) index the quadrant nodes 
know. The distribution node distributes the keys differently as follows.
For each distribution node that receives a rekeying message R\ with encryptor key k,
For each altered key K} in R,
Project the quadrant space in two dimensions Ki-Kj and consider only the 
11-quadrant.
Distribute the part Ki\Kj(Kj )  to the 11 quadrant using directed flooding





times fo r  k 
altered keys
Fig. 14. Localized quadrant multicast with 2D rekeying.
According to this scheme, in a particular length-m quadrant, multiple 2D projections are 
used to distribute the rekeying messages. Specifically, one projection for each pair o f  
keys K; and Kj that at least known but a single node in the quadrant. Fig. 14 depicts this 
multiple 2D distribution. Each node receives only the relevant keys without any overhead 
traffic. The tradeoff here is between traffic overhead and the number o f unicast messages. 
This is expected to be relevant in certain environments where nodes have even more 
limited resources such as sensor networks. The overhead incurred by each node in 
receiving irrelevant keys may achieve better overall performance with lower number o f  
messages in some other environments.
3.3. THRESHOLD-BASED KEY GENERATION IN WAHNS (TKGS)
We assume a WAHN of hundreds to thousands o f  nodes. A set o f  N  autonomous 
nodes participates, or intends to participate, in a secure multicast group with a single
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source. Nodes communicate via a multi-hop wireless facility and are prone to failure or 
mal-behaving. N o centralized key generator is assumed.
In order to provide dependable and efficient secure group communication service in 
such environment, we start with an EBS-based key assignment. Key distribution is 
performed via any o f the two C K D S  key distribution schemes presented in Section 3.2. 
We propose a collaborative verifiable threshold-based key generation scheme to replace 
the centralized group controller. Fig. 15 shows a proposed general architecture for secure 
group communications in WAHNs. In this architecture, no network-level support for 
multicast is assumed. A group manager module performs necessary group key generation 
and re-keying initialization. A key distribution module, such as CKDS, performs key 
distribution based on unicast multi-hop message service. In Fig. 1616, we show some 
more details about the proposed group manager that uses our proposed TKGS.
3.3.1. THRESHOLD-BASED KEY GENERATION SCHEME (TKGS)
In order to design our secure threshold key generation scheme, we propose a simple 
key generation mechanism. For each administrative key K„ 1< i < k+m, in the original 
E B S , we define a key generation key, K G K j. K G K f is used to generate K';, the updated 
version o f K ,  through a simple cryptographic function C. Thus,
K,'=C(KGKhK,)
3.3.1. THRESHOLD-BASED KEY GENERATION SCHEME (TKGS)
In order to design our secure threshold key generation scheme, we propose a simple 
key generation mechanism. For each administrative key Kj, 1< i < k+m, in the original 
EBS, we define a key generation key, K G K j. K G K j is used to generate K \ ,  the updated 
version o f Kj, through a simple cryptographic function C. Thus,
K,'=C(KGKhKi)
To make it more systematic, we consider all the administrative keys to depend on discreet 
intervals. At time tp we have the key Kj takes on the value Ky, instead o f  using the 
notation o f  K f. Accordingly,
Kij '=C(KGKi,Kij.])
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Fig. 15. Architecture for secure group communications in WAHNs.
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Fig. 16. Architecture o f the Group Manager.
The cryptographic function C should be secure and should be known to all nodes with 
relatively simple computation. The KGKs are not stored anywhere via participating 
nodes. They are used as the shared secret for the VSS scheme. The secret is shared 
among all nodes that know the administrative key K,. To apply a t-out-uf-N VSS [42] 
scheme, we assign N  shares, one to every node in the set o f  nodes knowing Kj. According
f  M-Hfc-lV
to CKDS [80], this set contains N,= nodes. Any t nodes out o f  n suffice to
reconstruct the KGK and generate the new updated key.
As illustrated in Fig. 16, rekeying can be done either periodically or as needed. 
Although subjecting the system to short vulnerability windows, periodic batch rekeying 
was shown to be more efficient in hierarchical rekeying structures such as LKFl [118]. 
Periodic batch rekeying improves efficiency by reducing number o f  rekey messages to be 
signed as well as taking advantage o f  join and leave overlap.
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In our proposed threshold-based rekeying scheme, rekeying is performed on individual 
administrative keys using a t-out-of-N  threshold scheme. The set o f nodes that know a 
specific administrative key K, represent the community {N j}, while any t nodes out of 
this community can form the quorum for rekeying. In order to perform a verifiable 
sharing o f K G K s, we use a technique similar to NEW-VSS [42]. To perform rekeying o f  
Kj, we assume a secret sharing polynomial Si(x)as well as a verification polynomial v,(x), 
both o f degree t-1, for each key generation key K G K j corresponding to an administrative 
key Kj, where t is the specified threshold. Each party, Uj, holds a share o f both 
polynomials, denoted as, S j ( j )  and V j ( j ) ,  as well as a commitment function C. We outline 
TKGS, our simple key generation protocol in Fig. 17.
The above basic TKGS provides systematic collaborative key generation in an 
environment with un-trusted nodes. TKGS tolerates faulty and misbehaving nodes as 
long as there could be up to t  valid participants. The key generation can take place only if
TKGS (ki)
1. A group member, referred to as the dealer dlh broadcasts a request fo r  rekeying  
o f  Kj to other m embers o f  {Nj}.
2. Each user, Uj in the community {Nj} broadcasts his own response to the 
rekeying request according to a certain probability.
3. Upon receiving a t least qrekey positive responses to the request, the dealer du 
assumes the request was granted and  broadcasts a ready-to-accept-shares 
message.
4. Each user, Uj in the community {Nj} m ay send its share o f  generation key, 
K G K j j  =  S j ( j )  as w ell as its share o f  the verification function  V j( j) ,  to the dealer 
via unicast.
5. Collecting at least t confirmation messages with verified shares, the dealer may 
proceed  with the rekeying, or time out
6 . The dealer reconstructs the polynomials s,(x) and  V j(x) using t valid points o f  
verified shares. Then, the dealer verifies the reconstructed polynomials using N t 
values o f  the commitment function  C.
7. I f  the verification fails, the dealer broadcast a complaint message and  a 
different node restarts the procedure.
8. I f  the verification succeeds, the dealer reconstructs K G K  and generates the 
administrative key K lt, . ,=C(KGK„ K J
9. The key distribution procedures takes p lace as in CKDS
Fig. 17. Threshold Key Generation Scheme, TKGS.
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a quorum o f at least qrekey vote to rekey. The parameter t can be tuned to reflect the 
amount o f trust in the environment. In case most nodes are un-trusted, we may use a 
larger value o f the threshold t at a higher communication and computational overhead. 
On the other hand, trust worthier environment can use a smaller threshold with lower 
overhead.
A simple DoS attack on the basic TKGS may take place by having multiple nodes place 
unnecessary rekeying requests and cause system thrashing. The parameter qKkey reflects 
the amount o f  trust placed on a specific individual node to play the role o f  the dealer and 
initiate rekeying. Higher value o f q„key means that more nodes should approve the act o f  
rekeying before it takes place and vice versa. Since nodes multicast their responses, 
different participant can verily the approval o f  rekeying before sending their shares. For 
secure transmission o f  shares, shares are sent encrypted with a symmetric key derived 
from all keys shared between the shareholder and the dealer.
3.3.2. TKGS/V
Although the basic TKGS protects the key generation process from faulty and 
mal-behaving nodes, a dealer might falsify the generated key. Since no other node has the 
whole t verified shares, the dealer might correctly collect the shares and then distribute a 
different key. We suggest two techniques to protect the key generation from mal- 
behaving dealer. The first technique is through replication, i.e. replicate the key 
generation process with more than one dealer and compare the generated keys for 
verification. The second technique is through backward confirmation, i.e. nodes that 
played the role o f dealer through a certain past window o f time are responsible for 
confirming the key generation process and comparing it with the received key. Those 
nodes can multicast a complaint to all nodes in order to nullify the rekeying process.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
68
Replication is done simultaneously at all participating dealers and the keys are multicast 
to all members in {N j} . It is the responsibility o f individual nodes to verify the received 
keys. Clearly, using replication incurs an overhead o f  repeating the Basic TKGS as many 
times as the number o f replicas. On the other hand, in backward confirmation, 
verification is done after the key distribution. Since all past dealers have the verified 
share, they can use the current key Kj and the shares to replicate the process done by the 
current dealer. Accordingly, no communication overhead is incurred on other nodes. This
TKGS/V (ki)
Dealers
1. Start with (Rekeying Number) RN=0
2. for (j= 0; j  < q deaier -RNr ;j++)
a. Select dealer dj according to select criteria
b. Dealer dj initiates Basic TKGS(k)
c. Dealer dj distributes K,
3. RN++
4. For each past dealer dk, I <k<RN
Apply steps 6 , and 7 of Basic TGKS
Members
1. Upon approving rekeying by each dealer dk,, separately, I < k<qdealer -RN send 
your shares as in step 4 in Basic TKGS.
2. Compare K  received from each dealer, and verify it is the same
3. If you receive complaints from a quorum of past dealers, you may ignore the 
rekeying, and restart
Fig. 18. Threshold Key Generation Scheme with Verified dealer, TKGS/V.
might not be suitable for systems with tight time constraints. Another restriction is the 
availability o f  past dealers especially at system startup.
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In TKGS/V, we propose the use o f both replication and backward confirmation. We 
define a dealer quorum parameter qjeaier, to determine which technique is used. At the 
system start up, and as long as number o f rekeying time, and accordingly number o f  past 
dealers, less than qdealer, we use replication. When the number rekeying times exceeds 
qdeaier, backward confirmation is used. Fig. 18 depicts TKGS/V.
3.3.3. CHANGING KGKS
The above TKGS/V provides verifiable key generation as long as K G K  does not 
change. Every time rekeying o f  K  is performed, a new node plays the dealer role and 
reveals KGKj. If a large number o f nodes reveal KGK,, K G K  cannot be considered secret 
anymore. At the same time, if  a node that had played as a dealer left the group, then 
K G K , and accordingly, all future K j  are revealed. We consider each node that has played 
the role o f  dealer, since the last KGK change, as a type 2 node. Theoretically, any group 
dynamics, i.e. join or leave, related to type 2 nodes require K G K  to be changed. We 
assume that joining nodes are always o f type 1, knowing only k  administrative keys. 
When a node is selected to play the role o f  dealer for a certain key generation o f  any o f  
the administrative keys known to it, the node is promoted to be a type 2 node.
Altering the key generation key, K G K t is an expensive operation similar to the original 
system bootstrapping. This process maps to the sharing phase o f  the original VSS 
protocol. We assume KGKs to change less frequently than administrative keys. In order 
to ensure less frequent updates, we may place some policy on selecting a specific node to 
act as a dealer. Some parameters to consider in this situation is the probability o f  that 
specific node to leave the group, number o f times the node has acted as a dealer for the 
specific key Kj as well as for other administrative keys known to it, the specific node 
failure probability if  available, etc.
To handle the above situation, and to keep backward secrecy at the type 2 nodes, we need 
to change K G K  not only upon the leaving o f any type 2 node with respect to K G K , but 
also when the number o f previous dealers o f  the corresponding administrative key K, 
reaches a certain threshold, say 30% o f the total population, V,. Rekeying KGKs will 
hamper the collusion o f past dealers as well as mobile adversary attacks. Assuming a 
mobile adversary is capable o f compromising up to cCOmpromized, say 2%, o f  Nj at a certain
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
70
window o f time, T<t, measured in number o f  K, rekeys. We can set the threshold at 
which, we change KGK,, tKGK to be less than t/cCOmpromized-f, so that before the mobile 
adversary achieves the required t  compromised nodes, the corresponding KGKj changes.
3.4. KEY ASSIGNMENT AND MITIGATING COLLUSION (CKAS)
In the remaining part o f this chapter, we focus on Combinatorial Key Assignment 
Scheme (CKAS), our solution to the key assignment and batch issues in EDKMS. The 
main objective o f CKAS is to assign keys to group member in a way that facilitates and 
minimizes rekeying. In CKAS, batch rekeying is used instead o f individual rekeying 
(after each user joins or leaves) to improve system performance. In addition to batch 
rekeying, users are sub-grouped into clusters either based on physical location and/or 
behavioral characteristics (such as expected departure time). In order to support such sub­
grouping, we extend the original EBS scheme into a Clustered Exclusion Basis System 
(CEBS). Finally, we propose a simple key assignment scheme in which, keys are 
assigned to users in a way that reduces the need for rekeying.
3.4.1. BATCH REKEYING AND COLLUSION
Although subjecting the system to short vulnerability windows, periodic batch 
rekeying was shown to be more efficient in hierarchical rekeying structures such as LKH 
[114]. Periodic batch rekeying improves efficiency by reducing number o f  rekey 
messages to be signed as well as taking advantage o f join and leave overlap.
In EBS system, batch rekeying involves even more system vulnerability due to possibility 
of collusion. Evicting a number o f  users, c, without rekeying allows those users to 
exchange system keys and to be able to beat the system. On the other hand, batch 
rekeying improves efficiency significantly specially in high dynamic groups. The main 
question in batch rekeying is usually when to rekey. In case o f joins, since joining users 
do not know any system keys as long as no rekeying has happened, rekeying is either 
periodically or upon reaching a certain number o f joining users. A study o f the effect o f  
rekeying period on the performance can be found in [118]. In case o f  leaving users, the 
number o f leaving users and the keys they know induces a certain chance o f  collusion 
that can beat the system.
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In EBS, collusion o f c users happens when those users collectively know the whole set o f  
k+m EBS administrative keys. In clustered EBS, collusion happens when a group o f  c 
evicted users collectively know the entire set o f  kc+mc+kg+mg administrative keys. In this 
chapter, we consider only total collusion rather than partial collusion. Collusion is the 
main obstacle for using batch rekeying in EBS-base key management. Rekeying should 
take place before collusion can occur. In case collusion occurs, the only recovery can be 
through individual user rekeying in a way similar to GKMP [31], which incorporates 
0(N ) messages.
In CKAS, users are allowed to leave and rekeying is performed on a batch basis. Since 
they might exchange key information before rekeying takes place, leaving users in the 
rekeying period are considered potential colluders. Clearly, the more potential colluders 
are left in the system the higher the collusion probability is. Batch rekeying takes place 
upon reaching a certain collusion probability to avoid expensive collusion recovery. We 
present a model for collusion probability evaluation. Rekeying takes place as the system 
reaches a threshold collusion probability and accordingly a corresponding threshold 
number o f evicted users. If the number o f potential colluders is lower than a certain value 
(Cmm), the probability o f collusion is zero, and no rekeying is considered. After the 
number o f colluders reaches a certain value (cmax), collusion is certain since the potential 
colluders already have all system keys. For all values in-between, the collusion 
probability should be evaluated and based on that rekeying might take place.
3.4.2. CLUSTERED EXCLUSION BASIS SYSTEM (CEBS)
In many group applications, user behavior (e.g. joining and leaving the group) is 
not purely random. Users who join the group simultaneously may leave also 
simultaneously. Due to limited communication capabilities in a WAEIN environment, the 
group might be participating in several clusters according to their locations. 
Communications between nodes belonging to two different clusters might be infeasible. 
An efficient key management schema should take advantage o f such property to facilitate 
rekeying. We introduce CEBS, an extension to the EBS key management scheme with 
clustering support.
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In CEBS, two levels o f  EBS keys are used to support clustering. If we are using 
originally k+m  keys, o f which A: keys are known by each user, then we can divide this set 
as follows. Each user knows k  keys, out o f which, kg are global keys (used across 
clusters) and kc are local keys (used within the cluster), where k=kg+kc. The same for the 
unknown keys, each user have m unknown keys (represented as zeros in his key string), 
mg out o f which are global and me are local, where m=mg+mc.
In such solution, each cluster has the internal structure o f EBS(Nc,kc,me) while the outer 
group o f clusters has the structure o f  EBS(Ng,kg,mg). The maximum number o f clusters 
we can have is Ng and the maximum number o f users within any cluster id Nc, where
The total number o f users supported by the set o f  k+m  keys are N*=Ng*Nc. The 
minimum number o f colluders to reveal all kc+mc keys within the cluster is referred to as 
cmin,c. Parameters kc and mc may be selected to guarantee a minimum number o f colluders 
required to reveal cluster keys.
All users within the same cluster have the same assignment o f global keys. Colluding to 
reveal cluster keys requires a minimum number o f colluding clusters, cm„ig, represented as 
at least one individual user from each o f the cmng clusters. Selecting kg and mg to 
guarantee a reasonable cmmg, along with the assumption that inter-cluster 
communications are infrequent, makes such collusion unlikely.
The formal specification o f CEBS, a clustered EBS system o f Ng clusters with Nc 
users/nodes within each cluster, kg+kc keys out o f  kg+kc+mg+mc keys known by each 
user CEBS(Ng, N c kg, kc mg, mc) can be described as a cascaded organization o f two EBS 
systems, an inter-cluster system o f EBS(Ng,kg,mg), and an intra-cluster system o f  
EBS(Nc,kc,mc).
The number o f clusters, N g should satisfy
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The number o f users per cluster, N c should satisfy
(  k c + m c \
(2)
V kc y
From (1) and (2), the total number o f users in CEBS(Ng;, N c kg, kc mg, mc), N should be
The way keys are assigned to users in EBS affects the collusion possibility. In this 
context, key assignment refers to assigning to a specific user a key string that tells which 
keys are known and which are unknown to him/her. The objective o f a key assignment 
scheme is to assign keys to users expected to be evicted together so that the collusion 
probability is minimized. If key strings are assigned improperly o co-evicted users, the 
case o f  having cmi„ colluders who are able to reveal all keys and accordingly rekeying has 
to be done more frequently (individually if  cm,„=2). On the other hand, if  keys are 
assigned properly to those potential colluders, rekeying can be deferred till we have 
almost cmax evicted users (e.g. we can use a higher value for the rekeying threshold based 
on the collusion probability).
The following scheme assigns keys to a set o f  users in a plain EBS (who are expected to 
collude) so that the collusion probability is minimized.
Input: EBS(N,k,m)  canonical matrix, c joining users, c
Output: c key string assignment fo r  c users
Step 1: give the firs t user the string (ll..l)k (0 ..0 )m
Step 2: fo r  zeros=m -l to 0 do
Give each one o f  C(k+m-zeros,k) user one o f  the key strings with consecutive
zeros zeros at the end.
(  kg+ms Y  K +/M.A
N  = N rN„ < (3)
3.4.3. KEY ASSIGNMENT SCHEME
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The above scheme guarantees that users who are assigned key strings at one iteration o f  
the loop get the maximum possible key overlap and accordingly the minimum collusion 
probability. If c<cmax , the above assignment is collusion free.
In CEBS, if  clustering is logical, the system can fill each cluster with up to cmax,c users. 
Additional users can be distributed on other clusters according to the same criterion 
applied to the cluster EBS structure, EBS(Ng,kg,mg).
3.5. CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we introduced our proposed solution for key management in WAHNs. 
We started with key distribution and proposed using Combinatorial Key Distribution 
Scheme (CKDS). We followed with key generation using Threshold-based Key 
Generation in WAHNs (TKGS). For key assignment, we proposed Combinatorial Key 
Assignment Scheme (CKAS) and Clustered Exclusion Basis System (CEBS)., witch 
assigns closer key strings to co-located nodes. We claim that our architecture can readily 
be populated with components to support objectives such as fault tolerance, full- 
distribution and scalability to mitigate WAHNs constraints. In the next chapter, we 
present a simulation study that compares our proposed solution to existing ones and 
shows that it gives better results.
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CHAPTER IV 
SCHEME RESULTS IN WIRELESS AD-HOC NETWORKS
In this chapter, we review simulation results o f the three parts o f our proposed 
scheme for WAHNs. In Section 4.1, we view the simulation results o f CKDS. In Section 
4.2, we overview the simulation results o f TKGS. In Section 4.3, we overview the 
simulation results o f  CKAS
4.1. CKDS RESULTS
In key management systems such as [18] [30] [94], the system performance is 
usually evaluated in terms o f  the number o f  key changes or the number o f  multicast 
messages. Tree-based systems such as the LKH model achieve a logarithmic number o f  
rekeying messages in terms o f the number o f  users [18], [94], Particularly, in classical 
LKH, every changed key is multicast once for every descendant o f  the node holding the 
key. Some researchers achieved a better performance by using hybrid approaches [ 3, 42], 
or by optimizing the tree [133],[82],
In a general EBS(N,k,m), rekeying involves altering k keys and generating m rekeying 
messages. The relationship between the number o f users N  and the parameters k  and m 
can be determined by (4).
^ k+m''
>  N  (4)
V k )
The number o f keys changed per rekeying is at most (log2N+ log2  (log2N)), which is less 
than 21og2N, the number o f key changes in LKH systems such as in [18].
The assumption o f a reliable multicast channel results in a direct proportion relation 
between the number o f keys changed and number o f multicast messages. In an 
application-level multicast, this assumption is not valid anymore, since all messages that 
used to be multicast are now delivered through unicast. In our performance study, we 
focus on the number o f unicast messages as a performance parameter o f  the network
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overhead. Since we target wireless environments with limited resources, we expect nodes 
to have limited computational power. We consider the average number o f decryptions 
performed by a single node as a performance parameter that represents the computational 
overhead incurred at individual nodes.
To start with a base-line case, we consider an average system o f  N=10,000 users 
supported through EBS. EBS offers a tradeoff between the number o f  keys k known by 
each user, and the number o f  rekeying messages (m). In Fig. 19, we plot the number o f  
keys per user, k, against number o f  messages, m, for N= 10,000 users. There are 7 
different (k,m) combinations to support 10,000 users. Our basic comparison case will 
consider the simplest scheme o f  distributing m rekeying messages to all users using the 
directed flooding as in Section 2. In such a case, we have m rekeying messages to be
4.1.1. A BASE-LINE CASE
fk+m\
delivered to at most users using directed flooding on an m-dimensional space. If
12
0
6  7  8 9  11 14 20
keys per user (k)
Fig. 19. Rekeying messages Vs Number o f Keys per 
users for 10,000 users.
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we assume a perfectly partitioned space, we will have a single message per user. In such
f  k + m \
a case there are
(  k + m \
-1 unicast messages per rekeying message resulting in a total o f  m
-1) messages, each o f size k.
Another option is to use GKMP [49]. In such a case, the group controller will 
communicate the TEK individually to each group member using her personal key. The 
number o f rekeying messages is clearly N. However, if  we assume a uniform two- 
dimensional distribution o f  the nodes in the space, each message needs to travel in
average along a number o f hops equal to the-^-Z/V to reach its destination. This
forwarding introduces a large overhead o f unicast messages. Fig 20 shows the number o f  
unicast messages for 10,000 users using both Directed Flooding and GKMP under 
different (m,k) pairs.
(0
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- Directed Flooding 
GKMP
(6,11) (7,9) (8,8) (9,7) (11,6) (14,5) (20,4)
Number of keys per user ( k)
Fig. 20. Number o f unicast messages for 1000 Users 
Under Directed Flooding and GKMP.
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In the simple directed flooding approach, each user performs a number o f decryptions 
upon receiving a certain rekeying message, denoted by Nj. A specific user can share at 
most k- 1  keys with the evicted user, thus she may perform a maximum o f k- 1  decryptions 
for her own keys plus an extra decryption for the outer message encryptor. Generally, if  a 
user Uj knows i keys out o f m-unaltered keys, this user will perform k-i+1 decryptions. U , 
should know a total o f  k keys out o f  which, i keys are among the m-unaltered keys and k-i 
keys are selected from the remaining k  keys. For a specific value o f i, the number o f users
who satisfy the above condition is
(  k \
V  i \ k - i j
. Clearly, A  user can know a maximum o f m
keys out o f the m-unaltered keys. At the same time, a single user cannot know more than 
k keys. Thus, the maximum possible value o f  i is either k or m whichever is lower. 
Accordingly, the average number o f  decryptions done by each user, N<| for N users in the 
system, is determined by (5).
1 k 2 +m  + k (m  + k'\
^  I + J (5>
The proof o f the Nd final value can be found in Appendix B.
In GKMP, each user performs only one decryption upon receiving each rekeying 
message, i.e. Na=l. This lower Nd is achieved at the expense o f  done linear number o f  
key change per rekeying. Figure 21 lot the above Nd for directed Multicast with 10,000 
users under simple Directed Flooding.
4.1.2. ANALYZING M-DIMENSIONAL MULTICAST
In our m-dimensional key distribution, the multicast messages are propagated 
using directed flooding thorough different quadrants separately. Users are distributed at 
these quadrants according to the following. For a certain quadrant with i l ’s, the
maximum number o f users the quadrant can have is  ^ j . Similar to the derivation o f
m i n k \
(2), the maximum number o f  unicast messages is 2J I Jj^  J- With each message 
containing k keys, the message size can be considered as k  key-size. The upper bound on
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the total traffic in the network, Tm, is defined as the maximum number o f  messages 
multiplied by the message size. According to the above, this value is determined by (3).
The proof o f  the Tm final value can be found in Appendix B.
Tm is plotted at different values o f k (and accordingly m) in Fig 22.
Since every user will deciypt only the keys he or she needs to update, with an extra single 
decryption overhead per message, the average number o f deciyptions per user remains as 
in the simple directed flooding as in (5).
In the 2D multicast scheme, the group controller generates m messages, one for each o f  
wj-unaltered key. Each message contains a concatenation o f encryptions for each key o f k- 
altered keys. For LQD nodes in all valid m-length quadrants, the message will be split 
into k  parts, one for each K j ,  1 </<k. Each part will be sent to all users in the quadrant who
4.1.3. ANALYZING 2D MULTICAST
20
— si mpl e  d ire c te d  floodin 
a n d  m -d im esn io n al 
»  2D  m ulticast
- a - GKMP
(6,11) (7,9) (8,8) (9,7) (11,6) (14,5) (20,4)
N u m b e r  o f  k e y s  p e r  u s e r ,  and num ber o f  m e s s a g e s  (k ,m )
Fig. 21. Average Number o f Decryptions per user for 1000 users.
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know K j .  In a quadrant who knows i keys out o f m-unaltered keys, 0<i<m ; there exists a
, £ _ j  v i n i i i y n , //.
maximum o f nodes for each K j .  Since there are ^ /n-length quadrants,
the total network traffic, T2 D will be determined by (7).
§  700
2 500 ♦ — m-dimensional 
2D Multcast 
Directed Flooding
8 9 11 14 20
Keys per user (k)
Fig. 22. Total network traffic for 10,000 users under m-dimensional key distribution.




/=i v < / '
Fig 22 illustrates the total network traffic for both m-dimensional and 2D multicast as 
well as the simple directed flooding.
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From Fig 20, and Fig 22, we notice that using either m-dimensional multicast or 2D 
multicast instead o f Directed Flooding significantly reduces the network overhead. The 
main reason behind this is that in our two schemes users receive only messages needed to 
update their keys. If we use just Directed Flooding, every user gets a copy o f  every 
message.
From Figure 21, it may be observed that the overhead per user is significantly less in 2D  
multicast than in m-dimensional multicast. If we select larger number o f  keys per user as 
k, the average number o f  decryptions becomes almost the same in both. This is due to the 
fact that users decrypt all keys they should know. In case o f  larger k, the number o f  
overlapped keys between any two users is quite large. Thus, each user needs to decrypt a 
larger number o f keys in eveiy rekeying message. In smaller k, there is less overlap and 
users decrypt less number o f keys out o f  every message.
2D multicast uses a one-way hash function to generate the combined decryption key, 
while m-dimensional multicast uses an extra dectyption instead. In the above analysis, we 
assume a simple hash function that incurs almost no cost with respect to node processing 
power. For that reason, we neglected such a cost when we selected the number o f  
decryptions per node to represent processing cost. However, this is not usually the 
situation, especially if  we use a more sophisticated and more expensive function.
In Fig 23, we notice that the traffic overhead in 2D multicast is almost one third o f it in 
m-dimensional multicast. This reduction o f overhead traffic is intended by design as 
every user receives only the portion o f  keys that she needs. Similar to the average number 
o f  encryptions in Figure 21, when the parameter k increases, the traffic overhead comes 
close to it in m-dimensional multicast. This is due to the same fact that when users know 
more keys, more keys overlap, and accordingly more single key messages per user.
Since both m-dimensional multicast and 2D multicast are based on EBS, the key storage 
requirements for both schemes are the same—k keys for individual nodes and k+m keys 
for group controller. In Fig 24 and Fig 25, we plot key storage requirement for GKMP, 
and all other EBS-based schemes.
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Fig. 23. Scalability o f  Traffic with changing k.
4.1.4. SCALABILITY ISSUES
The scalability o f our proposed approach depends on the scalability o f  the two 
underlying schemes, CAN and EBS. Scalability was the main reason for selecting such 
schemes in the first place. Here, we discuss the scalability o f our approach with respect to 
both storage and communications.
Every node in our space stores simple coordinate information about a maximum of  
2*(m+Ar) neighbors. As number o f  nodes grows within EBS limit in (1), this factor does
f  m+k\
not change. Adding nodes more than I j incorporates the choice o f adding a new key
in either k  or m. In such a case, all nodes in the system should accommodate a new 
dimension to store neighbor information. This incorporates an increase o f  one record in 
the storage space incurred on every node. However, the growth o f  the number o f keys is 
less than logarithmic in terms o f  N  according to [30]. Using an extra key or two for m and 
k, helps much in avoiding such change in larger networks for the price o f a small extra 
storage. In our case o f wireless ad-hoc networks o f hundreds to thousands o f nodes, this 
will be enough to maintain storage scalability.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
83
350000  r
c  300000  - a>
|  250000  
' I  200000  - 
2 150000 -Q>
a  100000 -k. j% 50000  4
G K M P (N)
•a— E B S -b a se d  
s y s te m s  
(k+m )
12870 2 4 3 1 0  4 3 7 5 8  7 5582  1E+05 2 E + 05  3E +05 
Number of users
Fig 24. Key Storage Requirement for GC.
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Fig. 25.Ke y Storage Requirement for Individual Nodes.
Our approach assumes a centralized group controller that performs key generation and 
message construction. Key distribution is done through a completely distributed scheme 
in both tfj-dimensional multicast and 2D multicast. The communications cost depends on
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the parameters m and k. For increasing number o f users, adding new nodes within the
m + k \
bound results in no change in the communication cost per rekeying. Adding more
* J
users than this value results in adding a new key. In such a case, the new key may result 
in increasing m or k. In both cases the number o f messages per rekeying will increase
/  m + k+ \\
slightly and continues at this new value till we reach the new limit . The new limit
is normally more than twice the old limit, so the overhead increases with an order less 
than logarithmic in terms o f  N. In Fig 23, we plot the traffic overhead for both m- 
dimensional multicast and 2D multicast when m = 8  with increasing k.
4.2. ANALYSIS OF TKGS
In this section we analyze the proposed TKGS. We focus on the success probability. 
To analyze the message cost involved in TKGS, we start by calculating the potential 




We assume that TKGS will use directed flooding for all multicast control traffic. For 
simplicity, we assume a perfectly partitioned space for the community {N,\ with respect 
to Kj. Accordingly, a single broadcast message sent to the whole community will unfold 
into Nj unicast messages. The total control traffic takes one round o f  response messages 
in addition to /-share sending messages. Knowing that most collaborative key 
management protocols consume multiple rounds to perform rekeying [44], TKGS 
provides better performance. However, in case o f protocol failure, rekeying may consume 
multiple rounds. In the following we focus on choosing appropriate values for all 
parameters involved in TKGS to obtain a high probability o f  first trial success and to 
achieve the above lower cost.
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Given that the individual node failure probability is p, and q=\-p, the probability of 
success for basic T K G S , Sj, can be computed as follows.
V,- f
s ,  = Z ( l - p ) ' * p " r t
j =i J
(9)
where t is the threshold at which the dealer proceeds with rekeying o f K,..
Basic TKGP Success probability under t=5% o f  N j. In Fig. 26, Fig. 27, and Fig. 28, 
plotted the probability Si for the value o f the threshold t equal to 5%, 10%, and 20% of  
Nj, respectively. The figures depict the basic TKGP success probability under different
1
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Fig. 26. Basic TKGP Success probability under t=5%ofNj.
values o f the individual node failure probability p. Intuitively, the more un-trusted the 
nodes can be, the less likelihood to find a valid t share. In our environment, we assume 
the nodes to malicious that the individual node failure probability, i.e. the probability that 
the node will refuse to participate, send invalid shares, or fail, is as high as 70% or 80%.
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Selecting smaller value o f the threshold t provide higher likelihood o f success. However, 
the smaller the threshold is, the more vulnerable the system can be under mobile 
adversary attack. Accordingly, we need to select the threshold t to represent a blocking 
number o f  nodes that an adversary needs to control in order to reveal the secret KGK.
0 .9 8  
0 .9 7
8 8 9
In d iv id u a l 
n o d e  f a i lu re  
p ro b a b i l ity  p
—M— 0 .8
A 0.7
Fig. 27. Basic TKGS Success probability under t=10%ofNi.
Input: EBS(N,k,m) canonical matrix, c joining users, c
Output: c key string assignment fo r  c users
Step 1: give the first user the string (11 ..I) f 0 . .()),„
Step 2: fo r  zeros=m -l to 0 do
Give each one o f  C(k+m-zeros,k) user one o f  the key strings with consecutive 
zeros zeros at the end.
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Fig. 28. Basic TKGS Success probability under t=20%of N/.
4.3. CKAS ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the proposed CKAS. We focus on collusion analysis 
and computing collusion probability in both EBS and CEBS. Then, we propose a simple 
key assignment scheme to reduce collusion probability and accordingly, the frequency o f  
rekeying in both EBS and CEBS.
4.3.1. COLLUSION ANALYSIS IN EBS
In EBS, collusion is considered when the set o f evicted users know the entire set 
o f keys regardless o f whether they communicate to exchange those keys or not. In order 
for a subset o f c users to collude and reveal the system keys, they need to collectively 
own the whole set o f  k+m  administrative keys. If those users succeed to collaborate 
before any key update messages are delivered to other users, the system fails. We 
consider the time between eviction o f such users and the update o f  keys to be a system
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required to distribute the updated keys and the number o f users who need to collaborate, 
cmm. In WAHNs, the first two parameters are greatly affected by the nature o f such 
networks such as high mobility, weak connectivity, hop-by-hop routing, low 
computational power, etc. The number o f  users who are capable o f  such knowledge is 
greatly determined by the values o f  m and k. For example, consider the EBS(10,3,2). Any 
pair o f  the following users is capable o f revealing all the system keys if  they collude. (Ui, 
U6), (U,, U9), (Ui, Uio), (U2, U5), (U2, U8), (Ui, U10), (U3, U4), (U3, U7), (U3, U10), (U4, U8), 
(Ui, U9), (U4, Uio). Simply, it takes the collusion o f two users to beat the system. This is 
due to the fact that the overlap between keys known by different users is quite large. This 
overlap is maximal when (m/k is close to 1).
In EBS, the parameters m and k  represent a tradeoff between number o f  rekeying 
messages and number o f keys known by each user, if  we assume a fixed total number o f  
keys m+k. In addition to that role, m and k play an important role in controlling the 
possibility o ff collusion through controlling the average number o f  key overlaps among 
users. Consider an example EBS( 10,3,2), above, the collusion o f any pair o f  users from 
the set mentioned is enough to reveal all system keys. Since rekeying is not performed 
individually after each join/leave, leaving users have enough time to collude during the 
rekeying period before rekeying is performed. Batch rekeying should take place 
whenever the probability o f  collusion exceeds a certain threshold. We denote the 
minimum number o f parties needed to collude as cmm and the maximum number o f  
parties that might exist without collusion as cmax- In the following analysis, we assume an 
EBS with a complete canonical matrix unless otherwise specified.
4 .3 .1 .1 . MINIMUM NUMBER OF COLLUDERS (C Min)
The two key points in reducing the probability o f such collusion are selecting the 
appropriate rekeying period and maximizing the minimum number o f  users, who need to 
collude, denoted by cmin, in order to beat the system. The two factors are not disjoint. The 
longer the rekeying period is, the more time is available to leaving users to collude and 
vice versa. For longer rekeying periods, it is required to have a larger value for cmm. 
However, on one hand, frequent rekeying consumes more communication and
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computational overhead. On the other hand designing the system such that cmin is quite 
large implies larger number o f rekeying messages. In the following, we analyze the 
impact o f selecting different values o f the parameters k  and m on the value o f cmin. 
Assuming minimum overlap between user keys gives the maximum contribution to the 
set of keys revealed by colluding users. For example, in the EBS( 10,3,2), Table 1, since 
each user knows only three keys out o f total five keys, the minimum possible overlap is 
one key. For example, users Ui and Uio have one key overlap, which is K3. Upon the 
collusion o f Ui and Uio, Ui contributes Ki, K 2 , and K 3 , while user Uio contributes K 3 , 
which is redundant, K 4  and Ks. The minimum possible overlap is zero keys. A possible 
example is similar EBS total 6 keys, with 3 keys per user, EBS(20,3,3). In such a system, 
two colluding users may reveal the system keys by contributing two disjoint sets o f three 
keys each. The maximum possible overlap is k-1, when two users have similar keys 
except one key each. In the following, we explore the theoretical bounds o f the required 
number o f  colluding parties, cmm. The following two theorems set the bounds for the 
minimum number o f  colluders, cmin, to reveal system keys.
Theorem 1: In a canonical EBS(N,k,m), i f  1 < m < k, there exist two users who can 
collude to reveal all system keys.
Proof:
Assume there are no two users Ui and Uj who can collude to reveal the k+m  keys. 
Accordingly, i f  Uj can reveal k  keys, and Uj can share 0<kjj<k-l keys with Uj. If £,y=0, 
then collusion o f the two users Uj and Uj reveals R=2k keys, and 2k<k+m, which means 
m>k, and contradicts the assumption that m<k.
If k,j=k-1, then m =l and the total number o f users is k+1. The collusion o f the two users 
U j  and U j  reveals R=k+1 =k+m, and contradicts the assumption that they cannot reveal 
the system keys.
If 1 <kfj<k-l, then the collusion o f  the two users Uj and Uj reveals R=2k-ki/ <k+m.
Thus, k-kj<m  or k-m<ku, and ku> l ,  which contradicts with the assumption that m<k.
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Theorem 2: In a canonical EBS(N,k,m) with N=C(k+m,k), the minimum number o f  users 
required to collude, cmi„, is at most m+1.
Proof:
The first colluding user contributes k keys to the set o f  revealed keys, R. Since each user 
has a distinct key assignment, the maximum contribution to the set R is 1 key. 
Accordingly, to reveal m remaining keys after the first colluding user, we need at most m 
users. Thus, the number o f  colluding users is at most m+1.
From the above discussion,
m + l> cmin>2 (10)
4.5
2.5
Fig. 29. Min number o f  colluding parties 
required to reveal system keys, cmm.
In order to select the values o f m and k  to set a specific value for the parameter cmim we 
assume the worst case o f no overlap. In such case, each colluding user will reveal k  keys, 
and the collusion o f cmin should not reveal the total m +k  keys, i.e., k+m<kc. If we add the 
result from (10), we get
1 + m/k -< cmin < N  (11)
Thus, selecting m and k such that (11) is satisfied will guarantee a required minimum 
number o f parties to collude in order to reveal the system keys.
Applying the above to our EBS(10,3,2), we have m/k=2/3. Since 0<2/3<l, our minimum 
number o f colluding parties, cm,„, is 2.
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Fig. 30. Max Number o f supported collude e
users for different selections o f m and 
k.
In the above example, we selected m and k  to produce cmin equal to either two or three 
parties out o f  total number o f users N=10. Although these values represent 20-30% of 
total number o f users, they tend to be unpractical for larger number o f users. In a 
population o f N  users, with frequent rekeying, selecting m and k to produce values o f  cmin 
that reflects 3 to 4 % of total population is reasonable. Fi 29 depicts possible selections of 
values for m and k to support a population o f N=100, and different values o f cmm.
We assume the number o f colluding user to be a percentage, e, o f the total population, N. 
Accordingly, we have
m  




Flowever, in a canonical EBS, the maximum number o f users, Nmax is determined as 
follows.
f  k + m \
N < N  =— max
V k  ) (13)
As in Figure 30, we select k and m such that they produce an acceptable value o f cmin, 
even if  they produce a value o f Nmax larger than our projected group size N. If we 
consider N max instead o f N in (11), and considering N max quite large, we get
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e min ^  / m+ k- i \
V m J  (14)
This percentage is depicted in Fig 31. Due to the different number o f users supported by 
different selections o f m and k, the percentage o ff colluding users e, does not correspond 
directly to the value o f c mjn in Fig 31.
4.3.I.2. MAXIMUM NUMBER OF NON-COLLUDERS
Having a number o f c evicted users in EBS implies that there is a chance o f collusion. 
Intuitively, the larger the number o f potential colluders, c, the more likely the collusion 
can happen. If the number o f colluders is 1, clearly, she can know no more than k keys 
and cannot collude as long as there are some other keys unknown to her (m>0). On the 
other hand, if  we have all users to collude (c=N), it is certain that those colluders know 
all the keys. The following theorem determines the maximum number o f potential 
colluders who are unable to collude, cmax.
f k + m - l \
C m ax =  I
Theorem 3: In an EBS(N,k,m), i f  ]<m<k, there exist up to \  k J  users wjlC)
collectively do not know all the keys.
Proof:
For a group o f cmax users to collectively do not know the entire set o f  k+m keys, there 
exist at least one key, Ku, unknown to all the members o f the group. Accordingly, all cmax 
users have a zero in their key string in the position u. Their key strings represent all 
possible combinations to distribute k keys in the remaining k+m-1 positions. Thus, 
(  * + m - A
^  max
y
A result o f theorem 3, if  we have cmax+ l potential colluders or more, collusion is certain. 
The value o f  cmax sets an upper limit on the number o f evicted users (and potential 
colluders) that can be allowed before rekeying. In other words, if  at any time there exists 
Cmax= evicted users, rekeying is a must. Otherwise, any other eviction will certainly cause 
collusion.
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As an example o f the above theorem, consider the key assignment o f  EBS( 10,2,3) in
( 2+ 3-1  \
e.g. K5. Those users are Ui, U2, U3, U4, U7, and U9. Adding any other user to this 
collection will reveal ks and cause collusion.
Probability o f collusion
According to the above, having cmax an evicted user is pretty dangerous. Rekeying should 
take place quite long before the number o f evicted users reaches this value. The question 
is how to quantity the possibility o f collusion when having a number o f  c potential 
colluders so that rekeying takes place if this probability is larger than a certain threshold, 
say 0.5. In the following we suggest an approximate function that quantifies this 
probability.
For a set o f  c colluders we compute the probability that they know a set o f  k+m keys, p. 
In case c < c min, this probability is zero since at least c mj„ users are needed to reveal all 
k+m keys. In case c>cmax , the probability evaluates to one (a certain collusion) as 
described above.
In all cases cmm< c <cmax ,if we assume the number o f colluders , c, is significantly less 
than the total population N, the collusion probability may be approximated as follows. 
The probability o f  not knowing these keys (1-p) is the probability that there exist one key 
(or more) unknown to all users.
The probability that the first user does not know a certain key, ku, p(l,ku) is
( k+m - A
The probability that the second user does not know the same key , ku , given that the first 
user does not know the key p(2,ku)is
table 2. We can collect up to 6 users, ^ 2 '  , such none o f them know a specific key,
(15)





Generally the probability that the ith user, c>i>l, does not know ku, p(i,ku),given that the 
all previous users do not know the key is:
The probability that all the c users do not know the specific key, ku, can be independently 
computed as follows
And accordingly, the probability o f the set o f  c users collectively knows the key ku is 1- 
pc. The probability that they know all the k+m keys, p, can be computed as
To verify the accuracy o f this approximate probability function, we consider the cases o f  
number o f  colluders, c<cmin. In such case, we expect the probability o f  collusion to be 
zero. The function evaluates to a very tiny value close to zero. In case number o f  
colluders more than cmax, the function evaluates to one.
Selecting the values for k and m as the design parameters of an EBS system affects the 
values o f both c mjn and cmax. The probability o f collusion o f  randomly selected c users is 
also affected with the selection o f these two parameters and accordingly the frequency o f  
rekeying. Figure 32 depicts the effect o f selecting different values o f k  and m on the 
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Fig. 32. Collusion probability for different 
EBS key assignments for 100 Nodes.
From the figure, it can be seen that EBS systems with larger values o f the ratio k/m 
implies a lower collusion probability o f a specific number o f  colluders, c.
4.3.2. COLLUSION ANALYSIS IN CEBS
In clustered EBS, for collusion to take place, the colluding parties must cover 
both kc+mc cluster keys as well as all kg+mg global keys. The colluding parties have to 
span at least cmin g clusters to cover the set o f kg+mg. Assuming a controllable inter-cluster 
communications, this is very unlikely to happen. In case inter-cluster communications is 
there, the collusion probability can be computed the same way we derived (17). In such 
case, we are considering collusion in a 2 layer independently cascaded EBSs. For 
independence, the collusion probability in a clustered EBS, pc, can be expressed as the 
product o f  two independent EBS collusion probabilities. Under the same assumption for 
EBS, the probability might be approximated as follows.
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In CEBS, for the collusion to take place, at least parties from at least different cmm>g 
clusters should exchange keys. In case o f location-based clustering with no inter-cluster 
communication, the collusion probability is next to zero. On the other hand, if  we have 
logical clustering with allowed inter-cluster communications, the collusion probability 
can be determined by (20). Fig. 33 show that having 1000 nodes logically clustered even 
on random basis achieves lower collusion probability than using plain EBS.
4.4. CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we compared our proposed architecture for key management with existing 
solutions. In CKDS, we combined two scalable schemes to introduce an efficient 
application-level key management protocol for secure group communication in wireless 
ad-hoc networks. We used CAN for application-level multicast and EBS for key 
distribution. We assumed a centralized group controller that performs key generation and 
rekeying message construction. We introduced two new key distribution schemes, tri­
dimensional multicast and 2D multicast to deliver keys efficiently to group members in 
such an environment.
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Fig. 33.Col lusion probability in 
supporting a 1000 users with EBS 
and CEBS.
We used Directed Flooding as a multicast message forwarding technique in our approach 
at individual quadrant level. We compared our scheme to using this type o f flooding 
solely to deliver keys.
For key generation we evaluated the proposed TKGS. TKGS was founds to achieve a 
significant network traffic reduction o f almost one eighth o f it in using normal 
application-level multicast in CAN. We compared storage requirement and overhead 
incurred on each node to GKMP. Our scheme showed better scalability and lower storage 
requirement at the cost o f  small number o f  decryptions performed by each individual 
node. We showed that selecting lower number o f  keys per user, and accordingly higher 
number o f  rekeying messages, in EBS achieves better performance under our 2D 
multicast key distribution scheme. We showed our approach to be scalable with respect to
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both storage and communication. We believe this approach is suitable for mid size 
wireless ad-hoc networks with hundreds or thousands o f users.
For key assignment, we proposed CKAS and CEBS that minimizes the collusion 
probability o f co-located nodes. We evaluated our proposed techniques and presented a 
comprehensive group management module, an efficient decentralized scheme that 
performs key assignment, generation, and distribution in compliance with this 
architecture. We overviewed each o f these components and showed how they meet the 
architectural objectives. We performed some analysis on the performance parameters o f  
each component separately and showed the feasibility o f such design compared with 
existing architecture. Currently, we are integrating all the key management and group 
session management components together and define all the interaction. Our next step is 
to perform simulation experiments on such integrated group management scheme and 
compare real network parameters, such as actual delays and traffic overhead, with other 
existing key management schemes.
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CHAPTER V 
KEY MANAGEMNT IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
The envisioned growth in using sensor networks in a wide variety o f  applications 
ranging from healthcare to warfare is fueling extensive research in securing these 
networks. We have an unprecedented window o f opportunity to build this emerging 
technology right! Key management is crucial to the secure operation o f sensor networks. A 
large number o f keys need to be managed in order to encrypt and authenticate all sensitive data 
exchanged. The characteristics o f  sensors and sensor networks, including lack o f physical 
protection and the resource constrained nature o f sensors render most existing key 
management solutions developed for other networks (for example, PKI-based solutions) 
infeasible for sensor networks. The tradeoff between managing acceptable levels o f  
security and conserving network energy for sensor network operation is a challenging 
task.
Recently a number o f key management schemes have been developed for sensor 
networks [25] [14] [122] [32] [121] [56] [17] [27] [134] [132] [29] [33]. We broadly 
classify key management schemes for sensor networks into static and dynamic keying 
based on whether the administrative keys (those used to establish communication keys) 
are updated or not after the initial network deployment and setup. A well known static 
keying scheme is due to Eschenauer and Gligor [35]. In this scheme, each sensor node is 
assigned k  keys out o f a large pool P  o f keys in the pre-deployment phase. Neighboring 
nodes may establish a secure link only i f  they share al least one key, which is provided 
with a certain probability based on the selection o f k and P. A major advantage o f  this 
scheme is the exclusion o f the base station in key management. However, successive 
node captures enable the attacker to reveal network keys and use them to attack other 
nodes. An enhancement to this scheme was proposed in [17] in which two nodes can 
establish a link only if  they share q keys. Liu and Ning [70] provided further 
enhancement by using t-degree bi-variate key polynomials. Since an attacker needs to 
capture at least t+1 nodes to obtain any t-degree polynomial, this solution was shown to 
significantly enhance network resilience to node capture as long as the number o f
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captured nodes is below a certain threshold (around 3% as shown in[70])\. However, if  
the number o f  captured nodes exceeds this threshold, the network is almost entirely 
captured by the attacker.
Another problem with the abovementioned static key pre-distribution schemes is the 
reduction in network connectivity resulting from the use o f a large key pool, P. As P 
increases for the same k, network connectivity decreases since only nodes that overlap in 
one or more keys (or key polynomials) can directly interact. Unlike static keying, 
dynamic keying schemes change all keys revealed to an attacker upon node capture. The 
major advantage o f  dynamic keying is enhanced network survivability, since any 
captured keys are replaced in a timely manner. Also, when adding new nodes, unlike 
static keying, the probability o f  network capture does not necessarily increase.
Jolly et al. [56] have proposed a dynamic key management scheme that is using Identity 
Based Symmetric Keying. Although their approach requires very few keys to be stored 
at each node, the re-keying procedure is inefficient due to the large number o f messages 
exchanged for key renewals. In addition, they require a centralized key server to play a 
major role in key management. Another group o f dynamic keying schemes, including the 
one proposed in this thesis, are based upon Exclusion Basis Systems (EBS) - a 
combinatorial formulation o f group key management problem [30]. In EBS-based 
schemes, each node is assigned k keys out o f pool o f size k+m  keys. Once one or more 
nodes are captured (or suspected to be captured), rekeying takes place by generating 
replacement keys, encrypting them with all the m keys unknown to the captured nodes 
and distributing them to the other nodes. However, since the value o f m is selected to be 
relatively small, to make rekeying feasible in terms o f  number o f messages, a small 
number o f nodes may collude and collectively reveal all the network keys. EBS-based 
schemes with collusion-resistance have been proposed recently in [14] [31] [121]. While 
more energy efficient than Jolly et al’s scheme, both schemes still considerably rely on a 
centralized key server to perform rekeying.
The main contribution o f this chapter is proposing an efficient and scalable key 
management scheme for clustered long-lived sensor networks. In order to prevent the 
attacker from knowing the keys by successive node capturing, we propose the use o f key 
polynomials. The rest o f  this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 describes our
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basic Dynamic Combinatorial Keying (DCK), the dynamic keying scheme for sensor
describes our proposed solution. Section 4 describes the attack mitigation. Finally, 
Section 5 describes the use o f  key polynomials with our proposed solution.
5.1. STATIC VERSUS DYNAMIC KEY MANAGEMENT IN SENSOR 
NETWORKS
As described in the introduction, static key management schemes depend on the pre­
distribution o f a randomly selected set o f k keys [35] (or bi-variate key polynomials [71]) 
to each node out o f a pool o f  P=k+m  keys. Two nodes can communicate directly if  they 
are within the transmission range o f each other and they share at least one key/key 
polynomial. Since the key polynomial model is more general, it is used in the analysis 
below. For simplicity, we only consider key management within a cluster.
The probability o f sharing a key polynomial between any two randomly selected 
nodes Ps, is defined as follows:
where k is the number o f  polynomials known to a node and m is the number o f  
polynomials unknown to that node.
It two nodes are neighbors, they can directly communicate only if  they can establish a 
communication key, otherwise, they use an intermediary node that shares at least one key 
polynomial with each o f  them to establish an indirect communication key. The network 
topology as well as the transmission range determines the physical network connectivity, 
whereas the probability Ps is an indicator for logical connectivity.
Static keying schemes select a large value o f k  (e.g. 250 or more [35]) to guarantee 
reasonable connectivity (e.g., Ps >  0.99). However, since the value o f k  is directly related 
to the node storage capacity C, it might not be a design option to use such a large value o f  
k, especially in case o f polynomials where for polynomial degree t, C =(t+ l)k. On the 
other hand, in order to enhance the network resilience to node capture, m is selected to be
networks. Section 2 describes the use o f key polynomials to replace the keys. Section 3
P s  =  1 i f  k>m,
ifk<m, (21)
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quite large so that more nodes would be needed to reveal all keys. However, the larger 
value o f m leads to less network connectivity since the probability o f sharing a key is 
lowered. The relationship between resilience, connectivity, and m in a 20,000 network is 
shown in the next section. Since LOCK (and other EBS-based schemes) essentially use a 
similar idea for selecting k polynomials for each node as in [71], formula (21) holds for 
these schemes too. However, dynamic schemes operate at lower values o f m, thus 
guaranteeing higher connectivity in general.
The probability Py, o f  compromising a specific key polynomial, F , given the capture o f  
Nc nodes that communicate directly is given by (22)
P f, = 1 - X
k YY m vV<"
;=o y k  +  m j k  + n t y  r i r .  ,jo r  Nc> t
Ppi = 0 otherwise (22)
The probability Pc o f any direct or indirect key to be compromised is
Pc=P, * Ppi+(1-Ps) (1-Pfi)2)  ((1- Nc/N) , (23)
In [71] these probabilities were studied against the polynomial degree t. It was shown that 
network resilience is maintained up to a certain threshold N *  o f captured nodes, with 
probability very close to zero. When Nc exceeds N *, the probability rises rapidly very 
close to one. When Pc is close to one, then capturing a small number o f nodes may reveal 
all keys, i.e., the network is fully captured and controlled by the attacker. Fig. 34 shows 
the network capture probability against Nc. The network capture point Nc* is defined as 
the number o f captured nodes at which the capture probability is close to one. Nc*is 
considered a measure for network resilience.
Different parameters affect the value o f Nc* including k, m, and t. First, increasing the 
polynomial degree t enhances the network resilience at the expense o f storage per node. 
Simple keys can be considered as polynomials o f degree zero. Using simple keys, 
capturing a very few number o f nodes is usually enough to capture the network as long as 
the attacker is assumed to foster collusion among these nodes without being restricted to 
the node locations. Secondly, assigning more polynomials to each node (i.e. using a 
larger value o f k) enhances the connectivity (i.e. the probability o f sharing a polynomial). 
However, since more polynomials are known by each node, this also increases the 
number o f  polynomials revealed to an attacker once a node is captured, which certainly
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decreases the network resilience (Nc*) as shown in Fig. 34. Finally, increasing the size o f  
the polynomial pool while using the same number o f polynomials per node (i.e. 
increasing m) tends to enhances resilience since more polynomials will be needed to 
capture the network. However, this solution reduces connectivity since the probability o f  
sharing a polynomial falls.
LOCK attempts to perform re-keying early enough before the number o f  captured nodes 
reaches N *. Since the node capture probability rises rapidly close to N *, re-keying can be 
performed at the rising edge o f the node capture probability; the point termed R-point in 
Fig. 49. The re-keying overhead for doing that is sending m messages, each containing k 
polynomials. One obvious way to minimize the number o f  times re-keying is needed is to 
enhance the network resilience (increasing N *) by using a lower value o f m and a quite 
larger value o f k. Since re-keying is performed early enough before reaching N *, we can 
afford to use a smaller value o f t to save storage without jeopardizing network security.
In conclusion, from the above analysis, both static and (EBS-based) dynamic schemes 
share the idea o f selecting a random subset o f  keys for each node out o f a pool o f keys. 
Static schemes tend to rely on using a larger key pool to enhance network resilience to 
attacks, whereas dynamic schemes use a limited pool o f  keys as well as a limited number 
o f keys per node to achieve better network connectivity. In the latter schemes resilience 
to attacks is primarily achieved by re-keying. Table 2 summarizes primary features of 
static and dynamic key management schemes and provides a qualitative comparison o f  
both classes o f schemes.
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TABLE 2.
Summary Comparison o f Static and Dynamic Key Management
Static keying Dynam ic keying
Network life \s.-> timed 4'n'rt-lived. Assumed long-lived.
Key pool Very large pool; Static administrative 
key values.
Small size pool; dynamic 
administrative key values.
Key assignm ent Once at pre-deployment Multiple times post deployment
Key generation Once at pre-deployment Multiple times post deployment
Key distribution All keys are pre-distributed to nodes 
prior to deployment
Subsets o f  keys are re-distributed to 
some nodes as needed
H andling node capture Revealed keys are lost Revealed keys are altered (k-+ k  ’)
Re-keying cost May be practically infeasible with 
respect to number o f messages (m  is 
very large, e.g., 20,000).
Requires few messages (m  is small, 
e.g., 20).
Com m unication cost Not applicable for administrative keys 
(key pre-distribution).
Re-keying overhead.
Storage cost More keys per node. Fewer keys per node.
H andling node addition New node preloaded with keys from 
static pool -  may decrease network 
resilience to node capture.
New node receives new set o f  keys; 
other nodes may be re-keyed -  less 
impact on network resilience to 
node capture.
Network resilience High as long as number o f  nodes 
captured is small (assuming key 
polynomials). Once a threshold is 
exceeded, resilience falls sharply.
High, largely independent of 
number o f nodes captured as long 
as re-keying is performed timely.
Network connectivity Less connected due to large key pool. 
Connectivity improves with increasing 
number o f  keys per node.
More connected due to small-sizc 
key pool.
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5.2. OVERVIEW AND FUNDAMENTAL DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF 
DCK
Our goal is to efficiently mitigate node capture attacks in long-lived large-scale sensor 
networks operating in hostile environment. The network should maintain freshness o f  
keying material and be able to survive multiple node captures. Our design decisions are 
guided by this goal.
Nodes are preloaded with certain code (initial state) prior to deployment. All nodes 
belonging to the same class should carry the same code initially with no individual node­
specific pre-programming. No distinctive state per node is needed (compare with static 
key-pre-distribution schemes). Communication among nodes is encrypted with regularly- 
updated communication (or session) keys. Administrative keys are used to generate and 
update session keys. DCK manages both administrative and session keys. Node capture 
attacks, including the capture o f  sensor nodes and cluster leaders, are handled through 
different levels o f  rekeying (or changing administrative keys). Because the sensor 
network is assumed to be long-lived and operates in hostile environment, DCK should 
survive continual attacks.
DCK is based on EBS for efficiency. EBS was shown to out-perform other dynamic key 
management schemes (such as LKH) in terms o f storage and communication overheads
[16]. In addition, EBS-based dynamic keying schemes were shown to outperform static 
keying schemes (e.g. pair-wise key pre-distribution [20]) in terms o f  network [23]. In 
order to achieve scalability with respect to both the number o f sensor nodes and the 
number o f  clusters, DCK uses two cascaded EBS systems at two different levels to 
manage both administrative and session keys.
As we proposed in [85], key management can be split into three basic sub-tasks, namely, 
key assignment, key generation, and key distribution. In DCK, we separate the concerns 
o f such duties from the physical architecture o f the network. We use three types o f nodes, 
namely, Key Assignment Node (KAS), Key Generation Node (KGN), and Key 
Distribution Node (KDN). This separation enhances security, robustness and flexibility 
o f the system. Dynamically assigning key management functions to different entities in 
the system helps in mitigating attacks as well as adaptation to meet certain constraints.
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The normal network operation involves data processing and forwarding on the one hand 
and key management on the other hand. DCK deliberately assumes that data processing 
may be independent o f key management. As stated earlier, cluster leaders are not 
necessarily data aggregation and forwarding nodes. Separation o f concerns may enhance 
the security since the attacker will not be able to target both processes by capturing 
specific nodes. For example, a captured cluster leader does not necessarily provide the 
attacker with the current data aggregation results in the cluster. Another advantage is 
allowing the altering o f  data processing topology without disturbing the key management 
process during the network operation and vice versa.
We start with an overview o f  EBS, the theoretical basis of our solution, followed by an 
overview o f DCK’s network components.
5.2.1. DCK COMPONENTS
DCK uses two layers o f  EBS administrative keys. The upper layer (level 1) is 
EBSb that enables the base station (BS) to manage the cluster leaders as a group. The 
main motivation for using EBS in the upper layer is for its efficiency and scalability in 
terms o f number o f  clusters. Recall that we assume that the capture o f  a Cluster Leader 
(CL) is as likely as any other sensor node. The EBSb administrative keys are used to 
construct group session keys used by the base station to communicate with cluster 
leaders.
The lower layer (level 0) involves an EBSci for each cluster C,. The clus ter leader is a 
member in both the upper EBSb as well as the lower EBSq . EBSci administrative keys are 
also used to construct cluster session keys used by the cluster leader to communicate with 
the sensor nodes within the cluster. The CL is considered a regular member in EBSc that 
knows as many cluster administrative keys as any other node in the same cluster (k keys 
out o f k+m keys). Accordingly, the capture o f a CL does not provide the attacker with 
any more cluster keys than the capture o f a regular sensor node. Fig. 34 and Fig. 35 
shows the physical and functional components o f DCK respectively.
During the initialization phase, the sensor nodes in each cluster establish a set o f  backup 
keys (one chain o f keys for each cluster) shared with the base station and unknown to 
their (or any other) cluster leader. Key generation o f EBSC keys is performed by a group
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of sensor nodes within the cluster (including the cluster leader) called Key Generation 
Nodes (KGNs). Key distribution is performed by the cluster leader.
The capture o f a sensor node (or a KGN) is handled solely by a local re-keying 
mechanism within the cluster to exclude the captured node from EBSc- Handling the 
capture o f a cluster leader is done through re-keying o f  both EBSs in order to exclude the 
captured cluster leader. Deploying a new cluster leader for a cluster whose leader has 
been captured requires the cluster sensor nodes to authenticate the new leader using the 
backup keys shared with the base station.
DCK does not involve any inter-cluster leader communication to generate new cluster 
keys as in SHELL [122] and [14]. We will show through security and performance 
analysis that DCK consumes less energy than the other EBS-based schemes without 
jeopardizing the network security. In the remainder o f this section and in the next two 
sections we describe physical and functional components o f DCK respectively.
Fig. 34. Physical components o f  DCK.
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5.2.2. DCK NETWORK COMPONENTS
The components o f  the DCK network components are: the base station (BS), 
cluster leaders (CLs), and the sensor nodes (SNs). Nodes are organized in clusters as well 
as communication groups. Each communication group uses an exclusion basis system to 
manage their administrative and communication keys. Fig. 34 depicts this logical and
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Fig. 35. DCK Functional Components.
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physical organization o f network components. In the following, we briefly state some 
assumptions and characteristics o f  these components.
Sensor Nodes (SNs): are very limited in communication, computation, and storage 
capabilities. Each SN has a pre-deployment unique id, a pre-deployment initial state, 
which includes two one-way key generation functions KGFC and KGFb, as well as a 
deployment seed Sb. Each SN is equipped with a short range radio as well as an optional 
location sensing device, such as a GPS receiver (only if  required by the collusion 
mitigation algorithm [27]. SNs are assumed to be stationary once deployed, and have 
short duty cycles to save energy. They are capable o f  transmitting and receiving short 
radio packets within their communication range. No individual shared key is assumed 
between a SN and the base station or cluster leader nodes. During the bootstrapping, the 
base station establishes backup keys with the sensor nodes o f each cluster. Thos backup 
keys are unknown to the cluster leaders. A cluster leader node, CLci manages each cluster, 
ch through a cluster-specific exclusion basis system EBSCi(NCi,kCi,mcj). A number o f SNs 
within a cluster, specifically kci nodes at each cluster, are appointed as Key Generation 
Nodes (KGNs).
Cluster Leaders (CLs): A C l is a node designated to manage other nodes in the same 
cluster. CLs may have better capabilities than sensor nodes including better, but limited, 
batteries, storage and computation capabilities. CLs may have a location sensing facility. 
Cluster leaders may be dynamically assigned to their clusters, which may lead to network 
re-configuration to mitigate attacks. In DCK, cluster leaders are not necessarily data 
gateways or data aggregation nodes as in other schemes [14] [122]. CLs are considered 
key gateways and may have nothing to do with data aggregation. One important reason 
for this distinction is the generic nature o f DCK. The separation between key 
management and other sensor network functionality enables DCK to serve at different 
network configurations independent o f the data-related network organization.
Currently, we assume CLs to be stationary. However, we are studying the mobility of 
CLs to meet application and network security requirements. For scalability reasons, CLs 
do not share individual keys with the base station. They are managed by the base station 
through a EBSb(Nb,h,mb). Each CL has a pre-deployment unique id, a pre-deployment 
initial state, which includes a one-way key generation function KGFb• A CL does not
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store (or know) the sensor node key generation function or the kc+mc EBS keys used to 
manage its own cluster. However, CLs are capable o f storing the EBS matrix for their 
clusters with key ids as a row header and node ids as a column header similar to 1. The 
same column header is also used as small registry to record the IDs and locations o f  all 
nodes in the cluster. The CL duties include:
Registering all sensor nodes in the cluster
- Playing the role o f a Key Assignment Node (KAS) by generating the EBS matrix and 
assigning key strings to individual nodes.
- Appointing specific sensor nodes to play the role o f  Key Generation Nodes (KGS) 
Performing the role o f  a Key Distribution Node (KDS) by broadcasting rekeying 
material to all cluster nodes. In case such facility is not available in the CL, another 
node in the cluster that has such facility might take that role. Alternatively, a flooding 
protocol might be used.
Base station (BS): The BS is the chief executive entity o f the sensor network. It delegates
all data sensing, aggregation and fusion to it subordinate SNs and CLs. In this work, we
focus on the key management role o f  the BS. The BS is assumed to be a trusted entity 
and cannot be compromised. The following are the key responsibilities o f the BS:
- Acts as a central repository for valid node IDs and KGF  seeds.
- Admits the CLs and SNs, initially deployed as well as latently added to the network 
after.
- Manages the CLs through EBS.
- Deploying and setting up new CLs and/or redistributing SNs to clusters.
It is worth mentioning that the BS does not intervene in regular network key management 
functionality, including periodic rekeying within the clusters and handling the capture o f  
a SN. In the capture o f  a CL, the BS intervenes to maintain the security o f  network keys.
5.3. DESCRIPTION OF DCK
As shown in Fig. 35 DCK functional components include pre-deployment and post­
deployment initialization, regular network operations as well as attack mitigation 
procedures. Starting with pre-deployment phase, we devote this section to discuss each o f  
these functional components and how they meet the design objectives.




The pre-deployment phase securely implants the initial state in all nodes. One 
major advantage o f DCK is that all SNs are preloaded with the same state except for a 
unique ID. A similar approach was followed in [29] with nodes carrying no unique IDs. 
A valid node ID is a long enough bit string with some parity code to rule out random 
numbers. In addition to the unique ID, each node is also preloaded with two key 
generation functions, KGFb and KGFC.
A key generation function is a secure one-way hash function that takes two parameters, 
typically a key and a data string, and produces a unique string based on the input. In the 
context o f  this thesis, we call such two parameters: a seed (S); and a key (K). Popular 
message digest functions such as SHA1 [24]or MD5 [25] may be used for such purpose. 
In order to generate a key, each node applies this function to the two parameters and uses 
the output as the new key.
A pre-deployment initialization includes loading the entire set o f sensor nodess with the 
first parameter o f each KGF, namely Si, and Sc The reason for using two parameters is to 
enable the network to generate a different set o f  keys for different deployments, so that a 
node that belongs to the same batch that was not deployed at the same site could not be 
used by an adversary to launch an attack. The common state preloaded to each node as 
well as the two seeds are known to the BS prior to deployment. It is not required that the 
BS knows the unique IDs o f the nodes before deployment. However, given a node ID, the 
BS can determine whether it is valid or not as well as whether the node is a sensor node 
or a potential CL. Appendix A summarizes the notations and keys used.
5.3.1.2. POST-DEPLOYMENT INITIALIZATION
After deployment, the network starts a top-down bootstrapping process beginning 
at the base station and proceeding downwards to the cluster leaders and sensor nodes. As 
shown in Fig. 35, the DCK initialization can be divided into 3 phases. In the following, 
we discuss the details o f the above network bootstrapping procedure.
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Phase I: Initializing cluster leaders
After deployment, both the base station and all nodes generate an initial network-wide 
session key KSb using KGFb(Sb,0). All cluster leaders use this key to register with the base 
station by sending their IDs and location encrypted with Ksb. Upon receiving such 
messages, the base station registers all cluster leaders and determines the number o f  valid 
CLs and accordingly computes suitable value o f kb and mb. In case o f  a highly hostile 
environment with cluster leaders subject to successive capture, the base station may also 
tabulate the IDs o f  the cluster leaders with the key combinations and apply a key 
assignment algorithm such as [122] to ensure that capturing neighboring nodes will not 
reveal the system keys. Another option that applies to less hostile environments is that 
every cluster leader uses its ID to hash into the EBSb key assignment matrix to determine 
the column that contains its key-string as in [29],
The base station broadcasts to the cluster leaders a new session key K o , kb, and w* 
encrypted with KSb and possibly the key string assignment of each cluster leader. Kob is 
used as the second parameter to KGFb. Upon receiving this message, each node generates 
h+m b  keys using KGFb(Sb,Kb°). Note that sensor nodes at this moment are also capable 
o f generating the h+m b  administrative keys.
After knowing its key combination string, each cluster leader purges mb keys and keeps 
h  keys. At this point, the EBSb system is constructed with every cluster leader knowing kh 
keys and every non-cluster leader node knows h+m b  keys.
Phase II: Establishing and distributing backup keys
In the second initialization phase, the base station generates a cluster initialization key 
K j  for each cluster leader C L ,, 0< i<Nb, as well as a sequence o f shared keys with each 
cluster’s sensor nodes. These keys are unknown to the cluster leader. In order to generate 
a key sequence, { K /} , 0 < j < t, o f  t keys for cluster /, the base station applies a simple 
hash function to selects one o f  the mb keys unknown to CL, Then, it uses K°j as a 
seed to a two parameters one-way function, F . The base station uses a special random 
seed, S*h for each cluster as the first parameter to F  and K°, as the second parameter. The 
base station generates a sequence o f t  keys A?„ 0<j<t, where, K1 ,=F(S*„ K?'1)). Each key 
K'i, is encrypted with its previous key, K1'1, and stored to be used as a shared key with the
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cluster sensor nodes. It should be noted that once t nodes are evicted from a cluster, the 
C L  should renew its key sequence from the B S .
To initialize each cluster, the base station forms a message for each cluster leader C L j,  
with two parts. The first part contains the initial cluster session key, Ksc‘, which is used 
for communication between the cluster head and the cluster nodes, and the sequence o f  t 
communication keys, each one encrypted with its predecessor. The second part contains 
both K j  and CL, key string, both encrypted with K,*, which is unknown to CL,. The base 
station then encrypts the entire message with kb keys known to CL, and broadcasts the 
message.
K*t : a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s h a r e d
k e y  b e t w e e n  C L  a n d  K G N  
Ks c : c u r r e n t  s e s s i o n  k e y  






K G N 1
x""
'  K G N
Fig. 36. Refreshing the cluster session key, Ksc.
Step 1: CL sends the new session key, K'sc, encrypted with the old 
session key, to mc KGNs o f all keys unknown to CL, encrypted with 
K*, a shared administrative key between CL and KGN 
Step 2: Each KGN decrypts the K* encryption, and re-encrypts with its 
key, and send back to the CL
After receiving the initial message from the base station, each cluster leader decrypts the 
message and gets K sc', then it broadcasts part 2 o f  message to its cluster sensor nodes
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augmented with its key string. Since sensor nodes still keep fa+mb keys, each sensor 
node decrypts the message using Kj* to get K j .  It then uses K J  to encrypt its ID (and 
location) and broadcasts to the cluster leader. In case location information is necessary, 
once they used K,* to announce their locations, each sensor node purges the kb+rrib-I keys 
used for cluster leaders and keeps the key K ,*.
Phase III: Initializing sensor nodes
The next stage proceeds between cluster leaders and sensor nodes within the cluster is to 
establish EBSC the same way as the base station and cluster leaders established EBSb.. The 
cluster leader generates a random cluster seed Kc', According to the number o f sensor 
nodes in the cluster, Nc, the cluster leader determines suitable values for kc and mc and as 
a key assignment node KAN of the cluster, it generates the EBSd(Ncukci,mci)  assignment 
matrix. Since sensor nodes within the same cluster are more prone to multiple node 
capture (to foster collusion between them), DCK applies the collusion minimization key 
assignment algorithm in SHELL [27].
The cluster leader includes itself a group member and assigns itself a cluster key string. 
The cluster leader also appoints to each key K j  in EBSCi , 0<j<ka+mc, a key generation 
node KGNJ. The key generation node is a (sensor) node in the cluster such that, KGNJ is 
already assigned to know K j  and shares the maximum possible number o f keys with the 
cluster leader. The cluster leader forms a message containing the key assignments (i.e. 
key strings and node Ids), the KGN assignments, and the cluster seed K j. This message is 
encrypted with session key, Ksc', and broadcasted to all the cluster nodes as well as the 
base station.
When receiving the above message, each sensor node within the cluster, including the 
cluster leader CZ„ uses K j  to generate kc+mc keys using KGFc(Sb, K j). According to the 
nodes’ key string, each node keeps kc keys and purges mc keys in a way similar to [29], 
Each node should know the key generators o f its kc known keys. If the node is not a key 
generator node (KGN) o f any key, it purges the entire EBS matrix except its own key 
string (column). Each KGN, keeps the row o f  the EBS matrix that corresponds to the key 
it is generating and purges the remaining kc+mc- l  rows.
To ensure no overlapping takes place between the backup keys nodes communication 
keys and the administrative keys used to manage the cluster leaders, the cluster head
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encrypts the next base station communication key, K /  with all kc+mc keys and broadcasts 
it to the cluster. After getting the message, each node in the cluster, except the cluster 
head, can obtain the new key by decrypting the message both with its administrative keys 
as well as K*. Each node then purges the old key K *to prevent an adversary from 
knowing it by capturing the node.
At this point o f time, the network initialization phase is complete, and the network can 
start its normal operation. Appendix A summarizes the messages exchanged as well as 
information stored in different nodes during initialization. At the end o f  the network 
bootstrapping phase, the status o f  the network is as follows:
- Cluster leaders are in a group with EBSb(Nb,kb,nib) key management scheme led by 
the base station.
- Sensor nodes in each cluster are in a group with EBSc(Nc,kc,mQ) key management 
scheme.
Each cluster leader knows kc keys out o f kc+mc keys o f EBSC, the same as every other 
node in the cluster.
- Each one o f  the kc+mc keys in EBSc(Nc,kc,mc)  is assigned a sensor node as a KGN. 
Each KGN of a certain key Kj knows the corresponding row o f the EBSC matrix, so 
that, all KGNs can collectively recover the matrix once the CL is captured.
- Each cluster leader has established a session key with its cluster sensor nodes.
Each sensor node in a cluster knows Kj°, a backup key shared with the base station that is 
unknown to the cluster leader
5.3.2. NORMAL NETWORK OPERATION
Key management involves generation, assignment and distribution o f session keys as 
well as administrative keys. DCK is composed o f upper level EBS to serve base station- 
cluster leader communication, as well as lower level EBSs to serve cluster leader-sensor 
nodes communications. Each EBS is used during network operation to regularly generate 
and distribute a session shared among members for data enciyption. The base station 
creates and distributes also a session key K j  to be used among cluster leaders. Each 
cluster leader CL, generates and distributes a cluster session key K j  shared among all 
nodes in the cluster to facilitate the first task.
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TABLE 3.




CLi Current cluster leader node for cluster i
K G F j Key Generation function o f sensor nodes (with two parameters)
K G F b Key Generation function o f  cluster leaders (with two parameters)
K A Sci Key assignment node o f cluster i (usually C L ,)
K D S C Key distribution node o f cluster / (usually CL,)
KGN/ The key generation node o f  key Kj in cluster i
SNV Sensor Node j  in cluster i
N Total number o f  sensors
Nc' Total number o f sensors in cluster i
N b Total number o f cluster leader nodes
kci Number o f keys known to each node in cluster i
m. Number o f keys unknown to each node in cluster i
EBSd The EBS matrix o f cluster i
h Number o f keys known to each cluster head
mb Number o f  keys unknown to each cluster head
EBSb The EBS matrix o f the cluster leaders
K  / The jth shared backup key between the base station and sensor 
nodes o f cluster i
Kj* A  selected key o f the m b administrative keys unknown CLj and 
Known to the all nodes in cluster c,
K c‘ Initial seed for cluster i
Kj** A selected key o f the kc+mc administrative keys known to both CL 
and KGNj and unknown to the evicted node
K sb Initial bootstrapping key for cluster leaders
KSJ Initial session key for cluster c
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Session keys are generated by the CL and distributed using EBS administrative keys. 
Data exchanged during normal network operation is encrypted with group session keys in 
every cluster. A  new group session key is generated and distributed periodically to 
maintain current secrecy and to protect against brute-force attacks. After every rekeying, 
the appropriate session key(s) are updated to maintain backward and forward secrecy. 
Periodic rekeying involves refreshing the [base station, cluster leaders] session key, KbSj,
K * :  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s h a r e d
k e y  b e t w e e n  C L  a n d  K G N ,  
u n k n o w n  to e v i c t e d  n o d e  
K/ :  B S - S N  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  k e y
Step 3: B ro a d ca st  
Ki((Kj(K'j)), 
K / K / f K , ' 1))




KG N! KG NK G N
Fig. 37. Handling sensor node capture.
Step 1: C L  sends key generation commands to kc KGNs o f  all keys 
unknown to the captured node, encrypted with K*, a shared 
administrative key between CL and KGN, unknown to captured node 
Step 2: Each KGN; generates K \ and encrypts it with Ki and further 
with K* and sends it back to CL
Step 3: C L  broadcast Kj(Kj ( K ' j ) ) ,  for each administrative key K j  
unknown to the captured node, in addition to the new BS-SN  
communication key
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
118
and upgrading it to K j +1, as well as refreshing each cluster session key k!scj and 
upgrading it to K Csj+i for each cluster i, where 0<i<Nh. The new session key is encrypted 
once with each EBS administrative key and broadcasted to the group. In the following, 






K*i: adriristnatixe shared 
l«y belween CL and M3N 
LrkroAn to elided rccte 
K*: achiristrstiveshared 
Vej between CL and W3M 
irknoAn to aided nocte
K: BS^crnmiicaticntey
Fig. 38.Ha ndling the capture o f a KGN.
Step 0: CL appoints a new KG for K; using K'*i, a shared key between CL 
and the new KGN, unknown to the captured KGN and proceeds with Steps 
1,2, and 3 o f  handling node capture
Steps 2,3: The node eviction procedure proceeds as regular node 
Step 4 : CL hands the EBS matrix row to the new KGN
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S t e p l  rB r o a d c a s t  K ,((K j(K 'j) ) ,  fo r  e v e r  Kj 
u n k n o w n  to  c a p tu r e d  C L , B r o a d c a s t  K 'jfC L  
re v o k e d " ) ,
S t e p  2: B r o a d c a s t  K i((K sb ( K ’sb) ) ,  for ever K* 





S t e p 4  :B r o a d c a s t  K s((K j(K 'j)> , fo r  e v e ry  m c 
o f kc+ m c u n k n o w n  to  c a p tu r e d  C L .
K G N
K D N
S t e p  3 : K i((K j(K 'j)> , fo r  e v e ry  Kj kn o w n  to 
CL, a n d  Kj u n k n o w n  to  CL, a n d  k n o w n  to  
K G N
Fig. 39. Handling cluster leader capture, phase 1.
Step 1&2: BS broadcasts new administrative keys to evict CL from 
E B S b  and a notification to the cluster nodes.
Step 3: each KGN o f  a key known to the captured CL updates its key 
and sends it to some KDN
Step 4: KDN broadcasts the new keys to evict CL from EBSC
Level 1 ( F .B S h )  Periodic Rekeying In order to refresh_K/,v j, the base station follows the 
simple E B S  session key refreshing procedure [16]. The base station generates a new 
session key, Kh,y  i, encrypts it with the old session key, Kbsj: and then once with every 
one o f E B S b  h+mb administrative keys. The base station broadcasts this message to the
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N e w  C
C L
KGN
S t e p  3 a ;  Authenticate CL„twand proceed 
with re keying and adding it to the EBS
Fig. 40. Handling cluster leader capture, phase 2.
Step 1: BS sends authentication code and all needed status to CLnew 
Step 2: CLnew broadcasts the message to the cluster 
Step 3: after authentication, KGNs proceed with normal rekeying to 
add CLnew to EBSC
cluster leaders. Since each cluster leader knows kb keys as well as the old session key 
Kbsj, all CLs decrypt the message and update their session key.
Level 0 (EBS,-) Periodic Rekeving Similar to level 1, refreshing the cluster session key 
K?cij involves generating the new key and encrypting it once with every administrative 
key o f  the EBSC keys. One feature that distinct DCK from other schemes (e.g. SHELL 
[122]) is that DCK performs this refreshment in a localized fashion without involving the 
base station or other cluster leaders. The cluster leader (CLj) generates a new session key 
K?+1csij, encrypts it with the previous key as well as once with each o f the k„ keys known 
and broadcasts the message to the cluster. Cluster nodes that know any o f the kb keys 
known to the CL can decrypt the message and obtain the new key. When the message is 
received by the K G N s of the m* keys unknown to the cluster leader, each K G N j encrypts 
the message with K, and sends it back to the cluster leader, which broadcasts the message.
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Although this scheme seems to take more time since multiple encryptions take place at 
multiple nodes, simulation results shoes that it is more efficient than sending the new key 
to be encrypted in other cluster leaders as in SHELL [122].
5.4. ATTACK MITIGATION
When the network is under attack, a group o f nodes might be captured. All the 
information in the captured nodes is assumed to be revealed. We do not assume nodes to 
be tamper-proof. However, we assume that some effort is spent in revealing the keys 
carried by a captured node enough to allow time for the network to apply some attack 
mitigation mechanism. Recall that a cluster leader is as likely to be captured as any other 
node while the base station is immune to capture attacks [122]. DCK limits the 
involvement o f the base station in mitigating attacks for the limitations on 
communications as mentioned earlier. In the following, we describe how DCK mitigates 
the capture o f different types o f  nodes.
Attack mitigation procedure:
1 .-Upon detecting the capture o f  a sensor node S N j  belonging to cluster i, the 
cluster leader CLt determines the key string K S ,  assigned to such node.
2 .-C L i issues a revocation message with the key string o f the captured node 
encrypted with the session key and broadc.
3.-Upon receiving such message, each K G N C o f  a key Kc known to SNj generates 
a new key Kc+j and encrypts it with both the old key Kc and then with all the key 
Kc' unknown to the evicted SNj. Each K G N c sends the encrypted message to the 
cluster leader, which broadcasts it to the entire cluster.
4.-After SNj is evicted, it is necessary to change the session key to prevent it from 
receiving the cluster group traffic. This is done through the session key 
refreshment procedure described earlier.
5.- To prevent an adversary from obtaining the [base station, sensor node] backup 
key, Kj, the cluster leader distributes the new key encrypted with both the old key 
K j 1 and the kc+mc administrative keys o f EBSC. Fig 37 shows the messages 
exchanged to implement in the procedure.
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5.4.2. KGN CAPTURE
If the captured node plays the role o f a key generator o f a certain key K c, it is 
required to install a new K G N  to securely replace the captured node. The cluster leader 
selects a new key generator o f  K c according to some policy, among all nodes that know 
K c the cluster leader announces this selection to the entire cluster using the cluster leader. 
The rekeying procedure goes the same as for the general sensor node. After the eviction 
takes place and the new session key is established, the new KGN needs to obtain its row 
of the EBS matrix.
The cluster establishes a session key with the KGN and uses it to send this information 
Fig. 38 depicts the messages exchanged to perform this procedure.
5.4.3. CLUSTER LEADER CAPTURE
Cluster leader capture is one o f  the most severe attacks on a sensor network. It is 
usually handled by having the base station either deploy a new cluster leader and 
reinitialize the cluster or distributing the cluster sensor nodes to join other clusters[14], 
[122], The problem with the former approach is that re-initialization involves the loss o f  
all the state information stored in the cluster leader, which might disturb network 
operation. The latter approach may also disturb network operation by both redistributing 
the workload and interfering with the new host cluster normal operation.
The objective o f DCK is to minimize and localize the key management overhead 
involved. We assume that the base station will either deploy a new cluster leader or move 
one o f its backup cluster leader nodes to the cluster whose cluster leader was captured. 
Mitigating such attack involves basically evicting the captured CL from the network, and 
installing the new replacement C L .
In order to revoke the old CL, the base station starts by applying the standard EBS 
eviction rekeying procedure on E B S b  as follows:
l.-The base station generates new keys for all the kt keys known to the evicted 
cluster leader, encrypts them with the old keys and then once with each key o f the 
mi, keys unknown to that cluster and broadcast the message to the entire network.
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2.- When the above message is received by other cluster leaders, since each o f
TABLE 4.
List o f  simulation parameters used
Transmission range 150 m
Deployment region 850m x 500m
Simulation time 2 x 104 sec
Frequency o f  key refresh 5 x 101 sec
Data packet length 10 Kbits
Routing packet length 2 Kbits
Key Size 128 bits
Number o f node evictions 10 nodes
Length o f  shared key chain
it)
10 keys
them knows at least one o f the mb keys unknown to the evicted cluster leader, they 
can decrypt the message and get the new administrative keys.
3.-The base station then generates a new session key KSbj+i and the procedure 
goes exactly as in the refreshing o f  the cluster leaders session key.
4.-At the cluster c, whose cluster leader was captured, all the sensor nodes receive 
the above message. Since all sensor nodes know the K jt which is unknown to their 
evicted cluster leader, they can decrypt the message and know that their cluster 
leader was evicted. They proceed as follows:
a) Since each sensor node knows the key string o f  the cluster leader, each 
KGN o f a key Kk known to the cluster leader, generates a new key, 
encrypts it with the old key and then with all other keys known to it and 
unknown to the cluster leader.
b) Each one o f the above KGNs broadcasts the message to the entire 
cluster (e.g. via controlled flooding).
c) By receiving the above message and decrypting it to get the new keys, 
the cluster leader is now out o f  the cluster EBSC system.
Figure 40 shows the messages exchanged to implement phase 1.
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The second step o f  the procedure is to install a new cluster leader, CLnew without re­
initializing the cluster. The base station appoints a new cluster leader. The procedure goes 
as follows:
1.-After rekeying the cluster leaders, the base station adds CLnew to the E B S b  
using the standard E B S  node addition procedure with the same key string as the 
evicted luster leader.
2.-The base station loads the new CL with kc keys o f the cluster.
3.-The base station encrypts a specific authentication code along with a session 
key with K j unknown to CL„ew and gives the session key and the encrypted 
message to CL„ew.
4 -CLnew broadcasts the encrypted part o f  the message to the cluster.
5.-After receiving and decrypting the message, each node decide whether or not to 
verify the new cluster leader.
6.-Once verified, the CLnew issues a rekeying command as in section 5.5.
7.-KGNs should proceed with the regular rekeying normally if  they have verified 
the new cluster leader, otherwise, they should refrain.
8.-If the rekeying goes normally, CLnew reports success to the base station.
9.-To reestablish the EBSC matrix, each KGN  can proceed by announcing its ID, 
the key it generates as well as its row o f the matrix using the session key. Fig 38 
shows the messages exchanged to implement this phase.
5.4.4. KEY SECRECY
As stated earlier, once the adversary captures a node, they may uncover all the 
memory content o f such node including administrative keys. The core functional 
principle o f  dynamic keying schemes is to invalidate any keys believed to be revealed to 
attackers so that they are as good as random data. In the following, we analyze how this 
principle is applied when nodes are captured. The figure gives a brief summary.
5.4.4.I. SENSOR NODE CAPTURE
Each sensor node carries kci keys o f E B S Ci, current cluster session key, and the 
chain o f the [base station, senor node] backup keys K j. Cluster rekeying takes place by
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generating new kc, keys, encrypting them with the ma keys unknown to the captured node 
and distribute them to other nodes. Once the cluster is rekeyed, the cluster leader uses the 
(currently unknown to the captured node) ka+mcl keys to distribute the next key in the 
[base station, sensor node] key chain, K / +l encrypted with K f  1, which prevents the 
captured node from obtaining the key.
5AA.2. KGN CAPTURE
In addition to all keys held by a sensor node, a KGN of one or more o f EBSC, keys 
knows one row o f  the EBSci matrix. Since KGN, also knows Kh this information basically 
tells the attacker, who else knows the same key. Attacking such node will give the 
attacker the same key, which does not add new keys to the attacker’s knowledge.
5.4.4.3. CLUSTER LEADER CAPTURE
A cluster leader is a member in both EBSb and EBSa. It knows k keys from each 
EBS. In addition to these keys, CL knows the key assignment o f the cluster as well as the 
chin o f  keys shared with the base station. Rekeying takes place at both levels to void the 
known kh+ka keys. The session keys are updated after rekeying, which invalidates the 
attacker knowledge o f such keys. The base station key chain is stored within the cluster 
leader in an encrypted form. New chain o f  keys is delivered to the new cluster leader 
encrypted with the last key known to the sensor nodes. Finally, the EBSC, is recoverable to 
the new CL through the KGNs. Tables 5 shows the security analysis o f both sensor node 
and cluster leader captures.
5.5. USING KEY POLYNOMIALS WITH DCK
In order to reduce the number o f keys known to the attacker by capturing nodes, we 
propose the use o f  key polynomials instead o f traditional keys. Each node is assigned k  
polynomials out o f  existing k+m  polynomials. Key polynomials are used in [8] and [70] 
in conjunction with key pre-distribution to enhance resiliency to node capture. The 
scheme in [70] does not employ rekeying. We propose to use key polynomials in an EBS- 
based scheme to make use o f  efficient rekeying to further enhance resilience to node 
capture and consequently enhance network survivability.
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In our proposed scheme, similar to Liu and Ning’s [70] are pre-distributed to nodes. Two 
nodes can establish a pair-wise key if  they share a key polynomial. A group session key 
can be encrypted k+m  times, each time with a key derived by evaluating F„ the ith 
polynomial at the base-station. Each node can decrypt the session key with at least one of 
the polynomials known to it.
Rekeying to evict a node can be done by generating k new replacement key polynomials. 
The new polynomials are encrypted m times each time with a key derived by evaluating 
the ith polynomial, 0< i <m, o f  the m polynomials unknown to the evicted node(s) and 
broadcasted to the sensors.
The major advantage that can be achieved by our scheme is the reduction o f  the 
attacker’s ability to obtain key polynomials by capturing nodes since he needs at least t+1 
shares o f  each polynomial. This is studied through simulation in chapter 6.
In EBS-based schemes that use traditional keys, each node has to store k keys (typically 
128 bits each) in addition to a bit-string o f  length k+m  bits. In basic key pre- 
distribution[30], each node also stores k  keys. In key polynomials pre-distribution [70] t- 
degree key polynomials are established over a finite field Fq, and each node stores the 
shares o f k polynomials. Accordingly, each node stores k*(t+l)logq  bits. Our scheme 
incurs similar storage overhead with k(t+ l)logq  bits in addition to a k+m  bits key string. 
Since static schemes do not alter administrative keys, communication overhead for 
administrative rekeying is not applicable. In previous EBS-based schemes, each rekeying 
involves m messages o f length k*key_size bits each. In our scheme, each rekeying 
involves the distribution o f m messages each with (t+ l)logq  bits.
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TABLE 5.
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/
Fig. 41. Establishing pair wise keys.
The following is a summary o f using key polynomials for establishing pair wise keys, 
establishing group keys and rekeying.
5.5.1. ESTABLISHING PAIR WISE KEY
Currently, plain cryptographic keys (e.g. 128 bits key) are used. Once a node is captured, 
all keys known to that node are considered compromised, t-degree bi-variate 
polynomials, f(x,y), may be used instead o f plain keys. Accordingly, f(x,y)=f(y,x). Each 
key Ki is replaced with a polynomial f .. Regular keys can be considered key polynomials 
with t=0. Node Ni receives a share uni-variate polynomial, fj(i,y), for each key Kj„l<j<k. 
Two nodes can establish a pair-wise key if  they share a polynomial.
5.5.2. ESTABLISHING GROUP KEY
Session key encrypted k+m  times, each time with a key derived by evaluating fi, the 
ith polynomial at a certain point known to all nodes. Each node can decrypt the 
session key with at least one o f the polynomials known to it. Rekeying to evict a node
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can be done by generating k new key polynomials. New polynomials are encrypted m 
times each time with a key derived by evaluating the ith polynomial, 0< i <m, and 
broadcast to the sensors. For an attacker, in order to know a polynomial, he needs to 
capture at least t+1 nodes.








Fig. 42. Establishing Group Session Key.
5.5.3 REKEYING
New administrative key polynomials are generated. New polynomials are encrypted m 
times each time with a key derived by evaluating the i,h polynomial, 0< i <m, and 
broadcast to the sensors. Each node can decrypt the administrative key i f  it has the key 
with at least one o f  the polynomials known to it. For an attacker, in order to know a 
polynomial, he needs to capture at least t+1 nodes.
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5.6. CONCLUSION
In this chapter we proposed a solution for WANs. We started with comparing static and 
dynamitic keying schemes. Static key management schemes tend to enhance network 
resilience to node capture at the cost o f lower network connectivity. Dynamic key 
management schemes preserves connectivity and handles node capture through rekeying 
using a centralized KDC. Our proposed scheme enhances network resilience by using key 





Fig. 43. Rekeying under key polynomials.
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We proposed Dynamic Combinatorial Keying (DCK) which combines key analysis, 
generation, assignment and distribution. Since sensor networks are subject to more 
attacks, we proposed the used o f key polynomials to make capturing the network even 
harder. In the next chapter, we analyze the proposed solution and compare it to existing 
solutions through simulation.
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CHAPTER VI 
SCHEME RESULTS IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
In this chapter, we review the simulation results o f  the two parts o f  our proposed 
scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks. In section 2, we view the simulation results o f  
DCK. In section 3, we overview the simulation results o f  the key polynomial. In section 
4, we focus on the possible extensions and future work.
6.1. DCK PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Security solutions for sensor networks usually involve a tradeoff between the 
required security level and the resource consumption. In order to evaluate the resource 
consumption in DCK, we performed a simulation study that compare DCK to another 
EBS-based key management scheme, SHELL [122]. Since the authors in [122] showed 
their scheme to consume less energy than Jolly’s scheme for dynamic keying [121], we 
consider only SHELL [122] for comparison. We simulated networks o f  different 
populations, namely, 500 to 950 nodes distributed in 10 clusters in a deployment field o f  
850 x 500 meters. We ran our simulation for 20,000 seconds. We consider the cost of  
key management in terms o f energy consumed on average by a sensor node and a cluster 
leader. This cost can be divided into setup cost, key refreshment cost and node eviction
Average Energy Consumed by a Sensor Node 












N u m b e r o f  N odes
. . A verage Energy Consum ed by a Cluster Leader ir 
Key M anagement
Fig. 44.Av erage energy consumed by a sensor node.
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cost. Results show that the cost o f key management in both schemes is mostly incurred 
on the cluster leader nodes rather than the senor nodes.
6.1.1. ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN KEY MANAGEMENT
To measure the overhead o f key management, we ran our simulation without key 
management and then with each o f DCK and SHELL and measured the difference in 
energy consumption as an indicator o f the key management cost.
Fig. 44 shows the average energy consumed by a sensor node and a cluster leader in both 
solutions for key management. It can be seen from the figure that using DCK, a sensor 
node on average consumed one order o f magnitude less energy than SHELL. The average 
energy consumed by a cluster leader in our approach is less than half o f  the energy used 
by a gateway in SHELL. This might be due to the fact that in SHELL, a sensor node 
shares a session key with two cluster leaders other than its own as well as a unique key 
with its own cluster leader, which is used to form an individual message per senor node. 
On the other hand, in DCK, we localize key refreshment through the use o f  KGNs within 
the same cluster. In order to factorize the energy used in key management, we measured 
the energy used for setup, regular key refreshment and the random evictions. It can be 
seen from Fig. 46 that the major portion o f  the key management energy is consumed in 
periodic key refreshment. Since our approach localizes regular key refreshment within 
the cluster, DCK saves more than two thirds o f the key refreshment energy.
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Fig. 45. Average energy consumed by a sensor node in session key refreshment.
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Fig. 46. Average energy consumed by sensor node due to eviction.
6.1.2. ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN NODE EVICTION
One o f the major advantages o f DCK is the handling most node eviction locally 
within the cluster. In Fig. 46, we show the average energy consumed by a sensor node 
and a cluster leader in evicting a number o f nodes that varies from 5 to 90 nodes in a 750 
node network. It is expected for the energy consumed to grow linearly with the number o f  
evicted nodes which is shown to happen in both schemes in Fig. 46. Since our approach 
handles node eviction locally within the cluster without involving other cluster leaders or 
the base station, we consume much less energy than the scheme in [122]. It can also be 
noticed that in SHELL, the major portion o f the node eviction energy is consumed by the 
cluster leaders. On the other hand, the major portion o f  total energy is consumed by 
sensor nodes. A possible explanation is that according to [122], in order to evict a node, 
the cluster leader should contact other cluster leaders assigned as key generators to 
generate the new keys and send them back to be distributed to the cluster. This inter­
cluster dependency mandates that evicting a sensor node or a cluster leader in a certain 
cluster affects other clusters (e.g. at least two other key generator clusters [122]). In our 
approach, the key generation responsibility is distributed locally among KGNs within the 
same cluster, which saves energy and localizes the effect. Hence, node eviction does not 
have a global effect on the network, which contributes in scalability.
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6.1.3. STORAGE AND SCALABILITY
In SHELL, the base station establishes inter-cluster keys between each two 
clusters and then selects for each cluster d  (typically 2) other key generation clusters to 
share keys with the original cluster’s nodes.
Accordingly, cluster leaders (a.k.a. gateways) in SHELL can be viewed to form a fully 
connected communication graph with respect to the inter-cluster keys, and a directed 
graph with an out degree o f  exactly d  with respect to the key generation relationship. 
Accordingly, evicting a cluster leader involves the updates o f n inter-cluster keys as well 
as the update o f d  sets o f keys shared between the key generation clusters and the sensor 
nodes o f the original cluster. In our approach, we replace the n(n-l) 12 inter-cluster keys 
with the EBSb matrix which scales better in the number o f clusters. Each cluster leader in 
DCK stores a chain o f t  (typically 10) backup keys shared between the sensor nodes and 
the base station. Fig. 47 shows the number o f keys maintained by a cluster leader against 
network sizes in both schemes. Since both schemes use EBS to manage sensor nodes 
within each cluster, the number o f administrative keys maintained by a sensor node is
. Number o f k eys m aintained by a c lu ster leader








Fig. 47. Number o f  keys managed by a 
cluster leader.
about the same. In SHELL, each sensor node shares an individual key with the base 
station, whereas, in DCK the same backup key is shared between the base station and all 
sensor nodes in a specific cluster. Sensor nodes in a specific cluster in SHELL share also
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a key with the key generation gateways, which is not the case in DCK. Hence, number o f  
keys held by a sensor node is almost the same in both schemes.
In this section, we compare our proposed key polynomials scheme to leading 
existing static and dynamic keying schemes. The major points o f  interest are (1) the 
network resilience, measured as the number o f  captured nodes required for the attacker to 
control the network; (2) the network connectivity, measured as the probability for any 
two randomly selected nodes to communicate directly; and (3) the rekeying overhead.
As described in section 2, static keying schemes depend on the pre-distribution o f  
a randomly selected set o f  k keys [35] or bi-variate key polynomials [70] to each node 
out o f a pool o f  P=k+m o f keys. Two nodes can communicate directly if  they are within 
the transmission range o f  each other and they share a key [70] or a key polynomial [35]. 
Since the key polynomial model is a generalization o f the basic probabilistic model, we 
focus on the former without loss o f generality.
The probability o f  sharing a key polynomial (and consequently establishing a pair wise 
key) Ps, is defined as follows:
Where k is the number o f  key polynomials known to each node and m is the number o f  
polynomials unknown to each node.
If two nodes are not in direct communication with each other, they use a third-party that 
shares a key with each one as an intermediary. The network connectivity is defined as the 
probability o f  direct communication between any two nodes. The network topology as 
well as the transmission range determines the physical network connectivity, whereas the 
probability Ps is an indication for logical connectivity.
Static keying schemes tends to select a large value o f k (e.g. 250 or more [35] ) to 
guarantee a suitable connectivity (e.g. A=0.99). However, since the value o f k  is directly
6 . 2 .  K E Y  P O L Y N O M I A L S  P E R F O R M A N C E  E V A L U A T I O N
6 . 2 . 1 .  C O M P A R I S O N  W I T H  S T A T I C  K E Y I N G
Ps  = 1 if  k>m,
(21)
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related to the node storage capacity C, it might not be a design option to use such large 
value o f k, especially in case o f  polynomials where C =(t+ l)k , where t is the polynomial 
degree. On the other hand, in order to enhance the network resilience to node capture, m 
is selected to be quite large so that more nodes are needed to reveal all keys. However, 
the larger value o f m the less connected the network is since the probability o f sharing a 
key is lowered. The relationship between resilience, connectivity, and m in a 20,000 
network is shown in Fig. 48.
Since our proposed scheme uses the same idea o f  selecting k polynomials for each node 
as in [70], formula (21) holds. However, our model operates at the lower values o f m for 
the connectivity and thus guarantees high connectivity. Resilience is achieved through 
rekeying since new keys are generated and distributed regularly to compensate for keys 
revealed by node capture.
The probability o f  compromising a specific key polynomial, Fi, given the capture o f Nc 
nodes given that they communicate directly is given by (22)
1 . 2
%' a' n r sTs h  a a iTT« s 8TTTT1 ?'
m
Fig. 48. Netwok connectivity and resiliance against m.
U N-Y k Y( rn
(22)
The probability o f any direct or indirect key to be compromised is
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P c = P ,  * P F i+ ( l- P s ) ( ( l - P c )  ( 1 -P f )2) ,  (23)
Where p c=Nc/N.
In [70], these probabilities were studied against the polynomial degree t and it was shown 
that the network resilience is maintained up to a certain threshold N *  o f captured nodes, 
with the probability very close to zero. When Nc exceeds Nc*, the probability rises rapidly 
very close to one. When Pc is close to one, this means that capturing a certain number o f  
nodes will reveal all the networks keys, which means in other words, the network was 
fully captured and controlled by the attacker. Fig. 49 shows the network capture 
probability against the number o f captured nodes Nc. We define the network capture point 
N *  as the number o f captured node at which the capture probability is very close to one. 
At this point, the number o f keys revealed to the attacker is k+m, which indicates that the 
attacker has full control o f  the network. Nc* is considered a measure for network 
resilience.
Different parameters affect the value o f  Nc* including k, m, and t. In regular EBS, using 
traditional keys can be considered as polynomials o f  degree zero. It can be noticed that 
increasing the polynomial degree t enhances the network resilience on the expense of 
storage per node. It can also be noticed in using regular keys, capturing very few number 
of nodes is enough to capture the network as long as the attacker is assumed to foster 
collusion among these nodes that are not necessarily co-located. Although enhances 
connectivity increasing k reduces the value o f  Nc* as shown in Fig. 50 48. Increasing m 
enhances resilience but significantly reduces connectivity.
0.6
0 .4
N u m b er  o f  ca p tu r e d  n o d e s
Fig. 49. Probability o f  network capture.
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In our approach, we try to perform rekeying early enough before the number o f  captured 
nodes reaches Nc*. Since the node capture probability rises rapidly before Nc*, we can 
perform rekeying on the rising edge o f the node capture probability at a point we call R- 
point. The rekeying overhead is sending m messages, each contains k  keys. One obvious 
way to minimize the number o f times rekeying is needed is to enhance the network 
resilience (Nc*), by using a lower value o f  m and a quite larger value o f  k. Since rekeying 
is performed early enough before reaching Nc, we can afford to use a smaller value o f t to 
save the storage space without jeopardizing the network security. This is shown in the 
next sub-section with dynamic keying schemes.
6.2.2. COMPARISON WITH DYNAMIC KEYING
In dynamic keying schemes, rekeying is performed regularly (before the number 
o f captured nodes reaches N*. In order to evaluate the network resilience to attack, 
dynamic key management schemes consider the number o f keys revealed to the attacker 
by capturing Nc nodes as the measurement o f  network resilience to attack. This is 








Number of key polynoim ails known to  e a c h  node (k)
Fig. 50. Number o f nodes needed to control the 
network.
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We simulate our scheme in the same environment used in location-based key assignment 
[124], For simulation feasibility, our network consists o f  40 to 200 nodes deployed in a 
500x500 field. We assume that the attacker succeeds in capturing a number o f  nodes that 
varies between 5 to 55 nodes. The transmission range is 55 meters. We select different 
values o f the EBS parameters k and m that totals to 10. To lower the storage overhead, we 
use t=0, 5, and 10. We study the effect o f using key polynomials on both random and 
location-based key assignment [124]. Traditional EBS keys can be considered using 
constant polynomials, i.e. t=0.
keys (k+m=10) 5-
Network size
Number of nodescaptured Number of nodes cap tu red
Fig. 51. Average number o f keys Fi -^ 52. Average number o f keys revealed
revealed under random key under polynomial random key assignment
assignment with 1=0. witFl t~^-
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In Fig. 51, Fig. 52, and Fig. 53, we plot the average number o f keys revealed under 
random key assignment for t=0,5, and 10 respectively. In Fig. 54, Fig. 55, and Fig. 56, 
we plot the average number o f keys revealed when under location-based key assignment 
[49], for t=0,5,10 respectively.
keys (k-HnslO) 5
Number of nodes captured
Fig. 53.Ave rage number o f keys revealed under 
polynomial random key assignment with t= l  0.
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Fig. 55. Average number o f keys revealed under 
polynomial location-based key assignment with 
t=5.
It can be seen from Fig. 51 and Fig. 54 that location-based key assignment is better than 
random key assignment in small number o f captured nodes and network sizes. In case o f  
large number o f captured nodes and large network sizes, location-based key assignment 
might not help much since the probability o f captured nodes being close to each other and 
able to exchange keys is high.
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In Fig. 52 and Fig. 55, it can be seen that using key polynomials reduces the number o f  
keys revealed significantly since it is needed to know at least t+1 shares to reveal a single 
key polynomial. If the number o f  captured nodes that can collude is less than t, no keys 
are revealed. In case o f  large number o f captured nodes, and/or large network size, the 
number o f revealed keys increases since the number o f shares available increases. 
However, the probability o f  revealing all the keys is very small since one need to have 
t+1 shares for each key. It can also be noticed that using key polynomials in conjunction 
with location-based assignment reduced the number o f  keys revealed in small number o f  
captured nodes but not in large number o f captured nodes for the same reason. This 
enhancement comes at the cost o f  sensor nodes ability to know their locations.
keys(k+m=10) 5
Network size
Number of nodes captured
Fig. 56. Average number o f keys revealed under 
polynomial location-based key assignment with 
t=10.
In Fig. 53, and Fig. 56, it is shown that increasing the degree t helps in reducing the 
number o f keys revealed further in small number o f captured nodes. However, if  the 
number o f nodes captured is high, increasing t does not help much since the overlap 
between shares known by captured nodes increases significantly.
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In this thesis, we classified key management schemes in sensor networks as either static 
or dynamic based on whether the administrative keys are updated or not after network 
deployment. We proposed a new dynamic combinatorial key management scheme based 
on key polynomials and compared our scheme to existing dynamic and static schemes. 
Most existing static keying schemes tend to enhance network resilience to node capture at 
the cost o f  lower network connectivity. Dynamic keying schemes preserve connectivity 
and handle node capture through rekeying. Our proposed scheme enhances network 
resilience to capture by using key polynomials similar to Liu and Ning’s static scheme. 
We handle node capture through EBS-based key assignment and administrative key 
rekeying similar to other EBS-based dynamic schemes.
Comparing our schemes to Liu and Ning’s, our scheme was found to enhance network 
resilience to node capture at a smaller polynomial degree t and accordingly with less 
storage per node. Most notably, our scheme preserves network connectivity by using a 
smaller key pool. Compared to location-based dynamic key management schemes, our 
scheme was found to provide significantly higher network resilience to collusion at the 
low cost o f using degree t (typically 5 to 10, compared to 50 to 100 in Liu and Ning's 
scheme) key polynomials instead o f  using constant traditional keys.
Finally, we note that this work presented a preliminary comparison o f static versus 
dynamic keying. We are currently conducting a more comprehensive analysis o f various 
schemes. We are also developing a localized multi-tier EBS-based scheme for clustered 
networks.
6.3. CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we evaluated our solutions for WSNs. We started with DCK and 
compared it to existing solutions. Unlike most key pre-distribution schemes, DCK uses 
administrative and communication key refreshment and emphasizes rekeying upon node 
capture to maintain secure communications. DCK decouples key generation, assignment 
and distribution, and maintains regular key refreshment as well as handling node captures 
locally within the cluster. Simulation comparison with the EBS-based SHELL key 
management scheme show that: (1) cluster leader nodes carry the major part o f the key 
management overhead; (2) DCK consumes less than 50% of the energy consumed by
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SHELL in key management; (3) localizing key refreshment and handling node capture 
enhances the security by minimizing the amount o f  information known by each node 
about other portions o f the network; and (4) since DCK does not involve the use o f other 
clusters to maintain local cluster data, it scales better from a storage point o f view with 
the network size represented by the number o f  clusters.
Comparing our key-polynomial based schemes to static key polynomials, our scheme was 
found to enhance network resilience at a smaller polynomial degree t  and accordingly 
with less storage per node. Our scheme was preserves the network connectivity by using 
a smaller key pool. Compared to location-based dynamic key management schemes, our 
scheme was found to provide around significantly better network resilience at the cost o f  
using degree t (typically 5 to 10) key polynomials instead o f  using constant keys.
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE EXTENSIONS
In this section, we conclude this dissertation by summarizing our motivations, 
objectives, contributions, and the performance o f our proposed Key Management 
schemes. Furthermore, we discuss a list o f possible future extensions to our work in the 
context o f  key management in ad-hoc and sensor networks.
7.1. CONCLUSION
In this sub-section, we conclude our proposed key Management schemes for Ad-hoc 
and Sensor Networks. We start with Ad-hoc networks and then we follow by Sensor 
networks.
7.1.1. CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS FOR AD-HOC 
NETWORKS
In this thesis, we proposed a novel architecture for secure group communications 
in WAHNs. We claim that our architecture can readily be populated with components to 
support objectives such as fault tolerance, full-distribution and scalability to mitigate 
WAHN constraints. In our architecture, group management is integrated with multicast at 
the application layer.
We presented a comprehensive group management module, an efficient decentralized 
scheme that performs key assignment, generation, and distribution in compliance with 
this architecture. We overviewed each o f these components and showed how they meet 
the architectural objectives. We performed some analysis on the performance parameters 
o f each component separately and showed the feasibility o f  such design compared with 
existing architecture. Currently, we are integrating all the key management and group 
session management components together and define all the interaction. Our next step is 
to perform simulation experiments on such integrated group management scheme and 
compare real network parameters, such as actual delays and traffic overhead, with other 
existing key management schemes.
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We started by CKDS, in which we combined two scalable schemes to introduce an 
efficient application-level key management protocol for secure group communication in 
wireless ad-hoc networks. We used CAN for application-level multicast and EBS for key 
distribution. We assumed a centralized group controller that performs key generation and 
rekeying message construction. We introduced two new key distribution schemes, m- 
dimensional multicast and 2D multicast to deliver keys efficiently to group members in 
such an environment. We used Directed Flooding as a multicast message forwarding 
technique in our approach at individual quadrant level. We compared our scheme to using 
this type o f flooding solely to deliver keys.
Our technique achieved a significant network traffic reduction o f  almost one eighth o f  it 
in using normal application-level multicast in CAN. We compared storage requirement 
and overhead incurred on each node to GKMP. Our scheme showed better scalability and 
lower storage requirement at the cost o f  small number o f  decryptions performed by each 
individual node. We showed that selecting lower number o f keys per user, and 
accordingly higher number o f  rekeying messages, in EBS achieves better performance 
under our 2D multicast key distribution scheme. We showed our approach to be scalable 
with respect to both storage and communication. We believe this approach is suitable for 
mid size wireless ad-hoc networks with hundreds or thousands o f  users.
We presented EDKMS, an efficient decentralized scheme that performs key assignment, 
generation, and distribution without assuming trusted nodes. EDKMS is based on 
combinatorial exclusion basis systems, application-level multicast, verifiable secret 
sharing, and application-based key clustering. EDKMS offers batch re-keying with 
collusion resistance, threshold-based verifiable key generation, and scalable key 
distribution. All three functions have been rigorously analyzed. Our future work includes 
complete protocol specification and prototype implementation. An interesting prospect is 
extending our work to wireless sensor networks that are characterized by a huge number 
of sensor nodes each with limited capabilities.
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7.1.2. CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS FOR SENSOR 
NETWORKS
Key management in sensor networks raises interesting research issues. Design 
requirements for key management solutions include energy awareness, survivability and 
localization o f  attack impact given a highly vulnerable network that mainly operates 
unattended, and scalability to a large dynamic network. Administrative key pre­
distribution has been the de-facto solution with the underlying assumption that a key will 
outlive the network. Recently, dynamic schemes (with re-keying) have been proposed 
particularly for emerging long-lived sensor networks. Efficient re-keying is essential for 
these schemes to be adopted. This article showed that both static and dynamic keying 
share some basic concepts. A study o f network resilience to attacks as well as storage and 
communication overhead for both classes o f  schemes has been presented.
One major challenge to dynamic keying schemes is the need for the participation (to 
varying degrees) o f  a key management authority (usually the base station) post network 
deployment. This participation is not needed in static schemes (as there is no re-keying). 
Research is ongoing to decrease the reliance on a key management authority in dynamic 
key management schemes such as LOCK. Other notable leading and promising research 
efforts on key management in sensor networks include Ning et al at North Carolina State 
University [71], [72], Perrig et al. at Carnegie Mellon University [4], [28], Zhu et al. at 
The Pennsylvania State University [108] and Hartel et al. at the University o f  Twente 
(EYES project) [63],
We started with DCK, a modified scheme suitable for WSNs. 1) cluster leader nodes 
carry the major part o f the key management overhead; (2) DCK consumes less than 50% 
of the energy consumed by SHELL in key management; (3) localizing key refreshment 
and handling node capture enhances the security by minimizing the amount o f  
information known by each node about other portions o f the network; and (4) since DCK 
does not involve the use o f  other clusters to maintain local cluster data, it scales better 
from a storage point o f  view with the network size represented by the number o f clusters. 
Optimizing DCK parameter values for each cluster involves a tradeoff between the cost 
of evicting a captured node and the cost o f  deploying new nodes. During the lifetime o f  a
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sensor network, multiple deployments might take place to compensate for damaged, 
failed, dead or attacked sensor nodes. Currently, we are investigating the dynamic 
adaptation o f the cluster structure during the lifetime o f the network to achieve optimal 
performance. Current and future research also includes using group key polynomials for 
collusion mitigation. Our preliminary research on using group key polynomials in flat 
networks showed promising results. We are also conducting an extensive study o f static 
versus dynamic keying schemes.
Static key management schemes tend to enhance network resilience to node capture at the 
cost o f  lower network connectivity. Dynamic key management schemes preserves 
connectivity and handles node capture through rekeying using a centralized KDC. Our 
proposed scheme enhances network resilience by using key polynomials similar to static 
schemes. We handle node capture through rekeying similar to dynamic schemes.
Comparing our schemes to static key polynomials, our scheme was found to enhance 
network resilience at a smaller polynomial degree t and accordingly with less storage per 
node. Our scheme was preserves the network connectivity by using a smaller key pool. 
Compared to location-based dynamic key management schemes, our scheme was found 
to provide around significantly better network resilience at the cost o f using degree t 
(typically 5 to 10) key polynomials instead o f using constant keys.
7.2. LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBLE FUTURE EXTENSIONS
Although our solutions contribute to solving several problems, such as multiple node 
capturing, collusion, energy saving, there are several other problems that are not yet 
addressed. Our techniques do not present solutions to such problems.
The first problem is excessive mobility. In a sensor or ad-hoc network with nodes moving 
very fast, maintaining the cluster structure o f  the network with the existing or newly 
introduced cluster leaders is very complicated if  the mobility exceeds certain limits. 
Maintains a list o f  cluster nodes inside the cluster leaders that keeps changing will 
consume too much energy. Moreover, the cluster leaders will be busy marinating the 
cluster structure most o f the time. The limitation o f  mobility should be studied and new 
solutions that might involve less information maintained by the luster leaders need to be 
studied.
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One different problem is that we try to do rekeying whenever the cluster leader suspects 
that a node was captured. This might be applicable in ad-hoc networks, but not in sensor 
networks. The reason is that nodes in senor networks just go to sleep and then wake up 
frequently to maintain their limited energy. Once the cluster leader do not hear from a 
node, it assumes it was captured and proceed with rekeying even if  this node went 
temporarily to sleep. When the node wakes up, it assumes it is a new node and may rekey 
to maintain the backward secrecy. This unnecessarily rekeying consumes most o f  the 
energy in a network with limited energy such as sensor network.
One partial solution to this problem might be to ask the nodes to send a special message 
to the cluster leader when they are going to sleep and another message when they wake 
up. The energy consumed in this solution might be large but compared the energy 
consumed in doing unnecessary rekeying might be less. Although this solution might 
consume less energy, it is not scalable with respect to the number o f nodes in the cluster. 
Energy consumption and scalability needs to be studied in more details.
Currently, the base station distributes keys to nodes in initialization. Capturing a node is 
handled through other nodes with no cluster leaders involved. Capturing the cluster 
leader or the base station might give the attacker enough information to threat the 
network. Two possible solutions for this problem: The first solution is to have tamper- 
resistant nodes that erase all the information they carry once they are captured. The other 
solution is the ability o f handling node capturing in a fully distributed fashion. Without 
the involvement o f  cluster leader or base-station
Next generation sensor networks will be long-lived, highly dynamic with roaming nodes 
and multiple network replenishments to satisfy evolving QoS requirements. The attack 
profile on these networks will be more varied and complex. Research is needed on 
adaptive key management to address these new challenges. Also, it is to be noted that 
currently the presence o f an intrusion detection system is assumed by both static and 
dynamic key management schemes. Intrusion detection in sensor networks remains an 
open research area at the time o f this writing.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
151
REFERENCES
[1] I.F. I. Akyildiz, W. Su, Y. Sankarasubramaniam, and E. Cayirci, “A Survey on 
Sensor Networks11, IEEE Comm. Magazine, August, 102-114(2002).
[2] L. Al-Sulaiman. “Cashing Techniques for increasing the availability o f  Mobile 
Ad-hoc Networks Certificate Authority services”, Ph.D. Thesis, Old Dominion 
University, 2004.
[3] W. Su Akyildiz, , Y. Sankarasubramaniam, and E. Cayirci, “Wireless sensor 
networks: a survey,” Computer Networks, 38(4), pp. 393— 422, 2002.
[4] R. Anderson, H. Chan, and A. Perrig, “Key Infection: Smart Trust for Smart 
Dust,” 12th IEEE Int. Conf. Network Protocols (ICNP'04), 2004, pp. 206-212.
[5] Koichiro Ban and others, “Wireless Ad-hoc Networks Project”, National 
Institute o f Standardization and Technology (NIST), 
http://www.antd.nist.gov/wctg/manet/.
[6] J. Binder, J. King, K. Mooney, and M. Wilkinson, “A  Lightweight Security 
Paradigm for Ad-hoc Wireless Networks”, January 30, 2003.
[7] G. R. Blakley. “Safeguarding Cryptographic Keys”. Proceedings o f  AFIPS 
1979 National Computer Conference, Vol. 48, pp. 313-317, 1979.
[8] C. Blundo, A. De Santis, A. Elerzberg, S. Kutten, U. Vaccaro, and M. Yung, 
“Perfectly-secure key distribution for dynamic conferences”, In Advances in 
Cryptology -  CRYPTO ’92, LNCS 740, pp 471-486, 1993.
[9] B. Bhargav, X. Wu, Y. Lu, and W. Wang. “Integrating Heterogeneous 
Wireless Technologies: A  Cellular Aided Mobile Ad-hoc Network (CAMA)," 
MONET Special Issue on Integration Heterogeneous Wireless Technologies
2004.
[10] E. Bommaiah, M. Liu, A. MvAuley, and R. Talpade. “AMRoute: Ad-hoc 
Multicast Routing Protocol”, Internet Draft, draft-manet-amroute-00.txt.
[11] M. Brown, D. Cheung, D. Hankerson, J. Hernandez, M. Kirkup, and A. 
Menezes. “PGP in Constrained Wireless Devices” In 9th USENIX Security 
Symposium, pp 247261, August 2000.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
152
[12] R. Canetti, T. Malkin, and K. Nissim. “Efficient communication-storage 
tradeoffs for multicast encryption.” in Advances in Cryptology- EUROCRYPT 
'99, J. Stem, Ed. Lectures Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1599. Springer- 
Verlag, New York, pp. 459-474, 1999.
[13] D. Carman, P. Kruus, and B. Matt. “Constraints and Approaches for 
Distributed Sensor Network Security.” NAI Labs Technical Report, 2000.
[14] M. Chorzempa, J. M. Park, and M. Eltoweissy, “SECK: Survivable and 
Efficient Keying in Wireless Sensor Networks,” IEEE Workshop on 
Information Assurance in Wireless Sensor Networks, WSNIA’2005, April
2005.
[15] C. Cordeiro, H. Gossain, and D. Agrawal, “Multicast over Wireless Mobile 
Ad-hoc Networks: Present and Future Directions”, IEEE Network, 
January/February 2003, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 52-59.
[16] H. Chan, A. Perrig, and D. Song, “Random Key Pre-distribution Schemes for 
Sensor Networks,” Proc. IEEE Security and Privacy Symposium (ISPS’2003), 
2003, pp. 197-213.
[17] H. Chan, A. Perrig, and D. Song. “Random key predistribution schemes for 
sensor networks.” In IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, 
2003.
[18] Chang, R. Engel, D. Kandlur, D. Pendarakis, and D. Saha. "Key management 
for secure internet multicast using boolean function minimization techniques," 
in Proceedings o f  Infocom'99, (New York), IEEE, March 1999.
[19] Y. Chawathe, S. McCanne, and E. A. Brewer. “RMX: Reliable multicast for 
heterogeneous networks.” In Proceedings o f IEEE Infocom, pp 795-804, 2000.
[20] Y. Chu, S. G. Rao, and H. Zhang. “A Case for End System Multicast.” In 
ACM Sigmetrics 2000, Santa Clara, California, USA, 2000.
[21] C. M. Cordeiro and D. P. Agrawal, “Mobile Ad-hoc Networking”, 
Tutorial/Short Course in 20 th Brazilian Symposium on Computer Networks, 
pp. 125-186, May 2002.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
153
[22] S. Corson, J. Macker, RFC 2501 -  “Mobile Ad-hoc Networking (MANET) 
Routing Protocol Performance Issues and Evaluation considerations”, Network 
Working Group, RFC 2501.
[23] H. Deng, W. Li, and Dharma P. Agrawal. “Routing Security in Ad-hoc 
Networks.” IEEE Communications Magazine, Special Topics on Security in 
Telecommunication Networks, Vol. 40 No. 10, October 2002.
[24] L. Dondeti, S. Mukheijee, and A. Samal. “Scalable secure one-to-many group 
communication using dual encryption.” Computer Communications Vol. 23, 
No. 17, Nov. 1999, 1681-1701.
[25] W. Du, J. Deng, Y. S. Han, P. K. Varshney, “A Pairwise Key Pre-distribution 
Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks,” Proceedings o f the 10th ACM 
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’03), 
Washington D.C., October 2003.
[26] H. Deshpande, M. Bawa, and H. Garcia-Molina. “Streaming live media over a 
peer-to-peer network.” Technical Report 2001-30, Stanford University 
(Computer Science Dept.), June 2001.
[27] C. Diot, B. N. Levine, B. Lyles, H. Kassem, and D. Balensiefen. “Deployment 
issues for the IP multicast service and architecture”, IEEE Network Magazine, 
2000 .
[28] W. Du, J. Deng, Y. S. Han, S. Chen, and P. Varshney, “A Key Management 
Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Using Deployment Knowledge,” Proc. 
o f IEEE INFOCOM’04, March 2004.
[29] B. Dutertre, S. Cheung, J. Levy, “Lightweight Key Management in Wireless 
Sensor Networks by Leveraging Initial Trust”, SDL Technical Report SRI- 
SDL-04-02, April 6, 2004.
[30] M. Eltoweissy, H. Heydari, L. Morales, H. Sadborough., “Combinatorial 
Optimization o f Key Management in Group Communications,” J. Network and 
Systems Management: Special Issue on Network Security, March 2004, p. 
332b.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of  the  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited w ithout perm iss ion .
154
[31] M. Eltoweissy, M. Younis and K. Ghumman, “Lightweight Multi-Granularity 
Key Management for Secure Wireless Sensor Networks,” in the Proceedings 
o f  the IEEE Workshop on Multi-hop Wireless Networks (MWN’04), Phoenix, 
Arizona, April 2004.
[32] M. Eltoweissy, A. Wadaa, S. Olariu, and L. Wilson, “Group Key Management 
Scheme for Large-Scale Wireless Sensor Network,” J. Ad-Hoc Networks, 
September 2005, pp. 796-802.
[33] M. Eltoweissy, M. Moharram, and R. Mukkamala, “Dynamic Key 
Management in Sensor Networks,” IEEE Communications, April 2006.
[34] D. Eastlake, P. Jones, “US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1),” RFC 3174, 
IETF, September 2001.
[35] L. Eschenauer and V. Gligor, “A Key Management Scheme for Distributed 
Sensor Networks,” in the Proceedings o f the 9th ACM Conference on 
Computing and Communication Security, November 2002.
[36] D. Estrin, R. Govindan, J. Heidemann, and S. Kumar, “Next century 
challenges: Scalable coordination in sensor networks,” in the Proceedings of 
the 5th IEEE/ACM Annual Conference on Mobile Computing and Networks 
(MobiCOM'99), Seattle, WA, August 1999.
[37] F. Farhmand, S. Navathe, G. Sharp, and P. Enslow, “Managing Vulnerabilities 
of Information Systems to Security Incidents.”, College o f Computing Georgia 
Institute o f technology.
[38] P. Francis, Yoid: “Extending the Internet multicast architecture”, April 2000. 
http://www.aciri.org/yoid/docs/index.html.
[39] P. Gemmell, “An introduction to threshold cryptography”, CryptoBytes 
Technical Newsletter, Volume 2, No. 3 - Winter 1997, RSA Laboratories.
[40] R. Gennaro, Y. Ishai, E. Kushilevitz, and T. Rabin. “The Round Complexity of 
Verifiable Secret Sharing and Secure Multicast”, ACM Symposium on Theory 
o f Computing 2000.
[41] S. Ghanem, Logical Key Hierarchy Maintenance and Rekey Protocols, Ph.D. 
Thesis, Computer Science Department, Old Dominion University.2004.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
155
[42] R. Gennaro, M. O. Rabin, and T. Rabin. “Simplified VSS and fast-track 
multiparty computations with applications to threshold cryptography.” In Proc. 
of 17th PODC, 1998.
[43] S. Ghanem and H. Abdel-Wahab, “A Secure Group Key Management 
Framework: Design and Rekey Issues,” Proc. IEEE Symposium on Computers 
and Communications (ISCC'2003), 2003.
[44] C. Gui, and P. Mohapatra. “Efficient Overlay Multicast for Mobile Ad-hoc 
Networks,” IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference 
(WCNC), New Orleans, LA, March 2003.
[45] G. Gaubatz, J. Kaps, and B. Sunar, “Public Key Cryptography in Sensor 
Networks” - Revisited. ESAS 2004: 2-18.
[46] G. Gupta and M. Younis, “Load-Balanced Clustering in Wireless Sensor
Networks,” in the Proceedings o f the International Conference on
Communication (ICC 2003), Anchorage, Alaska, May 2003.
[47] G. Gupta and M. Younis, “Fault-Tolerant Clustering o f Wireless Sensor 
Networks,” in the Proceedings o f the IEEE Wireless Communication and 
Networks Conference (WCNC 2003), New Orleans, Louisiana, March 2003.
[48] Z. Haas, et al., "Wireless Ad-hoc Networks, Encyclopedia of
Telecommunications,” J. Proakis, editor, John Wiley, 2002
[49] H. Harney and C. Muckenhim. “Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP) 
Specification.” RFC 2093, 1997.
[50] Z. J. Haas, et a.i., ’’Wireless Ad-hoc Networks,Encyclopedia of
Telecommunications”, John Proakis, editor, John Wiley, 2002.
[51] D. Harris and D. Pepelko, “Security in Wireless Ad-hoc Networks,” JMU 
technical report, 2003.
[52] M. Horton, et al., “Mica: The commercialization o f microsensor motes,” 
Sensors Online Magazine, April 2002.
[53] J. Jannotti, D. K. Gifford, K. L. Johnson, M. F. Kaashoek, and J. O’Toole. 
“Overcast Reliable multicasting with an overlay network”. In Proceedings of 
the Fourth Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, pp 
197-212, San Diego, CA, October 2000. USENIX Association.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of  th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
156
[54] S. Jajodia, R. Mukkamala, M. Eltoweissy, “Secure multicast for mobile 
commerce applications: Issues and challenges”, in Advances in Security and 
Payment Methods for Mobile Commerce, Wen-Chen Chu (Editor), Springer- 
Verlag, 2004.
[55] IETF Multicast Security (MSEC) Working Group 
http://www.securemuticast.org
[56] G. Jolly, M. Kuscu, P. Kokate, and M. Younis, “A Low-Energy Key 
Management Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks,” Proc. the IEEE 
Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC'2003), June 2003, p. 
335.
[57] D. Johnson, D. Maltz, and Y. Hu. “The Dynamic Source Routing Protocol for 
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (DSR)”, IETF MANET Working Group Internet- 
Draft, April 2003, http://www.ietf.org/intemet-drafts/draft-ietf-manet-dsr- 
09.txt
[58] K. Jones, A.Wadaa, S. Olariu, L. Wilson, and M. Eltoweissy, “Towards a New  
Paradigm for Securing Wireless Sensor Networks,” NSPW 2003, August 18th 
- 21st, 2003. Ascona, Switzerland, Proceedings New Security Paradigms 
Workshop 2003, pp 115-122.
[59] G. Judge and F. Takawira. “Spread-sprectrum CDMA packet radio MAC 
protocol using channel overload detection and blocking”, ACM Wireless 
Networks Volume 6 , Issue 6,December 2000, pp.: 467 - 479
[60] R. H. Katz, J. M. Kahn and K. S. J. Pister, “Mobile Networking for Smart 
Dust,” in the Proceedings o f  the 5th Annual ACM/IEEE International 
Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking (MobiCom’99), Seattle, 
WA, August 1999.
[61] J. Kohl and B. Neuman, “The Kerberos Network Authentication Service 
(V5)”. RFC 1510, September 1993.
[62] K. Langendoen and N. Reijers, “Distributed Localization in Wireless Sensor 
Networks: A Quantitative Comparison,” Computer Networks (Elsevier), 
special issue on Wireless Sensor Networks, August 2003.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
157
[63] Y. W. Law, “Key Management and Link-layer Security o f  Wireless Sensor 
Networks: Energy-Efficient Attack and Defense,” PhD thesis, CTIT Ph.D.- 
thesis Series 05-75, Univ. ofTwente, December 2005.
[64] S. Lee, M. Gerla, and C. Chiang. “On-Demand Multicast Routing Protocol”, 
IEEE WCNC'99, New Orleans, LA, September 1999, pp.1298-1304.
[65] X. Li, R. Yang, M. Gouda, and S. Lam, “Batch rekeying for secure group 
communications”, Proc. Tenth International World Wide Web Conf., pp. 525- 
534, 2001.
[66] J. Liebeherr and T. K. Beam, “HyperCast: A Protocol for Maintaining 
Multicast Group Members” in a Logical Hypercube Topology. Proc. First 
International Workshop on Networked Group Communication (NGC ’99), in: 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1736, pp. 72-89, 1999.
[67] J. Liebeherr, M. Nahas, and W. Si, "Application-layer multicasting with 
delaunay triangulation overlays", IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun., vol. 20, pp. 
1472-1488, Oct. 2002.
[68] C. Lin and M. Gerla, “Adaptive clustering for mobile wireless networks”, in 
the Proceedings o f the IEEE Journal on Selected Areas o f  Communications, 
Vol. 15, No. 7, 1997.
[69] G. Lin and G. Noubir. “Multicast over Multihop Wireless Ad-hoc Networks, 
MADNET: Workshop on Mobile Ad-hoc Networking and Computing”, 
Sophia-Antipolis, France March, 2003.
[70] D. Liu and P. Ning, “Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor 
networks," in the Proceedings o f the ACM Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security (CCS '03), pp 52—61, 2003.
[71] D. Liu and P. Ning, “Improving Key Pre-Distribution with Deployment 
Knowledge in Static Sensor Networks,” ACM  Trans, on Sensor Networks 
(TOSN), 2005. p p  204 - 239.
[72] D. Liu, P. Ning, and Wenliang Du, “Group-Based Key Pre-Distribution in 
Wireless Sensor Networks,” Proc. o f  2005 ACM  Workshop on Wireless 
Security (WiSe 2005), Sept. 2005, pp. 11-20.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
158
[73] G. Lin and G. Noubir. “Secure Multicast over Multihop Wireless Ad-hoc 
Networks”, MADNET: Workshop on Mobile Ad-hoc Networking and 
Computing, Sophia-Antipolis, France March, 2003.
[74] P. McDaniel, A. Prakash, and P. Heneyman. “Antigone: A flexible framework 
for secure group communication.”, In Proceedings o f the 8th USENIX Security 
Symposium. (Washington, D.C. Aug. 1997.). 99-114.
[75] D. McGrew and A. Sherman. “Key establishment in large dynamic groups 
using oneway function trees.” Tech. Rep. No. 0755 (May), TIS Labs at 
Network Associates, Inc., Glenwood, Md, 1998.
[76] R. Min, et al., “Low Power Wireless Sensor Networks,” in the Proceedings o f  
International Conference on VLSI Design, Bangalore, India, January 2001.
[77] C. Mitchell and F. Piper. “Key Storage in Secure Networks.”, Discrete Applied 
Mathematics. Col. 21(1988). pp 215-228.
[78] S. Mittra, “Iolus: A framework for scalable secure multicasting.” In 
Proceedings o f the ACM SIGCOMM. Vol. 27, 4 (New York, Sept. 1997) 
ACM, New York, pp. 277-288.
[79] M. Moharrum, R. Mukkamala, and M. Eltoweissy. “Efficient Secure Multicast 
with Well-Populated Multicast Key Trees”, The Tenth International 
Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems, ICPADS 2004, Newport 
beach CA.
[80] M. Moharrum, R. Mukkamala, and M. Eltoweissy. “CKDS: An Efficient 
Combinatorial Key Distribution Scheme For Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks”, 
International Performance Computing and Communications Conference, 
IPCCC 2004, Phoenix, Arizona.
[81] M. Moharrum, R. Mukkamala, and M. Eltoweissy. “TKGS: Verifiable 
Threshold-Based Key Generation Scheme in Open Wireless Ad-hoc 
Networks”, the Thirteenth International Cconference on Computer, 
Communications and Networks (ICCCN 2004).
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
159
[82] M. Moharram, R. Mukkamala, and M. Eltoweissy, “Efficient Secure Multicast 
Communications with Well-balanced Dynamic Key Trees,” IEEE 
International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS 2004), 
July 2004.
[83] M. Moharrum and M. Eltoweissy. “Key Management Schemes in Sensor 
Networks: dynamic versus static keying.” ACM Workshop on performance 
evaluation o f Wireless Ad-hoc, Sensor and Ubiquitous Networks (PE-WASUN 
2005), Montreal, Candas, October 2005.
[84] C. de Morais Cordeiro, H. Gossain, and D. Agrawal, “Multicast over Wireless 
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks: Present and Future Directions”, IEEE Network, 
January/February 2003, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 52-59.
[85] R. Mukkamala, M. Moharrum, and M. Eltoweissy, “A Novel Architecture for 
Secure Group Communication in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks with 
Application-Level Multicast”, in the Proceedings o f Workshop on Trusted 
Internet, Bangalore, India, December 2004.
[86] R. Needham and M. Schroeder, “Using Encryption for Authentication in Large 
Networks o f Computers”. Communications o f the ACM Vol. 21, No. 12, pp. 
993-999,1978.
[87] S. Olariu, A. Wadaa, L. Wilson, and M. Eltoweissy, “Wireless sensor networks 
- Leveraging the Virtual Infrastructure”, IEEE Network, August 2004.
[88] D. Otway and O. Rees, “Efficient and Timely Mutual Authentication”, 
Operating Systems Review, 21 (1987), 8-10.
[89] J. Pegon and M. Subbarao. “Simulation Framework for a Mobile Ad-hoc 
Network”, Proc. ofOPNETWORK1999, Washington DC., Sept. 1999.
[90] C. Perkins and E. Royer, “Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing”, 
Second IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications, 
pp.90-100, Februaiy 1999
[91] C. Perkins, “Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing”, Nokia 
Research Center E. Belding-Royer, University o f  California, 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3561.txt.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
160
[92] A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, V. Wen, D. Culler, and J. Tygar. “SPINS: Security 
Protocols for Sensor Networks.” In Seventh Annual ACM International 
Conference on Mobile Computing and Networks(Mobicom 2001), Rome Italy, 
July 2001.
[93] A. Perrig, R. Canetti, D. Song, and J. D. Tygar. “Efficient and Secure Source 
Authentication for Multicast”, Network and Distributed System Security 
Symposium, NDSS’01, Feb. 2001.
[94] A. Perrig, D. Song, and D. Tygar. “ELK, a new protocol for efficient large- 
group key distribution,” in: Proceedings o f the IEEE Security and Privacy 
Symposium 2001, May 2001
[95] A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, V. Wen, D. Culler, and J. Tygar, “SPINS: Security 
Protocols for Sensor Networks”, Wireless Networks Journal (WINE), 
September 2002.
[96] A. Perrig and H. Chan, “PIKE: Peer Intermediaries for Key Establishment in 
Sensor Networks.”, IEEE Infocom 2005.
[97] G. J. Pottie and W. J. Kaiser, “Wireless integrated network sensors,” 
Communications o f  the ACM, 43(5), pp. 51—58, 2000.
[98] S. Rafaeli and D. Hutchison. “A survey o f key management for secure group 
communication”, ACM Computing Surveys, Volume 35, Issue 3 , Pages: 309 
- 3 2 9 ,2 0 0 3 .
[99] S. Ratnasamy, M. Handley, R. Karp, and S. Shenker. “Application-level 
multicast using content-addressable networks”, In Proceedings o f Third 
International Workshop on Networked Group Communication (NGC '01), 
London, England, 2001.
[100] E. Royer and C. Perkins. “Multicast Operation o f the Ad-hoc On-Demand 
Distance Vector Routing Protocol”, Proceedings of the 5th Annual ACM/IEEE 
International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking 
(MOBICOM'99), Seattle, WA, USA, August 1999, pages 207-218.
[101] J. Rabaey, M. Ammer, J. Silva Jr., D. Patel, and S. Roundy, “PicoRadio 
supports ad-hoc ultra low power wireless networking,” IEEE Computer, 33(7), 
pp. 42— 48, 2000.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
161
[102] R. Rivest, “The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm”, RFC 1320, MIT and RSA 
Data Security, Inc., April 1992.
[103] S. Setia, S. Zhu, and S. Jajodia. “A Comparative Performance Analysis o f  
Reliable Group Rekey Transport Protocols for Secure Multicast”, In 
Performance Evaluation, special issue Proceedings o f Performance 2002, 
Rome, Italy, Sep., 2002.
[104] K. Sohrabi, J. Gao, V. Ailawadhi, and G.J. Pottie, “Protocols for self­
organization o f  a wireless sensor network,” IEEE Personal Comm., 7(5), pp. 
16-27  2000.
[105] A. Shamir. “How to Share a Secret”. Communications o f  the ACM, 
22[11]:612- 613, November 1979.
[106] M. Srivastava. “Power Considerations for Sensor Networks”, Collaborative 
Signal Processing Workshop January 14-16, 2001 Xerox PARC, Palo Alto, 
CA.
[107] J. Tavemier and M. Eltoweissy, “Effects o f  Keying Protocols on In-Network 
Processing in Wireless Sensor Networks,” in the Proceedings o f the IEEE 
Workshop on Algorithms for Wireless and Mobile Networks (A-SWAN 2004), 
Boston, August 2004.
[108] P. Traynor, H. Choi, G. Cao, S. Zhu, and T. La Porta, “Establishing Pair-wise 
Keys fo r  Heterogeneous Sensor Networks, ” Technical Report, The 
Pennsylvania State University, 2004.
[109] S. Tilak, N. B. Abu-Ghazaleh, and W. Heinzelman, “A taxonomy o f wireless 
microsensor network models,” ACM Mobile Computing and Communication 
Review (MC2R), 6(2), pp. 1— 8, 2002.
[110] A. Wadaa, S. Olariu, L. Wilson, M. Eltoweissy, and K. Jones, “Training a 
Sensor Network”, Mobile Networks and Applications (MONET), June 2004
[111] A. Wadaa, S. Olariu, L. Wilson, and M. Eltoweissy. “WiSe: A Group Key 
Management Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks”, IEEE Mediterranean 
Electro-technical Conference, Croatia , May 2004.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
162
[112] M. Waldvogel, G. Caronni, D. Sun, N. Weiler, and B. Plattner. “The VersaKey 
framework: Versatile group key management”. IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 
(Special Issue on Middleware) Vol. 17, No. 9, Aug.1999, 1614-1631.
[113] D. Wallner, E. Harder, and R. Agee. “Key Management for Multicast: Issues 
and Architectures”. RFC 2627, 1999.
[114] A. Wander, N. Gura, H. Eberle, V. Gupta, and S. Shantz. “Energy Analysis o f  
Public-Key Cryptography for Wireless Sensor Networks”, Third IEEE 
International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications 
(PERCOM'05).
[115] P. Wing and B. O'Higgins. “Using Public-Key Infrastructures for Security and 
Risk Management”. IEEE Communications Magazine vol. 37 No.9 Sept. 1999, 
pp. 71-83.
[116] C. Wong, M. Gouda, and S. Lam. “Secure group communications using key 
graphs”. IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw. 8, 1 (Feb. 2000), 16-30.
[117] J. Xie, R. Talpade, A. Mcauley, and M. Liu. “AMRoute: ad-hoc multicast 
routing protocol” , ACM Mobile Networks and Applications, Volume 7, Issue 
6, December 2002
[118] Y. Yang, X. Li, X. Zhang, and S. Lam, ’’Reliable group rekeying: a 
performance analysis”. SIGCOMM 2001: 27-38
[119] A. Yasinsac, V. Thakur, S. Carter, and I. Cubukcu. “A Family o f  Protocols for 
Group Key Generation in Ad-hoc Networks” Proceedings o f the IASTED 
International Conference on Communications and Computer Networks 
(CCN02), Nov 3-4, 2002
[120] R. Yavatkar, J. Friffioen, and M. Sudan. “A Reliable Dissemination Protocol 
for Interactive Collaborative Applications.” In: ACM Multimedia 1995, pp. 
333-343. November 1995.
[121] M. Younis, M. Youssef, and K. Arisha, “Energy-Aware management in 
Cluster-Based Sensor Networks,” Computer Networks, Vol. 43, No. 5, pp. 
649-668, December 2003.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
163
[122] M. Younis, K. Ghumman, and M. Eltoweissy, “Efficient Location-aware Key 
management in Wireless Sensor Networks”, Virginia Tech. Technical Report, 
March 2005.
[123] M. Younis, K. Ghumman, and M. Eltoweissy, “Location-aware Combinatorial 
Key Management Scheme for Clustered Sensor Networks,” IEEE Transactions 
on Parallel and Distributed Systems, 2006.
[124] M. Younis, K. Ghumman, and M. Eltoweissy, “Key Management in Wireless 
Ad-hoc Networks: Collusion Analysis and Prevention,” IEEE (IPCCC’05), 
Phoenix, Arizona, April 2005.
[125] A. Youssef, A. Agrawala, and M. Younis, “Accurate Anchor-Free Localization 
in Wireless Sensor Networks,” in the Proceedings o f the 1st IEEE Workshop 
on Information Assurance in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNIA 2005), 
Phoenix, Arizona, April 7-9, 2005.
[126] S. Yi and R. Kravets. “MOCA, a MObile Certification Authority for wireless 
networks”, proceedings o f the 2nd Annual PKI research workshop, NIST 2003.
[127] O. Younis and S. Fahmy, “HEED: A Hybrid, Energy-Efficient, Distributed 
Clustering Approach for Ad-hoc Sensor Networks,” IEEE Trans, on Mobile 
Computing, Vol. 3, No.4, pp. 366- 379, Oct.-Dec. 2004.
[128] X. Zhang, S. Lam, D. Lee, and Y. Yang. “Protocol Design for Scalable and 
Reliable Group Rekeying” In IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 
December 2003.
[129] W. Zhang and G. Cao, "Group Rekeying for Filtering False Data in Sensor 
Networks: A Predistribution and Local Collaboration-Based Approach," IEEE 
INFOCOM, March 2005.
[130] L. Zhou and Z. Haas. Securing Ad-hoc Networks. IEEE Networks, Special 
Issue on Network Security. November/December, 1999
[131] L. Zhou, F. Schneider, and R. Renesse. “COCA: A Secure Distributed On-line 
Certification Authority”. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems 20, 4 
(November 2002), 329—368. Earlier version: Technical Report TR 2000-1828, 
December 7, 2000.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
164
[132] S. Zhu, S. Xu, S. Setia, and S. Jajodia, “Establishing pair-wise keys for secure 
communication networks: a probabilistic approach,” Proc. 11th IEEE 
International Conference on Network Protocols, Atlanta, Georgia, November 
4-7, 2003
[133] S. Zhu and A. Chan. “Optimal Tree Structure for Key Management o f  
Simultaneous Join/Leave in Secure Multicast,” to appear in MILCOM 2004 
Military Communications Conference, Monterey, CA.
[134] S. Zhu, S. Setia, and S. Jajodia. “LEAP: Efficient security mechanisms for 
large-scale distributed sensor networks”, Proc. 10th ACM Conf. On Computer 
and Communications Security, Washington, DC, October 27-31, 2003, pages 
62-72.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
APPENDIX A 
INITIALIZATION PROCEDURE AND INFORMATION KEPT BY 
EACH NODE IN DCK












s b ,  s c
3- Generate kb+mb Keys using 
KGFb(Sb, K0h)
8 -  K j(ID .loc) CLj
11- Generate kCi+mct Keys using 
KGFC(SC, Kf),  purge ma keys
12-Purge the EBSC, matrix except 
node’s own key row
14- Purge K *
kd bit EBSC; Key string 
K o . . .  K kcb kci E B S  keys 






3- Generate kb+mb Keys using 
KGFb(Sb, Ko)
8 -  K j(ID ,loc) -> CK
11- Generate kCi+mct Keys using 
KGFc(Sa K,c), purge mci keys
12-Purge the EBScj matrix except 
node’s own key string
14- Purge Kj*
kci bit EBSC; Key string 
K o . . .  Kkd'. kci EBS keys 
K j: current shared key 
with BS




I-K a -  KGFb(Sb,0)
Ksb(ID, loc)->BS
3- Generate kb+mb Keys using 
KGF„(Sb, K0b)
4- According to the key string, 
purge mb keys
7- K * ( K j ,  KS(CL,))) A  All 
Sensor Nodes
9- Determine N f  and compute kci% 
mcb E B S Ci Matrix, and selects the 
KGNs
10- KSJ  (kb,mb, Kj.KGNs, key 
assignment) - >  All Sensor Nodes
I I -  Generate kci+mCi Keys using 
KGFC(SC, Kf),  purge mci keys 
13- Ksc'(Kj) ->All Sensor nodes
K b bit EBSbKey string 
ka bit EBScj Key string 
Nci Ids (and locations)
A chain o f  t future 
encrypted BS keys
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2-D eterm ine  N b, a n d  co m pu te  h  
and,m i,
3 -  Ksb(kb,m b,K 0b)-»  All Nodes
5-For each cluster i, generate Ksc', 
and { K j }  chain o f  t  keys starting 
with K i  = K-, , one o f  the keys 
purged by C L ,
6- Ko K,.. K bc( { K l } ,K j .K , '(  K j ,  
K S ( C .L j) ) )  CLi, for each CL,.. 
with Ko K j. .  K bc the EBSb keys 
known to CL,
EBSb matrix and keys 
Current shared session  
key with each cluster i
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APPENDIX B 
MATHEMATICAL PROOFS OF USED FORMULAS 
Lemma 0:
For integers m, n > 0, and arbitrary integers r,s, The following holds:
i(T>n/ \r+i J \s+ iJ  \n-r+sy
Proof:
The classic combinatorial correlations states that:
n+m
A combinatorial justification for combinatorial correlation goes as follows: We have 
a population o f n men and m women and want to select a committee o f  r+s people 
such that at least r members are men and at least s members are women. The seen in 
the left hand side and the excursion in the right hand side are two alternate ways o f  
expressing the details o f the committee that can be formed.
We can write:
Where s’=m-s.
By combinatorial correlation, the last term in the above expression can be written as:
m+n m+nm+n m+n
^r+m-(r-m+s);r+s' r+m-s
As claimed above in Lemma 0.
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Corollary 0:
For all integers m, n > 0,
n \ (  m \  (  n+m
Corollary 1:
If k=0; s= -l, Then:
n \ {  m \  f  n+m
Z .  A , vi V » - l
Lemma 1:
For all integers m, k > 0 ,




( i - l ) ! ( ( * - l ) - ( / - l ) ) !  
Using the above formula




By coronary 1, the right hand side can be written as
n + k - ] \  f  m+k- 1
k \  = *
n—i )  V, k
As claimed above in Lemma 1.
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Theorem 1:
m in {£ ,/n }
I
Proof:
The summation can be written as:
fm ' k 2 fm  + k']I +’ ii 1 +
J y m + k [k  )
i= 0
'm Y k '
( k ~ i + \ ) = Y J . . (* - /+ i)=(^+ix i;
\ i j
'm ' ( £
- s
' m ( k \
J  y J y i J  y
o






( k - i  + l) = (k + \)\
m + k
- k
m + k - 1
'm + k - l ' m 'm + k''
, k m + k Kk  y
, then the above expression becomes
'm + k'' km 'm + k' km 'm + k' k 2 'm + k'
— k + 1 — 1 + --------
k + m , k  , m + k t  , m + k t  y
As claimed above in Theorem 1.
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